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ABSTRACT 
 
Mitigating Anti-Americanism in Turkey through Public Diplomacy 
 
Watson, Forrest 
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
June 2007 
 
 
Record-high anti-Americanism in Turkey goes deeper than the ongoing Iraq War. The 
build-up to and aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Turkey’s neighbor ignited pre-
existing sensitivities in Turkey due to its past relations with America and its own 
identity issues and fears. Turkey views the U.S. through the lenses of 1) an 
exaggerated view of American agency coupled with mistrust and 2) a reactionary 
phobia about threats to undermine the Turkish Republic. Seen through theses lenses, 
anti-Americanism is driven by a perception that America is supporting 1) Kurdish 
self-determination, which will lead to the eventual dismemberment of Turkey and 2) 
political Islam as a part of its broader plan for Middle East politics, which threatens to 
erode Turkey’s secular state.  
 
Because anti-Americanism is mostly based on distorted perceptions caused by the 
lenses, public diplomacy is an effective tool that should be utilized by the U.S. to 
bring about understanding with the Turkish public. If the politically-rooted anti-
Americanism in Turkey continues, it will solidify into a view of the U.S. as a 
threatening power, squandering Turks’ natural affection for Americans.  
 
U.S. public diplomacy for Turkey can be improved by Washington and the U.S. 
Embassy in Ankara by acting from an understanding of the uniqueness of Turkey and 
the reasons that drive its anti-Americanism. Reinvigorated public diplomacy offers 
hope for strengthening a relationship that is in the best interests of both Turkey and 
America. 
 
 
 
Keywords: anti-Americanism, public diplomacy, U.S. Embassy, U.S.-Turkey 
relations, Turkish identity, Kurdish issue, political Islam 
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ÖZET 
 
Türkiye’deki Amerika Karşıtlığının Kamu Diplomasisi ile Azaltılması 
 
Watson, Forrest 
Uluslararası Đlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
Haziran 2007 
 
 
Türkiye’de Amerikan karşıtlığının şimdiye kadarki en yüksek seviyeye çıkmasının, şu 
an Irak’ta devam eden savaşın dışında, daha derin sebepleri vardır. Komşusu Irak’ın 
işgaline giden süreç ve işgalin kendisi, Türkiye’nin hassas olduğu konular 
bağlamında, ülke içinde rahatsızlık yaratmıştır. Türkiye’nin adı geçen 
“hassasiyetleri”, eskiden beri mevcut olan ve ABD ile ilişkilerinin tarihsel arka planı 
ve kendi kimlik kaygıları etrafında oluşmuştur. Türkiye, ABD hakkında iki ayrı 
“mercek”ten bakarak hüküm vermektedir: 1) ABD’nin güvenilmez bir ülke olduğu 
kanaatiyle beraber gücünün ve nüfuzunun fazlaca abartılması 2) Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti’nin “bir takım güçler” tarafından altının kazılmakta olduğuna dair süre 
giden fobi. Bu merceklerden oluşan görüntüde, Amerikan karşıtlığı iki algı etrafında 
yürümektedir: 1) ABD’nin Kürtlerin kendi kendilerini yönetmesi fikrine desteği ve bu 
yöndeki siyasetinin Türkiye’yi parçalayacağı 2) Siyasal Đslâm’ın, Amerika’nın Orta 
Doğu için tasarladığı “büyük planı”nın bir parçası olduğu ve Türkiye’de laik devleti 
tehdit ettiği.  
 
Amerikan karşıtlığının başlıca nedenleri, bahsedilen iki mercekten edinilen eksik ya 
da hatalı bilgilere dayalı kanaatler olduğundan, kamu diplomasisi, ABD’nin ve Türk 
kamuoyu’nun aynı düzleme gelip, birbirini anlamasını sağlamada etkili bir araç olarak 
kullanılmalıdır. Eğer Türkiye’de politik bir duruş olarak benimsenen Amerikan 
karşıtlığı şu anki gibi devam ederse, ABD’nin tehditkâr bir güç olarak algılanması 
kesinleşecek ve Türklerin, Amerikalılara doğal olarak duydukları yakınlığı ortadan 
kaldıracaktır.  
 
ABD’nin Türkiye’de yürüteceği kamu diplomasisinin etkinliği, Washington’dan ve 
ABD’nin Ankara elçiliği aracılığıyla, ancak Türkiye’nin bir benzerinin olmadığı 
hesap edilerek ve Türkiye’deki Amerikan karşıtlığının amillerinin anlaşılması 
koşulları altında geliştirilebilir. Canlı bir şekilde yürütülecek kamu diplomasisi, 
Türkiye ve Amerika’nın çıkarlarına en çok uyanı, yani kuvvetli ve yakın ilişkileri vaat 
etmektedir.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika karşıtlığı, kamu diplomasisi, ABD Büyükelçiliği, 
ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri, Türk kimliği, Kürt meselesi, siyasal Đslam  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 It was reading a Joseph Nye article with highlights of his ideas about soft 
power that I was first drawn to the topic of U.S. public diplomacy.1 I was struck by 
the statistics he cited of a fraction of one percent of the amount the U.S. spends on its 
military being invested in its public diplomacy efforts. Although I always considered 
myself to be a supporter of a strong military, this disparity in allocation of resources 
grabbed my intention. After reading Nye’s Soft Power2 and living in Turkey, 
surrounded by rising anti-Americanism, I was drawn to study what the United States 
can do through soft power to salvage the situation in the Middle East. The powerful 
U.S. military has seemed helpless to restore order in the tumultuous region.  
The U.S. is currently struggling to find its way in how to use its power for 
positive results rather than stirring more trouble than it can solve. With its power to 
influence every region of the world, the U.S. should pay attention to the concerns of 
the people it is influencing. Although the U.S. should not act based on anti-
Americanism, it must seriously evaluate the cost of built-up resistance to its 
leadership.  
   
                                                 
1
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “The Decline of American Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004). 
2
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
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 I feel I have something to write on the subject because I have lived the last two 
years in Turkey as a nonprofessional practitioner of public diplomacy in representing 
my country.  Living in the dorm, spending every day among Turks, still working to 
learn their language, I believe I have an important vantage point of Turkish-American 
relations.  I have experienced the shattering of stereotypes about Americans, just as I 
have spent time drinking çay being blasted with reasons, sometimes thought-
provoking, sometimes mostly vented anger, about the reasons why America is 
resented.   
 At times I despair about the magnitude of alienation between Turks and 
America’s involvement in the world.  But most of the time, in the context of personal 
friendships, I have tremendous hope that we want similar things for the world. The 
ignorance about Turkey among my American friends at home is comparable to the 
level of distorted perceptions that I feel Turks have about America.  As an American 
living in Turkey I believe I have been a bridge enabling both ignorance and 
misunderstanding to decrease, at least in my limited sphere of influence in America 
and Turkey.   
 I am thankful to be an American, just as I am thankful for Turkey to have been 
my home. It bothers me when Americans try to distance themselves from America, as 
if they are completely detached.  It also does not satisfy me for Turks to say that they 
like Americans, but dislike the policy. Although I was born into America by no choice 
of my own, I feel as an American I have responsibility to represent my country and 
not pass responsibility to politicians.  I set out with the intention of my thesis being 
solution oriented on what the United States can do to improve its relations in Turkey, 
and to stay away from empty criticism. 
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I believe that a close relationship with America is fundamentally in the interest 
of Turkey.  I am not one to speak to whether Turkey is right about its neighbors still 
hoping to divide Turkey, but I can say with great conviction that America has no such 
desires and would like nothing more than for Turkey to be a thriving country living up 
to the ideals of its founding father.   
 Although I try to make a strong case for the importance of public diplomacy, I 
know that public diplomacy alone is not enough for a strong relationship between the 
U.S. and Turkey. Consistent policies and common interests need to be in place.  
However, I believe that relationships and understanding bolstered by public 
diplomacy can play a critical part in mitigating anti-Americanism in Turkey.  
 
I.1 Research Question 
The original research question I set out to answer was, “How can public 
diplomacy, when accompanied by substantive adjustment of policies and style based 
on more sincere understanding and humble leadership, enable the United States to win 
the peace with Turkey?” This came out of a belief that the United States needs to 
reevaluate what must be done to turn the tide in its relations with the Middle East. It is 
clear that military power and coercion alone will not be enough to win the peace in 
the region. 
The diversity within the Middle East merits case studies to better understand 
the current predicament faced by the United States. Originally intending to do a 
sweeping study of the Middle East, my advisor encouraged me to focus in more detail 
on a case study of one country. Living in Turkey, the choice was not a difficult one. 
Over the last year I discovered the remarkable depth and complexity of the way 
Turkey sees the world and its interaction with the U.S. If the U.S. cannot win the 
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support of moderate, Westward-leaning, and its traditional ally, Turkey, it will not be 
successful in winning the peace in the region.  
 As I dug into my research I discovered that public diplomacy by itself is a vast 
topic, and therefore only touched on the policies and style of the U.S. I also stayed 
focused on the U.S. trying to lower anti-Americanism in Turkey. This turned out to be 
an ample challenge, without expanding to winning the peace throughout the region 
with Turkey.  
 
I.2 Structure 
Public diplomacy is defined in chapter two as the “government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
current policies.”3 This definition is placed in the context of traditional diplomacy, 
emphasizing how public diplomacy reaches out to foreign publics, whereas traditional 
diplomacy is primarily government-to-government interaction. It is argued public 
diplomacy has taken on increasing importance due to the erosion of the state-centric 
system and the democratization of technologies. A history of the public diplomacy in 
America is developed, from its origins during the World Wars to the hope it provides 
in the ideological battle after September 11, tracing the theme of public diplomacy’s 
importance being recognized only in the face of a competing ideology.  
 In chapter three, I make the theoretical contribution of an anti-Americanism 
framework, by which the anti-Americanism of different countries can be categorized 
based on the root causes and intensity. The final part of the framework presents a way 
                                                 
3
 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990), 3. 
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of thinking to analyze the deeper roots of anti-Americanism in a country. The reasons 
for and intensity of anti-Americanism are influenced by the lenses of 1) what America 
is viewed to be and 2) what the beholder itself is. Anti-Americanism varies so widely 
because the actions of the United States are seen through different glasses.  
The lenses of the glasses are the topics of chapters four and five, which are a 
case study analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey. The framework of chapter three is 
used to classify the Political strand of anti-Americanism and America increasingly 
being viewed as a Threatening Power. The problem of anti-Americanism goes deeper 
than the Iraq War and cursory assessments of reasons for resentment of America. The 
politically based reasons for Turkey’s resentment of America begin with the lens 
based on what America is viewed to be. Chapter four focuses on the exaggerated view 
of American power and untrustworthiness based on a history of Turkish-American 
relations since the end of the Second World War.  
Chapter five begins with the second lens of the glasses based on what Turkey 
itself is. Its Ottoman past, “Sevres phobia,” and sensitivity to its secular and 
homogeneous identity have created a reactionary phobia in Turkey that influences the 
way it views American behavior. The two lenses are combined to explain the two 
biggest drivers of anti-Americanism in Turkey: feared U.S. support for a Kurdish state 
and U.S. presenting a danger to secularism by backing political Islam as a part of its 
bigger plan for the region. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of how Turkey’s 
move towards its view of America as a threatening power is based mostly on distorted 
perceptions.  
Chapter six assesses the shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy, both at the 
State Department level and on the ground from the post in Turkey. These 
shortcomings come, in part, from not understanding the depth and reasons for anti-
 6 
Americanism in Turkey and from a failure to even treat public diplomacy drastically 
different based on the country.  
The final chapter offers recommendations for public diplomacy in Turkey 
based on the type of anti-Americanism in Turkey, an understanding of the forces 
driving it, and critical analysis of current shortcomings in public diplomacy. The 
chapter ends with conclusions about the findings of this thesis and recommendations 
for future areas of study.  
 
I.3 Sources 
My research has made extensive use of primary and secondary sources, both 
in English and Turkish. My primary sources included newspaper articles from the 
American and Turkish media; statements, congressional proceedings, speeches, and 
documents from especially U.S. government websites; international, local and my 
own survey and opinion polls; abundant personal interviews with Turkish academics 
and journalists, as well as with U.S. Diplomats; and many personal conversations and 
observations that came from living among Turks. For secondary sources, I relied on 
books about Turkish history and society and U.S. diplomacy; journal articles about 
Turkish identity and Turkish-American relations; and strategy reports about the 
current state of U.S. public diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
 
 
II.1 Public Diplomacy Defined 
Public diplomacy is the promotion of national interest by informing, engaging, 
and influencing foreign publics.1 Public diplomacy includes government-sponsored 
cultural, educational and informational programs, citizen exchanges, and broadcasting 
that promote the national interest of a country. Although this succinct definition will 
provide a useful handle for the discussion of public diplomacy in this paper, it is 
important to put this definition in the context of the changing and debated discipline 
of public diplomacy.  
Hans Tuch’s definition of public diplomacy in his 1990 book Communicating 
with the World has become foundational in the subject. According to Tuch, public 
diplomacy is the “government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an 
attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions 
and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.”2 Each of the carefully 
                                                 
1
 Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds Winning 
Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, Edward P. 
Djerejian, Chairman, (Washington, D.C., October 1, 2003), 13. 
2
 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990), 3. 
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selected elements in Tuch’s definition is helpful in framing the discussion of this 
subject. 
The opening phrase of Tuch’s definition of public diplomacy, the 
“government’s process of communicating,” includes three important words. First, 
“government” eliminates the inclusion of non-governmental elements, included by 
Edward Gullion in the “founding” definition of public diplomacy, which appeared in 
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy catalogue in 1965. Gullion articulated 
public diplomacy as:  
The role of the press and other media in international affairs, cultivation by 
governments of public opinion, the non-governmental interaction of private 
groups and interests in one country with those of another, and the impact of 
these transnational processes on the formulation of policy and the conduct of 
foreign affairs.3  
 
Gullion’s definition gives the impression that public diplomacy can be done by media, 
private groups, and the government. Public diplomacy has since tended to be 
narrowed from non-governmental efforts, partly because this does not fit within the 
normal parameters of diplomacy, which is performed by governments. However, 
Gullion’s definition is helpful in expanding the scope of public diplomacy beyond 
direct government programs. A government should have vision as to how private 
initiatives can be drawn into its public diplomacy repertoire. Therefore, the public 
diplomacy studied in this thesis will include what the government does directly and its 
efforts to spark private efforts, but will not venture into the entire breadth of non-
governmental interaction between societies. Public diplomacy encompasses what the 
government can do to influence foreign publics.  
Tuch’s use of the phrase “process of communicating” elucidates the 
understanding that public diplomacy is a process more than a “quick fix” program. It 
                                                 
3
 Quoted in Tuch, 8.  
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takes a sustained effort and is not accomplished by one large marketing campaign. 
This acknowledges the long-term element of public diplomacy. Many scholars and 
practitioners view public diplomacy in a more limited sense. Former Ambassador 
Robert Miller refers to public diplomacy as speeches, press conferences, press 
releases, discussion groups, public statements, and broadcasting.  
U.S. diplomacy resorts to the public media in a foreign country when aiming 
to correct a misrepresentation of an official position by the host government or 
its media; to convey the U.S. position positively, in greater detail, and to a 
wider audience; or to gain publicity for a U.S. action that benefits the local 
government and/or people.4  
 
This explanation makes public diplomacy sound as if it is primarily public media and 
used in an embassy only to address a specific problem or promote a particular policy. 
Public diplomacy is not about the use of media channels alone, but also includes 
cultural, educational and informational programs, as well as citizen exchanges. These 
should be pulled together in a long-term process that transcends dealing with 
problematic issues.  
“Communicating” is also an important element of public diplomacy that 
contradicts those who see it as one-way broadcasting or telling. In order to truly 
communicate, the message received needs to be considered. In the communication 
process, a sender “encodes” the information that is “decoded” by the receiver. 
“Noise” can interfere with the message sent and the receiver’s ability to decode is a 
factor. “Once a message has been physically received, it still has to be 
comprehended—and comprehension is a matter of psychology, not mechanics.”5 
Communication is not the mechanical process of broadcasting, but considering the 
psychology and worldview of the receiver. Communicating across cultures is 
                                                 
4
 Robert Hopkins Miller, Inside an Embassy: The Political Role of Diplomats Abroad. (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 54. Miller served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Ivory Coast and 
Malaysia.  
5
 Raymond Cohen. Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International 
Diplomacy. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 20. 
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especially challenging. “In the area of diplomatic negotiation the potential for 
dissonance inherent in intercultural communication finds its most sustained 
expression.”6 One of the best ways to ensure that a message has been received is to 
listen to what is communicated back. Communication through two-way dialogue 
promotes better understanding. 
Tuch clarifies that the target of public diplomacy is “foreign publics.” This 
emphasizes the distinction from public affairs, which is the process of a government 
communicating with its own public in order to gain its support for policies. Public 
diplomacy is limited to the communication with foreign publics.  However, in practice 
there has not always been such a clear break and it has caused Americans to fear that 
the government is exceeding the influence it should have on domestic opinion. The 
word “public” also helps distinguish public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy, 
which is mainly concerned with government-to-government interaction. Public 
diplomacy is specifically government-to-foreign public interaction.7  
The last phrase of Tuch’s definition is “understanding for its nation’s ideas 
and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current 
policies.” Public diplomacy is about improving understanding rather than influencing 
or manipulating. Senator J.W. Fulbright phrased it this way: “The fundamental 
requirement for a world community of good neighbors is that all different peoples 
achieve a broader and deeper mutual understanding of each other.”8 In keeping with 
Fulbright’s vision, Tuch mentions many areas in which a foreign public’s 
understanding can be increased, namely not just foreign policies. Public diplomacy is 
not to be a “quick fix” to rally support for a policy in times of crisis, but rather an 
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ongoing process to foster understanding about the nation’s ideas, institutions, cultures, 
goals, and policies. This emphasis on understanding exceeds the narrow self-serving 
perspective through which public diplomacy has often been seen.  
Public diplomacy, the focus of this paper, is best understood within the context 
of diplomacy; both the similarities with and distinctions from traditional diplomacy 
illuminate the definition of public diplomacy.  
 
II.2 The Context of Traditional Diplomacy 
  Traditional diplomacy is more generally the conduct of relations among 
nations. Diplomacy has also been defined with an emphasis on communication such 
as the dialogue between independent states9 or the “the communication system of the 
international society.”10 Within these definitions public diplomacy has an important 
place because it is about communication to foreign publics, beyond the scope of 
traditional diplomacy. 
Diplomacy has been around as long as independent political entities have 
existed. “Diplomacy, in short, exists whenever ‘there are boundaries for identity and 
those boundaries of identity are crossed.’”11 To discuss the need for diplomacy is to 
go back to the basics of states and the international system. States are created to 
protect and promote the interests of those who form them. These states are said to be 
in a system because what one state does directly or indirectly affects the others. 
Foreign policy is the substance of a state’s relations with other powers and the 
purposes it hopes to achieve by these relations. States  
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cannot function in a vacuum of isolation, with each community considering 
only how to manage its internal affairs. Each state is obliged, by the very 
desire to control its own destiny as far as possible, to take account of the 
neighbors who impinge on its interests and those of its citizens.12  
 
Due to the nature of independent states, they have different identities and 
interests. Because the states cannot function in isolation, these different interests rub 
against one another. “Relations between states, even those closest to each other in 
culture and temperament, are at once competitive and cooperative.”13 Diplomacy is 
the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their 
relations and pursue their purposes short of war.14  
At the core of diplomacy is the need for states to communicate with one 
another.15 As most people discover in relationships of any kind, communication is 
vital to avoid conflict as much as possible and work through the contention that 
inevitably still occurs. So too with states. Diplomatic relations “furnishes a secure 
channel of face-to-face communications with decision makers and a direct means of 
influencing them… Diplomatic exchanges reduce the likelihood of miscalculation by 
both sides.”16 Miscalculation and misunderstanding, likely even in close relations 
between people of the same culture, can happen all too easily in the interaction 
between widely differing states. “Communication is to diplomacy as blood is to the 
human body. Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the 
process of diplomacy, is dead, and the result is violent conflict or atrophy.”17 Ongoing 
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communication helps prevent the unnecessary escalation of violence. “In the absence 
of diplomatic discourse, confrontation is left to take its mindless course.”18  
Diplomacy is the first way a country deals with the perceived threat to national 
security. “The diplomatic establishment, not the military establishment, is the first line 
of defense.”19 Diplomacy is cheaper than war in dollars and lives. “It is obvious that 
in this Atomic Age diplomacy is cheaper than fighting, for the cost of a world war in 
one day is far greater than that of the entire diplomatic service for one year.”20 
Although not perfect, diplomacy is preferable to war. 
Diplomats are the actors that facilitate the dialogue between nations.  “The 
task of diplomats is the nonviolent advancement of the political, economic, cultural, 
and military interests of their state and people.”21 Diplomats take the foreign policy 
objectives of their state and attempt to communicate and persuade the country they 
visit to act in these interests. A government wants to be sure the diplomat clearly 
grasps the purpose and intended results of a message, but the manner in which to 
communicate the message is the skill of the diplomat.22  
A diplomat’s position is like that of a lawyer, whose job is to make a client’s 
case appear better in court or negotiations, regardless of the lawyer’s own opinion. 
The lawyer must promote the interests of his client as best he can within the limits of 
the law. It is also the lawyer’s duty to counsel the client on how best to achieve his 
interests. The same is true of the diplomat. 23 In diplomacy, as in the practice of law, 
there can be a reputation of and tendency toward duplicity. Stalin is said to have 
quipped, “a diplomat’s words have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of 
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diplomacy is it? Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden 
iron.”24 Despite there being some wisdom in such observations, at its core, diplomacy 
is about a search for compromise, understanding, and mutually acceptable solutions. 
Diplomacy has typically been carried out in private between high level 
representatives, whether diplomats or foreign ministries. Peter Marshall distinguishes 
between “Old” and “New” diplomacy. “The ‘Old Diplomacy’ was ‘political,’ 
esoteric, elitist, and far from the madding crowd.”25 Diplomats have traditionally been 
confidential messengers between sovereigns.26 In Byzantine and Renaissance times 
diplomacy was characterized by secret and confidential communication.27 However, 
the debate about whether diplomatic communication should extend beyond 
government officials to the public has taken place at different points in history. For 
example, in Ancient Greece, diplomatic envoys were expected to debate in public. 
Throughout the 20th century the public nature of diplomacy again took importance.  
 The official function of diplomacy is indispensable in the international 
system. “States establish diplomatic relations to manage official interactions with 
national governments.”28 However, as the international system has changed over the 
years, so too must the tools of diplomacy in order to preserve it as a better way of 
resolving differences between countries than war. Since World War II, changes have 
taken place to necessitate diplomacy expanding beyond the private and official 
interaction of diplomats.  
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II.3 Why Is Public Diplomacy Needed? 
Public diplomacy is taking on greater importance. Long before September 11 
sparked many Americans beginning to slowly recognize the dire need for public 
diplomacy, there were already many factors necessitating adjustment in the way that 
diplomacy is approached. Changes in the conduct of international relations in the 20th 
century caused public diplomacy to become an indispensable part of foreign affairs. 
In 1998 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) initiated a study 
entitled Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.29  A 63-person Advisory 
Panel, focusing on the information revolution and the expanding participation of 
publics in international relations, argued that “diplomacy must become increasingly 
public to serve the national interest.”  
The overarching reason for the increased importance of public diplomacy is 
the erosion of the state-centric system. Although states are still the primary actors, 
they are no longer the only ones, nor are they the only ones with enough power to 
influence the international system. Peter Marshall refers to the changes as a series of 
“invasions” of the political foreground.30 These invasions challenge the traditional 
diplomacy of government-to-government interaction, which was well suited for a 
world dominated by powerful states that monopolized power. States controlled 
resources, communication, and weapons. The preeminence of the governing elites 
was once accepted in more places around the globe. Accordingly, for a state to have 
its way when its interests rubbed against those of another state, it was generally 
sufficient to work through traditional diplomatic channels. This has changed due to 
the proliferation of actors, more competition over ideas, and a democratizing world. 
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II.3.1 Rise of Non-State Actors 
The first factor to cause the erosion of the state-centric system and render 
public diplomacy more important is the proliferation of actors in the international 
system. In centuries past a few dominant colonial powers monopolized most of the 
power. The influx of the number of states, transnational organizations, non-
governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and other non-sate actors left 
traditional government-to-government diplomacy insufficient for the international 
relations of a country. As the number of states since the World Wars has increased, so 
has the number of voices with their own interests in the international system. Before, 
if the United States had interests in Nigeria, they were part of the established relations 
with Britain. But after gaining its independence in 1960, Nigeria had its own voice 
based on its culture, preferences, and view of the world. The U.S. needs to care more 
about the opinions that Nigerians have than when they were ruled by Britain. A more 
complicated system means a greater need to get out and mobilize support for a state’s 
interests. In a family, for example, before kids come along a husband and wife can 
more readily discuss and come to an agreement on where to go for a vacation. But 
when a few kids enter the picture, each with their own opinions and preferences, the 
parents need to consider exciting the kids in order to do something in particular. A 
father may do well to talk directly to the children about how much fun it would be to 
go to a sports match, especially if the mother is speaking to them about another plan. 
Diplomacy has had to be broadened to foster new relations with many more 
independent states, altering the diplomatic landscape of a few powers sending private 
government delegations primarily to each other. 
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While the proliferation of states has required expanded diplomatic efforts, the 
rise in importance of non-state actors has especially challenged the traditional 
government-to-government role of diplomacy. “A major factor is the erosive 
influence of non-governmental activities on traditional sovereign prerogatives.”31 
Transnational organizations like the United Nations or European Union have to be 
considered in addition to the states that compose their parts. Non-governmental 
organizations influence public opinions and a vast number of causes. Multinational 
corporations likewise cross national borders and their practices influence the 
international community. “Whereas the fear in the 1970s was that multinationals 
would become an arm of government, the concern now is that they are disconnecting 
from their home countries’ national interests, moving jobs, evading taxes, and eroding 
economic sovereignty in the process.”32 Multinationals are among the non-state actors 
that erode the dominance of states and render traditional diplomacy inadequate. 
Another non-state actor garnering great attention is terrorist organizations. 
While states can support terrorism, it emanates first and foremost from non-state 
actors.33 One of the sources of terrorism was the radical groups that formed on the 
fringes of several religions towards the end of the 20th century. The tens of thousands 
of Muslims who went to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has 
formed the foundation of the Al Qaeda’s vast network in loosely affiliated cells 
scattered throughout perhaps 60 countries.34 In a review of articles about the terrorist 
organization, Byman cites that Al-Qaeda draws on the support of 6 million radicals 
worldwide but what makes precise numbers elusive is “simultaneously a small core 
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group and a broader network linking various Islamist groups and causes.”35 Working 
with states to combat terrorism is not enough to change the hearts of those who feel 
greater allegiance to a cause than their state. Because of the transnational nature of 
Islamist ideology and other terrorist groups, traditional diplomacy is not enough to 
deal with the issue. A wider audience needs to be directly addressed as the number of 
entities increases—whether states, multinational corporations, or terrorist networks. 
 
II.3.2 Competition over Ideas 
The ideological struggles engulfing the world since World War II have 
required democracies to enter the battle of ideas. “Ideas are tough. They cannot be 
killed with bayonets or bombs. They skip across international borders or billowing 
oceans. They can be successfully combated only with better ideas.”36 Fascism, 
communism, liberal democracy, and Islamism are among the ideas that have 
transcended state power. The recognition of necessity for public diplomacy in the 
U.S. was sparked by combating the ideas of fascism.37 The ideological clash with 
communism during the Cold War brought public diplomacy front and center in 
American foreign affairs. Coombs wrote at the height of the Cold War, “The highly 
charged compound of people, ideas, and knowledge, stirred by the new technologies 
and the ideological contest, has unleashed human drives far more powerful in their 
impact on societies and governments than the force of nuclear energy.”38 The U.S. felt 
the need to go directly to the people to make the case about a specific ideology. The 
ubiquitous term “hearts and minds” associated with public diplomacy became famous 
by President Johnson’s use of it during the Vietnam War. In 1965 he proclaimed, “So 
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we must be ready to fight in Viet-Nam, but the ultimate victory will depend upon the 
hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there.”39 President Johnson 
recognized an ideological battlefield.  
Traditional diplomatic effort with a country that impresses one ideology on a 
people is not enough to rally the public to change. Most recently ideological 
opposition from the Al-Qaeda brand of Islamism has caused reassertion of the 
importance of the discipline: “Public diplomacy is essential. So far, al-Qaeda is 
winning the battle of ideas: its concept of defensive jihad is gaining credence, as is its 
credo that the United States is at the root of the Muslim world’s problems.”40 Public 
diplomacy is vital in the competition of ideas.   
 
II.3.3 Democratizing World 
 Another reason for the rise in importance of public diplomacy is that more 
people around the world do not accept the right of a few elites to make all the 
decisions to guide the country. Both the number of democracies in the word and the 
amount of democratic involvement have increased since World War II. In Peter 
Marshall’s terms, the “New Diplomacy” which flourished around the time of World 
War I is “populist rather than elitist. It is a matter of intense public interest and debate. 
The auditorium is as important as the stage.”41 Partly due to more men and women 
having the chance for education, people are demanding more accountability by the 
government. Writing more than four decades ago, Coombs recognized this trend. 
“Millions of ordinary people who once accepted governments as a superior authority 
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to be paid and obeyed have now caught the radical notion that governments are meant 
not merely to rule but to serve.”42  
Accordingly, more people around the world are having a say in what their 
governments do. “Given today’s hyper-communicative, democratizing world, 
successful foreign policy cannot be made in secret by a tight group of trusted 
confidants.”43 There are times that a government may want to comply for strategic 
reasons, but is unable to do so because of the political cost. Democracy makes public 
diplomacy more applicable because the power and decision-making of a country are 
diffused. “To understand and to affect decision making in a democracy, diplomats 
must range broadly through parliamentary and party corridors, into newsrooms and 
interest group offices and beyond the capital city.”44 For a country to have influence 
abroad it needs to present its case increasingly to the people and not only the powerful 
decision makers of the foreign country.  
 
II.3.4 Facilitators of Democratization 
In addition to proliferation of actors, more competition over ideas, and a 
democratic population, the technological advances over recent decades have 
facilitated many additional changes that break down the state-centric system, thus 
making public diplomacy a vital part of interaction with the world. The changing 
facilitators could generally be referred to as “democratizing technology,” making 
technology more accessible to more people. The facilitators of democratization: 
communication technology, transportation, and weapons, have increased the impact a 
few people can have on those far away, people-to-people interaction, access to 
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information through non-governmental channels, the level of competition for 
allegiance, and the speed at which information travels and is expected. 
“The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the 
rise of non-state actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution.”45 Before, 
the time and cost of international communication was inhibitive, but now it can be 
done effortlessly by more of the world’s population. Computers and the Internet are 
becoming cheaper, and more accessible to the common person. Before, a computer 
filled an entire room and could only be financed by a government. Now, many people 
in the world own a personal computer and more than ten percent of the world’s 
population can access the Internet.46 The changes in technology have challenged 
traditional diplomacy but also provided new opportunities to reach out to more of the 
world.  
The communications revolution makes instantaneous exchange of information 
possible, disregarding national borders, and shrinking the world. It is no longer just 
the foreign ministries and governments that know what is happening across a border 
or an ocean. “In this world of instantaneous information, traditional diplomacy 
struggles to sustain its relevance.”47 Whereas before governments could mostly 
interact with each other and communicate selectively to their publics, the public now 
has almost instantaneous access to what is going on throughout the world. “Nations 
once connected by foreign ministries and traders are now linked through millions of 
individuals by fiber optics, satellite, wireless, and cable in a complex network without 
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central control.”48 When first introduced in 1915, a three-minute phone call from New 
York to San Francisco cost more than $20 or the equivalent of 90 hours of labor for 
the average wage earner.49 The same call can now be made for free by someone with 
access to a computer.  
The evolution of information and communications technology, which has only 
just begun, will probably heavily favor non-state entities, including those not 
yet envisaged, over states. The new technologies encourage noninstitutional, 
shifting networks over the fixed bureaucratic hierarchies that are the hallmark 
of the single-voiced sovereign state.50  
 
The growth in communication technology is a facilitator of change that makes public 
diplomacy increasingly necessary.  
Transportation is another facilitator that renders public diplomacy more 
pertinent than ever. Partly due to limits in transportation, diplomacy of the past 
typically involved elite representatives of governments being sent to another country. 
The transportation available drastically limited the feasibility of what could be done. 
When a diplomatic contingent took weeks or months and great expense to travel to a 
location, it had to be done sparingly. “In terms of both the volume and speed of goods 
and passenger transport the achievements of the last two centuries have completely 
outclassed the painfully acquired gains of the whole of previous recorded history.”51 
Such a vast revolution in transportation has drastically altered the ability of distant 
peoples to be in contact with each other. Now businessmen, tourists, and other 
common citizens can crisscross the world with remarkable speed. This facilitates far 
more non-governmental interaction between peoples. “Especially pertinent here are 
the new techniques of transportation and communication which have shrunk the 
globe, making close neighbors of formerly dark and distant continents and quickening 
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the circulation of provocative ideas and knowledge throughout the world.”52 This was 
in 1964. While the shrinking globe and provocative ideas are a challenge to 
governments, they also provide an incredible opportunity to strengthen relationships 
between states that did not exist in the formal meetings between diplomatic emissaries 
in centuries past.  
Another facilitator that has fostered the need for non-state actors to be taken 
seriously is the “democratization of weapons.” As with communication and 
transportation, powerful weapons used to be monopolized by states. Recent years 
have made it obvious that weapons of mass destruction are now accessible to people 
with a few hundred dollars. State-centric systems made the use of weapons more 
predictable. Most obviously, the Cold War, despite the unprecedented danger of 
thousands of nuclear weapons, maintained a level of predictability that was managed 
through tense diplomatic relations between states. However, in today’s world a 
handful of common people can kill hundreds in a single event. This facilitates the 
need to give non-state actors more attention.  
These facilitators combine to enable a small number of people to have a large 
impact on people far away. Because states no longer control communication, 
transportation, and weapons of mass destruction as they once did, maintaining 
relationships with just states is no longer sufficient. Although states remain the 
primary actors in the system, the awful terrorist acts in recent years emphasize that 
states do not control the flow of information and weapons. The tragedy of September 
11 is a terrifying example of how much power a small number of people can have. 
Communication utilized for planning, transportation for training, access to a foreign 
country, and even the weapons show how today’s technology can be used in tragic 
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ways. The London bombers in July 2005 were able to make weapons to kill hundreds 
and carry out the entire operation for less than 8,000 pounds.53 States no longer 
monopolize the use of force. The more power wielded by common people, the more 
they need to be taken into account. 
 
II.3.5 Impact of Facilitators of Democracy 
The technological advances of communication and transportation have 
increased the amount of people-to-people contact around the world. People can form 
their opinion of a country based on non-government channels like an on-line 
friendship with someone across an ocean. With the touch of a few keys an email about 
one’s impressions of a country can be sent to a hundred people around the world. This 
undermines the dominance of government-to-government diplomacy. However, new 
communication capabilities can create opportunities for interaction with a foreign 
public, even avoiding the filters of an unfriendly government. A government can 
sponsor a music group to come and play in another country to help break down 
stereotypes. Two students from different parts of the world can be brought together in 
an Internet chat-room to discuss common global concerns. With accessible 
transportation, citizens can travel and build an understanding between peoples. Every 
person that goes abroad becomes a representative of his or her country. Diplomacy 
that ignores person-to-person contact will become increasingly irrelevant and will be 
squandering a great opportunity.  
In addition to greater person-to-person contact, the public also has greater 
access to information through the radio, Internet, and satellite television. “Even 
remote populations have increasing opportunities to form their own views of the 
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United States directly, without the need to filter such information through the official 
media of local governments—or of the U.S. government.”54 Because the public can 
now get more information from non-government sources, government-to-government 
diplomacy is not enough to have a voice in the information that is shaping the minds. 
With little government control and a vast amount of information from many sources 
the chance for misperception is great. It is in a country’s interest to enter into that 
conversation and have a voice in the opinions that are being formed about it. This is 
highlighted by the French expression, “les absents ont toujours tort”: those absent are 
always wrong.55 If the truth is not available, ideas will be formed based on 
misinformation and distorted perceptions. As the youth of today grow up connected to 
the Internet, public diplomacy is only going to increase in importance. Official visits 
to other countries or formal correspondence between governments is not enough to 
win the support of the public. 
Facilitated by the rise of communication technology, there is also more 
competition for the hearts and minds of the public. Without the monopoly of 
information by states, more actors can compete for people’s allegiance.  
Widely accessible and affordable technology has broken governments’ 
monopoly on the collection and management of large amounts of information 
and deprived governments of the deference they enjoyed because of it. In 
every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to 
put it to use multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the 
number who command great authority.56  
 
This competition makes it necessary for states to respond. The most pressing 
challenge is from Al-Qaeda. “Al-Qaeda the organization has increasingly become 
indistinguishable from the media phenomenon.”57 Some have argued that Osama Bin 
Laden, even hiding in a cave, is out-communicating the United States. “Once again he 
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has beaten America at an American game: public diplomacy. He may be sitting 
powerlessly in a cave, but his image is as scary as ever.”58 Bin Laden is able to reach 
distant regions with his message. He is able to influence, convince, motivate, and spur 
to action great amounts of people. If a country does not reach out to its own people, 
they do not just remain uniformed or ambivalent. Instead, there is active competition 
for their allegiance. As long as non-state actors with their own—sometimes violent—
ambitions are competing for allegiance, states must too. An article in the New York 
Times last year illuminated the “increasingly sophisticated network of contributors 
and discussion leaders helping to wage Al Qaeda’s battle for Muslim hearts and 
minds.”59 This competition must drive public diplomacy forward. It is not acceptable 
to let Bin Laden dominate the media while governments talk in private amongst 
themselves. All the while, publics are making their decisions less based on what the 
government releases to them about the summits between states and more through the 
ideas released in videos and discussed on-line. Governments need to vigorously enter 
the on-line dialogue and compete for the hearts and minds of the public. 
In addition to the competition that forces states to enter into public diplomacy, 
the communications revolution has also raised the expectation of instant 
communication. The public expects to have instant information as events unfold. 
Ideas travel at remarkable speeds. Accordingly, governments need to make efforts to 
supply information at this fast pace before opinions are formed based on others telling 
the story. This presents a real challenge to governments. One former U.S. Secretary of 
State explained his concern, “Will the speed at which we communicate drive out 
thought? I worry about that a lot. Instant answers to instant problems can get you into 
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a hell of a lot of trouble.”60 Although there is still a place for governments exercising 
caution, diplomats nevertheless have to be able to adapt in order to remain relevant. 
The traditional reluctance of diplomats to change, specifically in regard to technology, 
is emphasized throughout Wilson Dizard’s Digital Diplomacy. “Until recently, they 
shared a belief that theirs was an elite profession and that its practitioners could rely 
primarily on their personal skills.”61 The speed of communication has necessitated 
change.  
In summary, there are abundant interconnected reasons for the increasing 
applicability of public diplomacy. The number and types of actors in the international 
system have challenged the state-centric system. The rise in democracy has bolstered 
the significance of the public. The days of government monopoly of information have 
faded into the past. In a more globalized world with access to new technologies, 
publics seek understanding without the filters of government. “The traditional concept 
that foreign affairs are a self-contained, somewhat recondite, specialty, which can be 
hived off from the rest of public business and handled separately from it, will no 
longer stand up to critical examination.”62 Although states are absolutely still relevant, 
the public has to be given more consideration than it was afforded previously. 
Common people now have the means to influence and inflict great harm to people 
outside their borders. Therefore the United States has slowly expanded beyond the 
boundaries of traditional diplomacy in response to the changing world. 
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II.4 History of Public Diplomacy in the United States 
 The practice of diplomacy has had to develop since the early days of America. 
The drastically different situation is magnified in President Thomas Jefferson’s 
famous letter to Secretary of State James Madison at the beginning of the 19th century: 
“We have not heard from our ambassador in Paris for two years. If we do not hear 
from him by the end of this year, let us write him a letter.”63  
The relatively recent history of public diplomacy in the United States began 
with the outbreak of the World Wars and the U.S. taking a more active role in the 
world. President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information 
during World War I to influence American public opinion to support the war and 
inform the world about U.S. intentions.64 In the words of George Creel, the influential 
journalist tasked with spearheading the effort, “We fought prejudice, indifference, and 
disaffection at home and we fought ignorance and falsehood abroad.”65 It is 
noteworthy the extent to which this one committee was involved with influencing 
public at both home and abroad. The degree of separation between these spheres was 
a debate in the ensuing decades. Creel emphasized how a fight for the minds of the 
public had been sparked by the Germans.  
It was in this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that the Great 
War differed most essentially from all previous conflicts. The trial of strength 
was not only between massed bodies of armed men, but between opposed 
ideals, and moral verdicts took on all the value of military decisions. Other 
wars went no deeper than the physical aspects, but German Kultur raised 
issues that had to be fought out in the hearts and minds of people as well as on 
the actual firing-line. 66 
 
While debatable whether World War I was unique in going beyond the 
physical aspects of war to fight for the hearts and minds of people, this quotation 
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identifies the reasons why public diplomacy is still thought to be vital today. 
Reflecting back on the motivation of the Committee that came to be associated with 
his name, Creel asserted a belief that the United States needed only to present the 
facts to bring the lies to light.  
Every possible expedient was employed to break through the barrage of lies 
that kept the people of the Central Powers in darkness and delusion; we 
sought the friendship and support of the neutral nations by continuous 
presentation of facts. We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German 
hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was 
educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our 
case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, 
straightforward presentation of facts. 67  
 
Despite the high rhetoric, the American public and Congress were suspicious 
of the government spreading propaganda in the U.S.68 A government-run news 
service and influencing Hollywood to make movies showing America in a positive 
light were among the efforts that many felt went beyond education and information. 
This early foray during a time of conflict was quickly abolished with the end of the 
war. Nevertheless, the Creel Committee set an important precedent for a belief that 
education and information were vital in a global battle over ideas.  
It was not until the rise of the Nazi cultural offensive in Latin America that the 
cultural dimension of foreign relations was recognized as an important tool of the 
government.69 In 1938, President Roosevelt created a Division of Cultural Relations 
in the State Department “for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening cultural 
relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other 
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countries.”70 This effort included exchanges of students and professors, book 
translations, libraries and cultural broadcasts.71  
President Roosevelt also established the Office of Wartime Information (OWI) 
during World War II. The OWI set up a vast campaign to disseminate information 
throughout the world. Underlying the distinction between the Division of Cultural 
Relations and the OWI was a debate between two approaches. On the one side, there 
were advocates of the culture and education programs that would have a trickle-down 
effect on relations between states. They argued for a long-term approach that must 
have continuity and be free of manipulation of information. On the other side was a 
“tough-minded” group more comfortable with propagandizing through media or 
movies that promised more “bang for the buck” in the short-term.72  
The end of World War II brought sharp opposition to continuing any kind of 
foreign information business in peace time.  
 
It is hard now to recall how utterly unenthusiastic, indeed downright hostile, 
the American people and Congress then were to the very idea of government 
being in the foreign information business in peacetime. Psychological warfare, 
like mass killing, had been accepted as a necessity of war; but the “dirty 
business of propaganda,” as it was called, had no place in peacetime… There 
was fear, too, that propaganda machinery in government hands might be 
turned to manipulating public opinion in our own country.73 
 
Indeed, in 1945 the OWI was abolished.  
However, the outbreak of the Cold War and the need to reconstruct Germany, 
Japan, and Australia made the continuation of the cultural and education programs 
important. In 1946 Congress approved the so-called Fulbright Amendment, named 
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after its primary sponsor, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. The horrors of 
World War II motivated Senator Fulbright to develop a program that would increase 
mutual understanding in the world. The fundamental idea of the Fulbright Act was to 
channel funds from the sale of surplus military equipment into scholarships, “literally 
swords into plowshares of the mind.”74 This was the forerunner to the still existing 
Fulbright Program and many other exchange programs. The flourishing programs 
were given large credit in the successful reconstruction and friendships that developed 
with Germany and Japan. For example, between 1949 and 1954 over ten thousand 
Germans came to the U.S. on official visits.75 
Many Congressmen came home from experiences abroad after World War II 
“shocked and angered by the calculated misrepresentations of the United States they 
had encountered and deeply concerned by the evident lack of understanding of 
American society and motives, even among good friends.76 This provided an impetus 
for the United States Information and Education Act of 1948. Better known as the 
Smith-Mundt Act, this was the key law in legitimizing what would become known as 
public diplomacy. The Smith-Mundt Act was “an act to promote the better 
understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen 
cooperative international relations.”77 This act authorized a world-wide information 
campaign and money to fund a broad educational exchange program to complement 
the Fulbright Program.  
The Smith-Mundt Act was also important in addressing some of the ongoing 
debates about public diplomacy. It helped sharply distinguish between information 
and education activities. The information side, described with such terms as 
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“propaganda” or “public relations,” would be separate from efforts at “mutual 
understanding” in the educational programs. The Smith-Mundt Act also encouraged 
the maximum use of private facilities whenever they could be used instead of federal 
agencies.78 
 The importance of these fledgling programs’ activities was realized as the 
Cold War began. President Truman’s “Campaign of Truth” speech in 1950 remains 
monumental in the recognition given to public diplomacy in the U.S. 
The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the world by the 
forces of imperialistic communism. This is a struggle, above all else, for the 
minds of man. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the 
communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are 
systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda 
can be overcome by truth—plain, simple, unvarnished truth—presented by 
newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust… 
Our task is to present the truth to millions of people who are 
uninformed or misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their 
daily lives, as they work and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent 
in reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their educational and cultural 
backgrounds may be. Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to 
economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way 
to strength, happiness, and peace.  
This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our 
foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful 
world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid. The Marshall 
plan, military aid, point 4—these and other programs depend for their success 
on the understanding and support of our own citizens and those of other 
countries.  
We must make ourselves known as we really are—not as Communist 
propaganda pictures us. We must pool our efforts with those of other free 
peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom 
against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard round the 
world in a great campaign of truth.79  
 
Some of the same themes from the Creel Committee of World War I are 
evident, such as the “unvarnished truth” triumphing over propaganda. The Smith-
Mundt Act led to the establishment of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) as a 
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separate agency in 1953. President Eisenhower charged the USIA “to submit evidence 
to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives 
and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their 
legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.”80 The Fulbright-Hays Act of 
1961 was also instrumental legislation for the continuation of the cultural side of 
public diplomacy and it created the structure under which international cultural and 
exchange programs are still organized. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs set policy and ran the exchange and presentations programs. The USIA 
implemented these programs overseas. The Advisory Committee on the Arts would 
continue in culture and arts exchanges.81 
The United States utilized all of these programs throughout the Cold War to 
keep friends and build bridges to people behind the Iron Curtain. Although the 
reasons for the eventual perestroika and end of the Cold War are complex, in the end 
public opinion was for change.82 The appeal of capitalism and freedom overtook the 
life imposed by the Soviets. “Working smart, working indirectly and by example as 
much as exhortation in Iron Curtain countries, the U.S. was able to influence and 
strengthen the resolve of people seeking democracy and the corresponding freedom of 
speech, thought and religion.”83 The public diplomacy effort of the U.S. came with an 
understanding that the Cold War (as Creel proclaimed about World War I) was not 
going to be won with only military might, but in a struggle of ideas. The economic 
and cultural attraction of the United States helped contribute to triumph over the 
Soviet Union.  
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With the immediacy of threats emanating from the Cold War, public 
diplomacy became limited in the minds of Americans to meeting the immediate 
national security objectives. In the National Security Directive 77 (NSDD-77) of 
1983, public diplomacy is defined as “those actions of the U.S. government designed 
to generate support for our national security objectives.”84 The Special Planning 
Group established by NSDD-77 was responsible for ensuring that “a wide-ranging 
program of effective initiatives is developed and implemented to support national 
security policy, objectives and decisions.” While the Reagan administration supported 
a wide range of public diplomacy activities, they were limited to increasing support 
abroad for the U.S. national security policies and objectives. The long-term benefits 
of cultural and education programs again lost value as the immediacy of the conflict 
favored short-term results.  
 It naturally followed, then, that the end of the Cold War, with the ideological 
battle seemingly won, brought diminished investment in public diplomacy. This 
continued the clear trend of recognizing the need for, or at least committing the 
resources to, public diplomacy only in the face of conflict. Whenever there was peace, 
the U.S. flagged in its desire to have active public diplomacy. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the public diplomacy resources developed over decades atrophied and 
even the value of a public diplomacy profession was highly disputed. Still, there were 
those who tried to voice the danger of cutting diplomatic efforts. Casimir A. Yost, 
Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, wrote 
in 1997, 
The United States is, in the process, using up what amounts to national 
security capital, in the form of influence and ties built up over decades in 
countries all over the world. By cutting its diplomatic representation and its 
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aid and information programs around the world, Washington risks 
contributing to a diminution in U.S. global influence at a time when U.S. 
global interests and dependencies are expanding.85  
 
However, there were not enough advocates of the U.S. continuing to invest in 
its long-term relations abroad. With the demise of the threat from communism, the 
United States was more interested in cutting its budget than investing in international 
diplomacy. Between 1989 and 1999, the budget of the U.S. Information Agency 
decreased by ten percent, before finally being folded into the State Department in 
1999.86 At the ceremony commemorating the consolidation of the State Department 
and the USIA on October 1, 1999, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the 
employees of USIA:  
I am honored to welcome you as co-architects in building a vigorous and 
farsighted American foreign policy with public diplomacy at its core—a policy 
that will lead our nation and the world into a new era, where information will 
matter greatly and freedom even more.87  
 
Although the consolidation of the USIA was done with the expressed intention of 
bringing public diplomacy closer to foreign policy development, many see it as the 
devaluation of public diplomacy. An article in the Foreign Service Journal argues that 
“contrary to the expectations of the policymakers who abolished the U.S. Information 
Agency in a fit of hubris and parsimony,” public diplomacy is as vitally important as 
ever.88  
 
II.5 Public Diplomacy as a Hope: Post-September 11 
As the debris from the attacks of September 11, 2001 was slowly cleaned up, 
Americans were left contemplating the nature and extent of the challenge to the U.S. 
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The terrorist attacks again pulled Americans from their tendency to devalue public 
diplomacy in the absence of conflict. “Only after September 2001 did Americans 
rediscover the importance of investing in the instruments of soft power, and even then 
inadequately.”89  
The primary response to September 11 was a declared war on terror,90 long on 
the use of hard power and short on soft power. The Bush administration’s 2002 
National Security Strategy declares, “To defeat this threat we must make use of every 
tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, 
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”91 Diplomacy or public 
diplomacy are noticeably missing in the ways to defeat terrorism and are only given 
scant mention throughout the seminal document. The U.S. is failing to win the peace 
in the Middle East by, in part, focusing too much on military intervention and not 
enough on building bridges to the people. One proponent of public diplomacy 
observed, “The Pentagon has 16 times as much funding for public diplomacy as the 
State Department, and we wonder why the rest of the world often thinks that we try to 
lead with the barrel of a gun.”92 
Instead of September 11 being seized as an opportunity to consolidate global 
support against common threats to humanity, the response of a war on terror, and 
especially the unilateral action in Iraq, have fueled unprecedented anti-Americanism. 
The United States has found itself heavily criticized and with few friends. It seems 
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that reservoirs of appreciation for the United States have dried up.93 The U.S. needs a 
sustained effort to reach out to foreign publics and bolster its reserves of friendship 
and goodwill.  
Just as military might is not adequate to win the peace, traditional 
government-to-government interaction will also not be enough to turn the tide of anti-
Americanism. In the Middle East, the heart of the ideological battle, it seems the U.S. 
is losing the fight for hearts and minds of people. Better public diplomacy offers hope 
as a way to increase the understanding of America. The U.S. must bolster its public 
diplomacy in order to deal with the current challenges, sustain relationships, and 
prepare for the future. Senator Fulbright’s words in 1964 offer more hope to the 
United States winning the peace than a “surge” in troops.  
Foreign policy cannot be based on military posture and diplomatic activities 
alone in today’s world. The shape of the world a generation from now will be 
influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to 
others than by our military or diplomatic superiority.94  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
ANTI-AMERICANISM FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
III.1 Introduction  
While anti-Americanism is on the rise, it is not a new phenomenon. Since its 
inception, America has been the source of both hope and resentment for people 
around the world. The entrance of the U.S. into world affairs in the 20th century and 
its eventual emergence as the world’s lone superpower brought it both admiration and 
criticism. The reasons and intensity varying from country to country, anti-
Americanism has surfaced as a significant concern for the U.S. in the post-September 
11 world. The event that moved the world with sympathy to empathize with a 
wounded America initiated a period of growing resentment of the same country.  
"Nous sommes tous Américains" was famously declared by the editor-in-chief 
of the French newspaper Le Monde two days after September 11. “We are all 
Americans.” This article is an example of identification with America, which is a 
product of the world, a “melting pot” of people, foods, cultures, and values. While 
America reflects the rest of the world, it also develops its own culture and in turn 
influences other countries. “Americanization” is a profoundly interactive process 
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between America and all parts of the world.1 This Americanization can prompt 
resentment, as can the other ways that America uses its power to influence the world. 
The diversity of anti-Americanism is as diverse as the views of America,2 which can 
at the same time be the object of one’s dreams and the embodiment of one’s greatest 
hatreds. 
 
III.2 Anti-Americanism Defined 
Although at first-glance the term seems to be self-explanatory, anti-
Americanism encompasses a widely varying phenomenon. The introduction to the 
forum held about anti-Americanism organized by the American Historical Review, a 
major historical journal in the United States, begins this way: “It is clear from many 
different sources that anti-Americanism around the world is at an all-time high…anti-
Americanism is hardly new. Nor is it simple.”3 Increasing, old, and complex are 
appropriate adjectives to introduce anti-Americanism. 
A simplistic definition of anti-Americanism from which to begin is an attitude 
of resentment and dislike for American politics or culture. Katzenstein and Keohane 
define anti-Americanism as “a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the 
United States and of American society in general.”4 Paul Hollander, in his 1992 book 
Anti-Americanism, writes a possible definition as “An unfocused and largely 
irrational, often visceral aversion towards the United States, its government, domestic 
institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people.”5 He argues that if 
there was not some irrationality associated with it, no one would be interested in the 
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phenomenon. “Since Nazism is universally perceived as self-evidently evil, nobody is 
seeking a better understanding of anti-Nazi sentiments in the post-World-War II 
period.”6 
Accordingly, anti-Americanism is something deeper than disagreement with 
the U.S. over policies. Alfred Grosser, writing in the same influential French journal 
Le Monde, points out that one need not be labeled “anti-American” for opposing U.S. 
foreign policy, nor an “anti-Semite” or “anti-Zionist” for taking Israeli government 
policy to task.7 Anti-Americanism, therefore, relates to an attitude or bias that 
develops against America. Resentment of policies, however, can harden into a bias 
against America. For example, during the years of the Vietnam War some would 
claim to be against the war but not necessarily anti-American. This is captured by one 
non-American author’s personal anecdote. “I remember demonstrating in Paris and in 
Washington… against the Vietnam War. I never felt anti-American at the time. In 
fact, I rarely felt so close to America as when riding in a ramshackle old school bus to 
the Capitol with my American friends.” 8 
Many scholars have also made efforts to demystify anti-Americanism. It is 
obvious to most that while there may be an over-arching definition, there are sub-
divisions within the phenomenon. Phillipe Roger’s distinguishing between the cultural 
and political strands of Anti-Americanism is representative of many scholars’ 
recognition that not all people dislike America for the same reasons: 
 
It always applies selectively, never extending to a total rejection of both forms 
of Americanism: the cultural and the political. Thus we can have either of two 
separate outcomes: One anti-Americanism rejects cultural trends that are seen 
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as typically American, while it admires America’s prowess, idealism, and 
optimism. The other anti-Americanism rejects an American political creed 
that, for all its missionary zeal, is perceived as imperialist and oppressive, 
while it admires American culture, from its highbrow to its pop varieties.9 
 
Other authors convey a similar concept in the distinction between America 
being disliked for what it primarily is or for what it does. Katzenstein and Keohane 
astutely point out that anti-Americanism fluctuates too much to be simply about what 
America is.10 Juan Cole entitled his article for the American Historical Review, “Anti-
Americanism: It’s the Policies.” After a lengthy evaluation of anti-Americanism 
throughout the world, Cole concluded his article in this way: “What is indisputable is 
that the sentiments are not generated by a clash over basic values. It’s the foreign 
policy, stupid.”11 Roger also points to the policies as the reason for anti-Americanism.  
All polls confirm what seems obvious: America’s image abroad has been 
rapidly deteriorating in direct connection with a policy seen as (check one or 
more): ill motivated, politically naive, hazardous for the region and the rest of 
the world, not to speak of illegitimate in the eyes of international law.12 
 
In addition to asserting policies are the cause for the rising anger towards the U.S., he 
articulates what many accept as given: that anti-Americanism is about foreign policy 
blunders and not about something deeper. “Although negative attitudes have spiked in 
recent years, world opinion is not intrinsically anti-American.”13 
However, there is also support that anti-Americanism has its roots in what 
America is. Paul Hollander wrote in 1992, “Anti-Americanism has less to do with the 
policies and actions of the United States and more with what the United States is or 
what it stands for.”14 Is it possible that one of the foremost works on anti-
Americanism could be out of date in the post-September 11 world? Markovitz is one 
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scholar who emphasizes that anti-Americanism, at least in Europe, is still caused by 
what it is: 
Negative sentiments and views have been driven not only—or even 
primarily—by what the United States does, but rather by an animus against 
what Europeans have believed that America is. While the politics, style, and 
discourse of the Bush terms—and of President Bush as a person—have 
undoubtedly exacerbated anti-American sentiment among Europeans and 
fostered a heretofore unmatched degree of unity between elite and mass 
opinion in Europe, they are not anti-Americanism’s cause.15 
 
 The next section proposes an explanation of anti-Americanism, taking into 
consideration the many frameworks and distinctions that have been made about the 
phenomenon, including the differences between culture and policy and what America 
is versus what it does. The framework that follows is a starting point for anti-
Americanism to be thoughtfully evaluated based on both the varying root causes and 
the level of anti-Americanism among a respective people or country.  
 
III.3 Anti-Americanism Framework 
The framework I have developed begins with an evaluation of the differing 
root causes for anti-Americanism throughout the world. Although the reasons for anti-
Americanism vary, the three primary strands could be termed Cultural, Economic, and 
Political. After a summary of the elements of the framework, each will be addressed 
in detail.  
The Cultural strand of anti-Americanism is based on America being seen as 
the leader and main culprit of the negative cultural trends coming from globalization. 
The spread of McDonald’s, Hollywood, or sex symbols are frequently cited sources of 
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resentment. As the negative cultural trends associated with what America is spread 
throughout the world, anti-Americanism rises.  
The Economic strand of anti-Americanism comes from those who resent what 
America does in relation to economic dominance in the world. America is viewed by 
these groups as economically imperialist, both in its forced spread of neo-liberal 
capitalism and unjust pursuit of natural resources. Capitalism failing to cause 
improvement in a country can be a source of bitterness, as can American 
unwillingness to come to the aid of countries that need help economically.  
The Political strand originates from what America does in its meddling in the 
politics of other countries and the harmful use of hard power. America is a “loose 
cannon,” using its military might in unilateral and irresponsible ways. Exemplified 
most recently by the Iraq War, America’s overthrowing of regimes and supporting 
corrupt dictators are long-lasting sources of anti-Americanism. The view of the Bush 
administration specifically, with its cowboy style and macho arrogance, is resented. 
Perceived one-sided support for Israel is one of the most commonly cited examples of 
this reason for anti-Americanism. 
The three-circle Venn diagram in Figure 1 highlights the predominant theme 
of each sphere. One of the strengths of the Venn diagram is showing the overlap of 
reasons for anti-Americanism. 
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The next step of the framework is based on the recognition that while the root 
causes differ, so do the levels of resentment and the corresponding view of the United 
States. Other frameworks do not typically include both of these concepts. Many 
authors give reasons for anti-Americanism or perceptions of America, but few try to 
combine them. The three representative grades of anti-Americanism are Benign 
Hegemon, Disruptive Force, and Threatening Power. This is shown visually in Figure 
2. While countries could be placed in one category, the cylinder shows a vertical 
continuum between the three categories within which a country could be placed.  
Composing the Benign Hegemon level are those that are the least anti-
American. They see the U.S. as not ill-intending, just unaware as it pursues its own 
interests. Like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla, the U.S. does not realize the extent of 
its power and influence. It is looking out for its own self-interest and, simply because 
of negligence and lack of awareness, causing harm to others. According to this view, 
America can be accommodated and hopefully even become a more responsible 
member of the global community.  
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The Disruptive Force category is the middle level where the U.S. is viewed as 
an irresponsible actor. The behavior of the United States needs to be corrected or the 
situation will get worse. The U.S. is perceived to be generally uncooperative and 
stirring up trouble for the world. More disorder and bloodshed will come if the U.S. 
does not correct its behavior.  
The Threatening Power category is composed of those who believe that 
America is an immediate threat and danger to the world. The most radical among 
these anti-Americans believe that the U.S. intends to conquer the world. People in this 
category view the U.S. as more than a general problem and a direct threat to their 
interests.  
 
Threatening Power
Disruptive Force
Benign Hegemon
Not ill-intending
Unaware as it pursues
Its own interests
More disorder will
come if not corrected
Stirring up trouble
Immediate danger
to the world
Must be changed
Figure 2:
Levels of 
Anti-Americanism
 
These three categories are on a continuum, but countries or groups of people 
could be placed generally into one of the groups. This can be depicted visually by the 
three-circle Venn diagram in Figure 1 becoming three-dimensional and the height 
showing where a country fits on this scale. The combination of the two could then be 
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used to formulate the perception of America and the strength of and general reasons 
for anti-Americanism in a particular country. Having provided an overview of the 
framework, the next sections explore each of the elements of this framework in 
greater detail.  
 
III.3.1 Cultural Anti-Americanism 
The first major root of anti-Americanism is Cultural. This is the resentment of 
American culture and the spread of the accordingly negative cultural trends to the rest 
of the world. These are connected because typically a resentment of what America is 
perceived to be is it at the core of the dislike of American culture’s dissemination in 
the world. If American culture was totally admired, then its spread would tend to be 
seen as a good thing. However, many dislike America for what it is, and therefore the 
negative influence it is having on the world. “In the eyes of its enemies, [America] is 
condemnable not only for what it does but for what it is. Whatever it does, whether it 
intervenes on the international stage or remains cloistered within its frontiers, it’s in 
the wrong.”16 
America is seen as the leader and main culprit of globalization. The 
globalization backlash, or the aversion to modernity, manifests itself in resentment to 
the U.S. The spread of Big-Macs, American-made movies and television shows, the 
sex-industry, and the spread of English can all be sources of resentment. People see 
these and other trends invading their own cultures and the United States is the easiest 
party to blame. Homogenization associated with U.S. mass culture is an 
accompanying danger for some that can bring hatred. 
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At the root of the cultural strand of anti-Americanism is the underlying 
theoretical claim that there is something fundamentally wrong with America. “Anti-
Americanism rests on the singular idea that something associated with the United 
States, at the core of American life, is deeply wrong and threatening to the rest of the 
world.”17 The theoretical accusations are abundant and diverse, but there are themes 
that run through the writings of the philosophers critical of America.  
America began as a place of inspiration and hope. Sir Thomas More, in his 
work Utopia released in 1516, followed by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
others, viewed America as free from history and an object of hope compared to the 
shortcomings of their societies.18 However, the utopian view of America faded as it 
became a reality. By the early 19th century, after the failure of the French Revolution, 
the United States was the only society based on an Enlightenment conception of 
nature. After romantics were proved wrong when the United States survived and 
prospered, they changed tactics to say that America’s continued existence was at the 
cost of everything deep and profound.19 They argued that with no hope of sustaining a 
genuine culture, there was only a dull materialism. A flattening of the soul, a loss of 
depth, mathematization and mechanization of life, no room for quality, and an empty 
and superficial world are among the criticisms attached to the United States by 
philosophers over the ensuing years.20 This theoretical anti-Americanism spreads 
from Western European intellectuals to influence others in the world.21 
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The ideological differences between Europe and America continue to today. 
Robert Kagan convincingly argues a “great philosophical schism has opened within 
the West” since the end of the Cold War.22  He claims “it is precisely the question of 
legitimacy that divides Americans and Europeans today—not the legitimacy of each 
other’s political institutions, perhaps, but the legitimacy of their respective visions of 
world order.” According to Kagan, the divide over Iraq was more about principles 
than policies. Although there also political reasons for European anti-Americanism, it 
has deeper cultural roots out of an objection to what America is. 
The theoretical reasons for anti-Americanism underlie an opinion that a 
negative predisposition to everything American gives a negative view to specific 
outcomes or policies. Phillipe Roger writes, “a globally negative reading of 
everything American constantly preempts isolated analyses in specific fields and 
circumstances.”23 This is in contrast to Rob Kroes’ argument that anti-Americanism 
proceeds from specific areas of disagreement to larger frameworks of rejection. 
“Entire repertoires of stereotyped Americas can be conjured up to account for any 
contemporary transatlantic disagreements.”24  
Katzenstein and Keohane use the term “polyvalence” to refer to the American 
symbols that mean different things to different people. Different people may dislike or 
admire the same characteristic of American life. There is: 
 
an alleged loss of purity and authenticity for Europeans at the hands of a 
threatening and unwelcome intruder who—to make matters worse—exhibits a 
flaring cultural inferiority. America is resented for everything and its opposite: 
It is at once too prurient and too puritanical; too elitist, yet also too egalitarian; 
too chaotic, but also too rigid; too secular and too religious; too radical and 
too conservative. Again, damned if you do, damned if you don’t.25 
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America is diverse enough that it is possible for everyone to find characteristics to 
resent.  
Europe is the clearest example of where anti-Americanism has cultural roots. 
America is disliked based on what it is in comparison to how Europeans perceive 
themselves. One scholar writes about America being viewed as “retrograde” based on 
moral, social, and cultural comparisons, all of which fit in the cultural category. He 
describes the European logic for the cultural backwardness as “America the 
commodified, Europe the refined; America the prudish and prurient, Europe the savvy 
and wise.”26 The following quotation provides insight into how the concept 
“American” is used in European countries.  
 
In German, the terms “Amerikaniesierung” (Americanization) and 
“amerikanische Verhältnisse” or “amerikanische Bedingungen” (American 
conditions) almost invariably refer to something at once negative and 
threatening—something to be avoided…In Britain, “Americanisation” and 
“American-style” also have an almost exclusively negative connotation—
often with the adjective “creeping” as a telling modifier in front: the creeping 
Americanization of the car’s feel for the road, the cult of guns fueled by 
creeping Americanization through violent films, the creeping Americanization 
of the growing girth of British novels, the creeping Americanization of British 
sport.27 
 
Especially interesting are the concerns of the British about the “American” cultural 
trends in as varying areas as guns, films, novels, and sports. 
The prototypical case of cultural anti-Americanism is France. “It is this 
cultural anti-Americanism that has remained the most pronounced among the 
manifestations of French anti-Americanism, persisting at a time even when its 
political roots atrophied.”28 Frenchman Pascal Bruckner provides a remarkably candid 
assessment of the roots of anti-Americanism in his home country. 
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Here is the problem of France: it has always lived in rivalry with the United 
States. They are the only two nations imbued with the messianism of 
universalism. Even though Paris and Washington have never gone to war, a 
bellicose coexistence characterizes our countries’ relations, all the more since, 
by its successes, Anglo-Saxon civilization eclipsed French civilization. It’s 
not an exaggeration to write that France today, turning away from its 
neighbors, looks toward America, the only object of its resentment. France 
hates America because it looks too much like it, only in miniature: the same 
fatuousness, the same certainty of excellence incarnate, the same mix of 
moralizing and cynicism. As Dominique de Villepin has often put it, our 
country’s principal title to glory lies in its resistance to America, its ability to 
underline its weaknesses, to put a stick in its spokes, to denounce it always 
and everywhere.29 
 
Bruckner continues about how the French media was astonished by the language used 
in a speech in France by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He writes that it  
reminded the French that we have forgotten the message of our revolution of 
1789. America embodies the democratic inheritance that we have repressed. 
We despise it for having grown great as we’ve diminished, but above all we 
despise it for defending, sometimes in brutal and quarrelsome fashion, those 
values that we’ve buried.30  
 
France provides the quintessential example of a country that dislikes America for 
what it is. The next two strands address the resentments primarily for what America 
does.  
 
III.3.2 Economic Anti-Americanism 
The second root cause of anti-Americanism is Economic. This can be 
resentment of economic imperialism, imposition of capitalism, insufficient help in 
financial crises, or the disregard for the environment in pursuit of economic gain. 
There are also those who feel they are the “losers” in global capitalism and 
consequently resent the U.S. 
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Economic imperialism is a large reason for anti-Americanism in parts of the 
world. The U.S. is seen to be exploiting others as a colonial power, seeking to expand 
its economic empire. One author writes of the tendency toward the economic roots of 
anti-Americanism in the Third World.  
Third Worldism is that mix of socialism and anti-Imperialism which blames 
the West, especially America, and the local elites which work with it for the 
shortcomings in the developing countries, offering a vision of a more equitable 
and prosperous society once the evil West is forced to open its death grip on 
the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.31  
 
Such thinking comes from a combination of blame and economic grievances.  
The spread of capitalism is also a source of resenting America. “Frequently 
anti-Americanism is a form of anticapitalism, when the United States is thought to be 
a repository of social injustice as the major capitalist nation in the world and defender 
of other capitalist nations.”32 This has its source in Marxist anti-capitalism. America 
was a place upon which Marxists, like other theorists, could place their hopes of how 
history would unfold. Friedrich Engels wrote with excitement in 1886 that the 
working class had passed through the two “stages” in only ten months,33 “Where no 
medieval ruins bar the way.”34 As for other theorists that saw great promise in 
America, David Kennedy writes that “something confidently predicted and eagerly 
anticipated had not come to pass in the United States, to the disappointment and even 
embitterment of those who had expected it.”35 Marxists were eventually let down by 
Americans not behaving in the way that Marxist theory had optimistically dreamed. 
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The fact that America has been the place of unrealized dreams is one reason for a 
tendency towards anti-Americanism. 
The Marxists’ hope in America was replaced by a perception that America 
was now the global capitalist project that “compelled all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production.36 The U.S. therefore came to 
represent the worst of capitalism.  
In American thinking, there is not a priori objection to straightforward 
economic exploitation. Anti-American Marxists like Noam Chomsky believe, 
of course, that that is the essence of the problem, and it calls into question the 
‘system’ on which the U.S., like most modern societies, functions.37  
 
Africa and Latin America are among the places where the economic reasons 
are the biggest cause of anti-Americanism. “Just consider: here is a country that 
attracts immigrants from everywhere, and has not succeeded in getting Africa to take 
off economically. It is surely responsible for the uneven economic records of its 
hemispheric neighbors.”38 Greg Grandin highlights the economic grievances of Latin 
America throughout his article on the history of anti-Americanism in the Americas.  
In the early twentieth century, criticism of the United States, sharpened 
through Marxist theory, gained political momentum with the growth of 
communist, socialist, and nationalist political parties, and connected both with 
domestic guerrilla insurgencies and internationalist movements… corporations 
and banks steadily replaced gunboats as the main agent and symbol of U.S. 
power.39  
 
He explains that Latin America does not have a history of outright rejecting the 
American culture. “Since the early nineteenth century, Latin American elites had 
shared with their North American counterparts the idea that ‘America’ represented a 
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renovating world force distinct from archaic Europe.”40 It is primarily economics, 
rather than resentment of culture, that is the root of anti-Americanism in Latin 
America. “There is an almost general belief in Latin America today that the United 
States has siphoned off the wealth which could have led to the Southern Hemisphere’s 
development. ‘They are rich because we are poor; we are poor because they are 
rich.’”41 
A wave of anti-Americanism that did not exist in the 1990s has swept over all 
segments of society in Latin America.  
 
Many Latin American governments woke up from a decade-long experiment 
with neoliberal prescriptions and realized they were not better off than they 
had been before—many in fact, were much worse. With the United States 
suddenly absorbed in its War on Terror, countries like Argentina, Peru, 
Uruguay and Brazil were left alone to recover from poorly managed reforms 
that had left them staggering under a huge debt load, growing unemployment 
and an even more unequal distribution of income. 42 
 
Economic issues dominate the assessment of anti-Americanism in Latin America.  
 The U.S. refusal to halt billions of dollars in farm subsidies on the one hand, 
while it speaks of free trade on the other, is viewed as hypocritical throughout the 
region.43  
A recent survey by consulting firm Research International found that a 
majority of Latin Americans believe U.S. brands are exploiting people and the 
environment. A third of those surveyed believed U.S. companies were ‘big, 
evil empires with lots of money.’ The survey, based on 850 interviews of 
upscale consumers, found that young people were more likely than not to have 
negative attitudes toward U.S. brands.44 
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The economic meltdown has paved the way for Hugo Chavez of Venezuela’s high 
profile defiance of America. 
 Argentina may be the strongest example of anti-Americanism caused by 
economic reasons within the region. “Washington refused to bail out Argentina as the 
country sank into default, forcing millions of Argentines into poverty.”45 Blame was 
placed on the U.S. for not doing enough to assist Argentina and even for having 
conspired against it. During the peak of Argentina’s financial implosion, “weekly 
newsmagazines and cable talk programs spun out scenarios in which the United States 
had co-conspired to sink Argentina economically paving the way for U.S. investors to 
acquire massive landholdings in the Pampas and Patagonia.”46 Argentina is an 
example of anti-Americanism with economic roots.   
 
III.3.3 Political Anti-Americanism 
The third and final grouping of root causes for anti-Americanism is Political. 
This is the resentment of America for primarily its political and military actions, 
including resentment of American use of hard power, perceived arrogance in the 
world, support of Israel, unilateralism and disregard for international law, and past 
support for dictators and meddling in other countries’ affairs.  
Especially in America’s response after September 11 and the Iraq War, the 
resentment of U.S. force is cause for anti-Americanism throughout the world. 
America is viewed as the culprit for killing and bloodshed in Iraq, and is threatening 
to use its military might again with Iran. The number of military campaigns causes 
some to resent America for being too militaristic. Others bemoan the disproportionate 
size of the U.S. military. The overwhelming U.S. nuclear arsenal and record as the 
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only country to have used nuclear weapons are commonplace in anti-American 
rhetoric. The coercive nature of American foreign relations is causing a backlash in 
most places around the world.  
A second source of resentment towards the U.S. in the political sphere is its 
arrogant style. This has become especially pronounced under the Bush administration 
since September 11. Fareed Zakaria has frequently written on the arrogance of the 
Bush administration. “This strange combination of arrogance and incompetence has 
not only destroyed the hopes for a new Iraq. It has had the much broader effect of 
turning the United States into an international outlaw in the eyes of much of the 
world.”47 The arrogance makes the situation all the worse. Bush’s rhetoric that “You 
are either with us or against us” in the war on terror has caused resentment. The rest 
of the world does not accept America’s campaign of “good versus evil.”  
The U.S. support of Israel is among the most-cited root causes of anti-
Americanism in parts of the world. The opening line to Katzenstein and Keohane’s 
article “Anti-Americanisms” emphasizes the impact of the Israeli issue on anti-
Americanism. “Arab reactions to American support for Israel in its recent conflict 
with Hezbollah have put anti-Americanism in the headlines once again.”48 Barry 
Rubin argues that “There is an attempt to reduce all American policy to a single issue: 
the U.S. support for Israel.”49 This is the main reference point for a widely held belief 
that the U.S. is anti-Arab.  
A fourth reason for anti-Americanism from the political sphere is the 
unilateralism and disregard for international law attributed to America, especially 
prominent since the start of the Iraq War. Phillipe Sands’ vehement attack against the 
U.S. in Lawless World is a clear example. He writes in the preface, “With the election 
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of George W. Bush in November 2002, a U.S. administration took office that was 
outspoken in its determination to challenge global rules. Soon it turned into a full-
scale assault, a war on law.”50 In the conclusion, Sands chastises America and 
especially the Bush administration “that behaves as though international law does not 
matter, that has withdrawn from international agreements with impunity, and that is 
willing to bully other states which seek to promote initiatives such as the ICC and the 
Kyoto Protocol.”51 This statement shed light on how objection to the U.S. in one area 
fuels broader resentment. It seems that Sands will view anything that America does 
with suspicion.  
Lastly, America’s past support for dictators or regime change, whether all true 
or not, continue to fuel anti-Americanism in many countries throughout the world. 
Hollander lists military interventions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama and the U.S. Marines landing in twenty 
Caribbean countries between 1905 and 1965 as examples in Latin America alone of 
sources of resentment.52 
China is an example of a country that has political roots for its anti-
Americanism. According to the observations of a Chinese writer, 
The media continues to characterize the United States as an irresponsible 
hyper-power that regularly interferes in other countries’ internal affairs. The 
word ‘hegemon’ has become synonymous with the United States in the press, 
as the maintenance of social stability (i.e., no democratization) has become 
synonymous with economic progress.53  
 
In 2006, 79 percent of Chinese were reported to acknowledge a liking for Americans, 
compared to 59 percent believing that the United States seeks to contain China and 56 
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percent that the United States is China’s competitor.54 This is evidence of political, 
rather than cultural, roots of anti-Americanism in China.  
 
III.3.4 Overlap within the Framework 
One of the strengths of this new framework is the overlap it accounts for in the 
Venn diagram in Figure 1. There are several issues that of course do not fit neatly in 
one of the main spheres. There is no assertion that there are three mutually exclusive 
reasons for anti-Americanism, but rather that these are strands that help clarify the 
main roots. 
 The environmental reasons for anti-Americanism are an example of overlap 
primarily between the Cultural and Economic spheres. America is seen as willing to 
disregard the environment in pursuit of its unbridled economic ambitions. The 
American image at home of irresponsibly driving huge, gas-guzzling SUVs is also 
hated by critics. The U.S. unwillingness to sign the Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the 
most notorious environmental shame, which combines economic motivation and even 
the perceived American unilateralism and arrogance of the Political sphere. 
 There is also overlap between Economic and Political, as both are primarily 
based on resentment with America about what it does. These involve accusations that 
the United States is only motivated by self-interest. The one word “oil” is a common 
reply as to why one resents American actions in Iraq and the Middle East. This 
overlaps the two categories because many people see it as both economic exploitation 
and the use of hard power to secure more oil. Economic and political resentment are 
often interconnected, such as in Grandin’s mention of both as causes of anti-
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Americanism in Latin America. “Over the course of two centuries, it has not been 
clashing universalisms that served as the primary fault line between the two 
Americas, but how the expansion of the United States’ political and economic power 
fractured a shared sense of exceptionalism.”55 
 The combination of Cultural and Political has to do with where exceptionalism 
meets American foreign policy. There is resentment for America considering itself to 
be a “city on a hill” and having the “right” type of democracy. As these filter into 
foreign policy it can cause embitterment. An example is America’s war on terror and 
“evil.” This combines resentment for both what America is and what it does.  
 There are also lines of thinking that all three of the spheres share, such as 
hypocrisy, imperialism, and anti-institutionalism. America can be viewed as 
hypocritical within any of the spheres. It speaks of free markets, but then has policies 
to protect itself that are viewed as detrimental to the world. The U.S. advocates 
democracy and personal liberty, but critics look to its hypocritical support of corrupt 
regimes and tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib. America can also be viewed as imperial 
in any of these areas, whether in culture, economic domination, or control by force. 
The U.S. unwillingness to join institutions such as the International Criminal Court 
and Kyoto Protocol, and undermining of the United Nations, has backlash in all of the 
primary areas of anti-Americanism.  
It is also typical for America to be held responsible for all of the ills related to 
one or more of the spheres. If the resentment is based on political roots, it would be 
normal for America to be seen as the culprit or at least influencer of all of the political 
problems in the country. The same is true for the cultural and economic reasons. 
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III.4 Benign, Disruptive, Threatening 
While the Cultural, Economic, and Political strands are the predominant roots 
for anti-Americanism, there is still the question of the nature of the United States. 
What is the degree to which a country or group of people resents America? The 
reasons for anti-Americanism are inadequate for comprehending the strength of anti-
Americanism within a country. Two countries may resent America for the cultural 
trends entering their countries because of globalization. However, how negatively one 
views America will influence the overall picture of anti-Americanism. Similarly, in 
the political realm America’s perceived unilateralism may be criticized in different 
places around the world, but it matters whether a country sees the U.S. as benign or 
threatening in its unilateralism.  
 
III.4.1 Benign Hegemon 
The first level, “Benign Hegemon,” is a term taken from François Heisbourg. 
In a 1999 article, Heisbourg explains this as one of four perceptions of the U.S. 
abroad. Heisbourg describes one vision of the U.S. as a Benign Hegemon, “basically 
attempting to focus on what it sees as its own affairs, with no malign intentions.”56 
The U.S. is acknowledged by this group to be a hegemon, the predominant power in 
the international system, as it is unparalleled in military force, information 
technology, brand-name, and cultural penetration. According to this perception, the 
U.S. is basically trying to focus on its own affairs, but with such size and power it is 
very difficult for the U.S. to carry out its business without interfering in the affairs of 
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others. The adjectives Heisbourg uses are “Strong rather than brutal; candid and 
possibly naïve, rather than sly or crafty.” 57 
Although a lot has changed since 1999, this remains a relevant category for 
describing the mildest form of anti-Americanism. Kishore Mahbubani, formerly 
Singapore’s Ambassador to the United Nations, gives a thoughtful analysis of anti-
Americanism in his 2005 book Beyond the Age of Innocence.58 Mahbubani essentially 
argues that America is a Benign Hegemon. While sympathetic because of the 
opportunities he feels he was given by America, he argues that America is not aware 
of its considerable power and influence on the rest of the world. Since the end of the 
Cold War, America has focused on its own interests to the detriment of the small 
global village that it has helped create. He makes a plausible case that America 
unintentionally causes turbulence in the world because of the incredible power it 
holds. “The other 6 billion citizens who are affected strongly, perhaps even more 
strongly, by decisions made in Washington have no means of influencing.”59  
The Benign Hegemon picture of America is intentionally mild. For some, as 
perhaps with Mahbubani, it may not even be anti-Americanism. However, it describes 
the frustration with America, without hatred or fear of bad intentions. In this grade, 
America could be disliked for McDonald’s taking root in one’s hometown and driving 
out the small traditional shops, but not faulted for intentionally trying to ruin one’s 
culture. Economically, a country could wish that America did more with all of its vast 
economic resources to help it recover from an economic crisis. America’s 
unilateralism may be disliked, but seen to be acting in its own self-defense, rather than 
intentionally trying to harm the world or disregard international law. Those who see 
the nature of America as a benign hegemon can still be anti-American in holding an 
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attitude of resentment and dislike for American politics or culture. In this view, the 
U.S. is not a danger to the world, but only an over-powerful country that needs to be 
accommodated and maneuvered. 
An analogy in a school setting could be a student that is extraordinarily rich 
and irresponsible in how he handles his money. He causes all sorts of problems in the 
school because he parks his car illegally and does not care about paying the parking 
tickets. He has money to buy all the latest fashions and also have expensive food for 
lunch ordered in each day. Although he does not care much about the influence on his 
peers, the families of other students are bothered by their children wanting to spend 
their limited money on the latest fashions and the traditional bag lunch being looked 
upon disparagingly. Some people think he should give money to help other students 
who could use assistance. The teachers hear the complaints, but the student is not 
really a direct harm to anyone. There are many students that dislike him and the 
amount of influence he has, but he has to be accommodated. After all, he has a lot of 
money.   
 
III.4.2 Disruptive Force 
A second view of the U.S is as a “Disruptive Force.” This degree of anti-
Americanism sees the U.S. as a force that needs to be disciplined and slowed down or 
the situation will get worse. The U.S. is viewed as uncooperative and stirring up 
trouble. It is looking out for its own interests and willing to trample the well-being of 
the world to achieve its own objectives. America’s ignorance about the rest of the 
world and lack of historical perspective are causing it to make great blunders. By 
trying to impose capitalism on everyone, the U.S. is causing harm to many countries 
and even disrupting the world economy. The U.S. has a history of intervening in the 
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affairs of other governments in Latin America and the Middle East and is causing 
continued problems by not changing this behavior. In undermining international 
institutions and being too reliant on military power and unilateral action, the U.S. is 
harming the international system.  
 In the school analogy, this degree of anti-Americanism is like the most 
disruptive student in the class. He is uncooperative with the teachers that are trying to 
keep the class under control, always fancying himself an exception to what the 
teachers wish. He also throws objects around the room. Many of the students feel like 
his immaturity is already disturbing them and that if he continues more problems are 
going to be caused. Some teachers have noticed that he is influencing other students 
to be more violent and bully some of their peers. He always seems to be getting into 
the business of others. Although he does not seem, at his core, to be a bad person, he 
is absolutely a negative influence and needs to be disciplined before someone gets 
their eye poked out with a pencil or the situation becomes unmanageable.  
 
III.4.3 Threatening Power 
“Threatening Power” is the third and highest degree of anti-Americanism. 
Countries or peoples in this group see America as a real and immediate danger to their 
culture or nation. The U.S. is perceived to have intentions to overtake other cultures 
and dominate countries, if not the world. America is an imperial power that already is 
ruling the world and is not satisfied. This classification includes and even exceeds 
Heisbourg’s most extreme category of Rogue State seven tumultuous years after he 
penned his perceptions of the U.S. abroad.  
Similarly, Katzenstein and Keohane’s Radical anti-Americanism fits within 
the Threatening Power classification. They write that this anti-Americanism  
 63 
is built around the belief that America’s identity, as reflected in the economic 
power and political power relations and institutional practices of the United 
States, ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, 
practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world. For progress towards a 
better world to take place, the U.S. economy and society will have to be 
transformed, either from within or without.60  
 
Although this is a helpful classification that is in agreement with the 
framework of this chapter, its shortcoming is a presumption that all radical anti-
Americanism is similar. I contend that for assessing how to deal with anti-
Americanism it is helpful to know whether the roots are more cultural, economic, or 
political. Katzenstein and Keohane combine them, saying that it is about “America’s 
identity, as reflected in the economic power and political power relations and 
institutional practices of the United States.” However, this is too general for America 
to focus its efforts to mitigate such anti-Americanism. The Threatening Power degree, 
as with the other levels of anti-Americanism, can be based on any of the three general 
root causes or a combination of them.  
 To complete the school analogy, this third group perceives the United States 
as a student who has sent a bomb threat to the school administration.  Such a student 
is a real and immediate threat to all of the students in the school. This student is not 
just a disturbance, but a bona fide danger to everyone involved. There is almost no 
hope to bring such a student back into the system. He needs to be expelled from the 
school. Sadly, there is something fundamentally wrong with this student’s character. 
This power-hungry student is not content to fit in with his peers. Both what this 
student is and does is a threat to the whole idea of the school. Disciplinary actions are 
not enough to stop such a student; he needs to be radically changed or eliminated 
from the system. Whether he will destroy the school first or not, the hatred of this 
student is increasing all the while.  
                                                 
60
 Katzenstein and Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, 33. 
 64 
 
III.5 Outside Influences 
. The framework explained the three primary strands of rationale that people 
have for their resentment of America. However, there are also mixes of other factors 
influencing anti-Americanism that fall outside of the rational, even if not altogether 
accurate, reasons. These are represented as other forces acting on the respective 
attitudes of anti-Americanism. Such influences that go beyond what America is or 
does are strong factors in the second dimension of the degree of anti-Americanism in 
a country. Paul Hollander makes a clear distinction between the rational response 
against American misdeeds and the irrational predisposition to America.  
A proper understanding of anti-Americanism can only be achieved by 
balancing two apparently incompatible perspectives: (a) that anti-
Americanism is a direct and rational response to the evident misdeeds of the 
US abroad and its shortcomings and inequities at home; (b) that anti-
Americanism is a largely groundless, irrational predisposition (similar to 
racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism) expressing a deeply-rooted scapegoating 
impulse.61 
 
Many scholars have also argued that anti-Americanism has less to do with 
what America is or does, and more to do with the beholder. Katzenstein and Keohane 
have pointed out that anti-Americanism is complicated because it can be just as much 
a reflection of the people that hate America as it is about any problems of America. 
“The phenomenon is too broad and diverse, reflecting the attitudes of America-haters 
as much as the America they hate.”62 These outside factors that have little to do with 
America itself could be categorized as: the manipulation of local forces, uniting 
around anti-Americanism, scapegoating, a lack of understanding, and America as 
“Mr. Big.” 
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Anti-Americanism can be specifically promoted by the local elites and 
governments. Patrick Clawson and Barry Rubin have argued in many publications 
that the real roots of Arab anti-Americanism are in manipulation by local forces. 
“Contrary to beliefs and assertions that U.S. policies are responsible for Middle 
Eastern anti-Americanism, local forces have promoted it in the service of particular 
political goals.”63 The commentary on conspiracy theories in the Philippines in 1990 
is an example of how such thinking has long existed, and not just in the Arab world: 
“It probably hasn’t occurred to many Americans that the United States might be 
contemplating an invasion of the Philippines…conspiracies involving the United 
States are a staple of this city’s political culture.”64 Anti-Americanism is also 
encouraged at high levels in China. “When it comes to anti-Americanism in China, 
the Chinese government, above all, molds its citizens’ thinking through state 
indoctrination.”65 
Anti-Americanism can become a unifying mechanism for countries and 
groups throughout the world. Some scholars have even cited anti-Americanism in 
Europe as an example. “Fundamentally, the European views about America have little 
to do with the real America but much to do with Europe.”66 The author argues that 
anti-Americanism is being utilized as something around which a common European 
identity can be built. “Far from harming Europe and its interests, anti-Americanism 
has helped Europeans gain respect, affection, and—most important—political clout in 
the rest of the world.”67 The same is said specifically about France. “To that end, anti-
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Americanism in France is a machine for producing consensus, the only means of 
reconciling all of its political and intellectual families.”68 
Scapegoating is another reason for anti-Americanism. Hollander writes that 
anti-Americanism “appears to be born out of a scapegoating impulse fueled by a wide 
variety of frustrations and grievances; as such it has much in common with 
chauvinistic nationalism that seeks to bolster collective self-esteem by the denigration 
of other nations.”69 Mary Eberstadt, in an article focused on the tendency to find 
scapegoats both in the U.S. and the world after September 11, includes America as 
one of the popular scapegoats. She writes that some have made an  
industry of scapegoating in the U.S. All have their reasons, and the overriding 
reason is an obvious one. There is something deeply human about the desire to 
find all the things scapegoats can provide: a vessel to bear one’s anxieties and 
outrages, a target that won’t hit back, a welcome distraction from the real 
thing.70 
 
Anti-Americanism can become a mechanism for blame. Barry Rubin is one prominent 
scholar who challenges the idea that America has acted against Arabs and argues 
Arab anti-Americanism has more to do with scapegoating.  
For years now, anti-Americanism has served as a means of last resort by 
which failed political systems and movements in the Middle East try to 
improve their standing. The United States is blamed for much that is bad in the 
Arab world, and it is used as an excuse for political and social oppression and 
economic stagnation.71 
 
 
Misunderstanding based on a presumption of understanding also contributes to 
anti-Americanism. Heisbourg makes a useful contribution in explaining why the 
perceptions of the U.S. can vary so much and why the U.S. can be hard to figure out 
for foreign publics. The diversity of the U.S. government and “an exceptionally 
vibrant, diverse and powerful civil society” make America a difficult place to 
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understand.72 He makes an astute observation that foreign perceptions of the U.S. are 
all too often based on the belief that one knows a lot about the U.S., but on the reality 
of ignorance. The result “is such that it is all too easy for outsiders to think that they 
know more about the U.S. than they actually do.”73 This leads to dangerous 
perceptions and simplifications about American culture, intentions, and foreign 
policy.  
 Another reason for anti-Americanism is the “Mr. Big” argument explained by 
Katzenstein and Keohane, among others. “In this view it is no accident that American 
power is at its zenith while American standing is at its nadir.” 74 Although this plays 
into the cultural, economic, and political roots of anti-Americanism, it is also another 
factor in anti-Americanism. James Ceaser holds that the dominant strategic position of 
the United States is a “natural” source of anti-Americanism.75 He argues that former 
great powers like the Romans, Greeks, and Great Britain were naturally disliked. 
Hollander’s first reason given for the rise of anti-Americanism is that the fall of 
Soviet communism and elimination of the second superpower has led to the opinion 
that as the only global force around the world, the U.S. can be held responsible for 
many cultural, economic, and political problems.76 Although superpowers can handle 
the position differently, the position lends itself to resentment.  
 
III.6 Iceberg Analogy  
 To this point, my framework has been an effort to shed light on the overall 
causes and variations of anti-Americanism in the world. The fundamental roots of 
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anti-Americanism, the varying intensities, and the contributing outside forces all 
provide a framework through which to view anti-Americanism. 
 However, these more general explanations still do not reveal the extent of 
deeper and unique reasons for the differing levels of anti-Americanism among 
countries. In order for the United States to effectively deal with anti-Americanism in a 
particular country, it is helpful to have a general sense of the reasons, but also to look 
deeper. One of the important features of anti-Americanism is that the reasons for it are 
deeper than normally recognized. 
A familiar analogy to help visualize the concept is that of an iceberg, a large 
section of freshwater ice that has broken off from a glacier or ice shelf and is floating 
on the open sea. Because of the lower density of the pure water ice compared to the 
sea water, typically only one ninth of the volume of an iceberg is above water. 
Icebergs are a well-known danger to ships because of the unpredictable shape of the 
iceberg under water.77 The iceberg has therefore become an analogy for a problem 
actually being much deeper or more complex than what is immediately visible on the 
surface of an issue. 
Although policies may be the spark of renewed anti-Americanism, past 
sensitivities and suspicions are almost always drawn upon. If this were not the case, 
the level of anti-Americanism would be more similar in countries examined. There 
are many reasons why the anti-Americanism in Turkey is not the same as in Iran, 
although both border Iraq. To really deal with anti-Americanism in a country, it is 
vital for the roots to be sought out and not settle for the simplistic explanations to 
which everyone points. The final part of the framework presents an analogy that can 
be applied to understanding anti-Americanism in a particular country. 
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III.7 Glasses Analogy  
Each country has its own lenses through which it reads American behavior. 
The two lenses of the metaphorical glasses could be described as 1) what America is 
viewed to be based on the country’s past relations with it, and 2) what the beholder 
itself is. The combination of these lenses influences how a country views America in 
the world. This is related to the argument from Robert Jervis’ classic work, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, that there is a strong tendency 
for actors to see what they expect to see and fit incoming information to pre-existing 
images.78 What America is doing is real, in countless international connections and 
actions. However, the extent to which each of the actions is perceived as a 
misjudgment, threat, or perhaps even positive influence, varies from country to 
country.  
The left lens is based primarily on the past relationship or interaction between 
the two countries. This directly influences the way that the current behavior of the 
U.S. is seen. A very strong relationship where America was a faithful ally will tend to 
give a country more of a positive view of American actions than a country that has 
felt manipulated and marginalized at the expense of U.S. interests. Almost every 
country has some past interaction with the United States, and this influences how it 
perceives the current actions. A trusting friend will give the benefit of the doubt to the 
suspicious actions of his friend, while the person who has felt harmed by the same 
behavior in the past will assume the worst. The actions can be the same, but be 
viewed differently based upon the history of the relationship. Likewise, America is 
viewed by countries through the left lens of the history of interaction.  
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The right lens of the glasses is about what that particular country is: this 
includes the history of the country, its identity, and the current political issues within 
it. This connects to Katzenstein and Keohane’s argument that anti-Americanism can 
say as much about the beholder as it does about America.79 
Anti-Americanism can be simply described as a negative predisposition or 
bias towards the United States. Therefore, the glasses analogy appropriately shows 
how the U.S., when viewed through certain lenses, can be viewed with a negative 
predisposition. 
 
III.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a framework for better comprehending anti-
Americanism. Without an appropriate evaluation, anti-Americanism could be rejected 
as a totally irrational phenomenon or as an obvious reaction to the wrongs of the U.S. 
Neither one of these is helpful to clearly identify the influences at work, and what can 
be changed.  
This chapter has argued that the basic roots for anti-Americanism are Cultural, 
Economic, or Political in nature. The Cultural resentment of America is grounded in 
what America is and the spread of its culture to other parts of the world. The 
economic and political roots have to do with the policies and what America does.  
The second contribution of this framework is to evaluate the degree to which 
America is resented. A country can exist somewhere along a continuum of perceiving 
America as a Benign Hegemon, Disruptive Force, or Threatening Power. These levels 
of anti-Americanism in a country are influenced by a variety of forces outside of the 
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United States, including manipulation of local forces, unity around America as the 
“other,” scapegoating, a lack of understanding, and America as the lone superpower. 
However, there is still more than meets the eye, and to understand the iceberg 
of anti-Americanism in most countries, the glasses analogy should be used to analyze 
how a country views America. The lenses of the glasses are the past relationship with 
the U.S. and what the beholder itself is. This allows a country’s place in the 
framework to be explored and understood. It is worth noting that anti-Americanism is 
not identical throughout a given country, although there are similarities that make this 
one appropriate unit of analysis. This thesis explores the diversity of anti-
Americanism by country, but the framework could be applied just as easily to 
segments of society.  
The next chapter applies this framework to the case of Turkey, a country 
where anti-Americanism is extremely high. By understanding the reasons for the 
problem of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the U.S. can work toward appropriate 
solutions.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY: WHAT AMERICA IS VIEWED TO BE 
 
 
 
IV.1 Introduction 
The 2003 decision by the Turkish Grand National Assembly not to cooperate 
with the U.S. war against Iraq is the clearest sign of the lack of solidarity in the 
Turkish-American relationship. The differing course of action leaves a lingering 
division between the traditional allies. This event increased the complexity of the 
invasion of Iraq and the overall outlook on the Middle East for the U.S., for whom the 
boiling war in Iraq is only one of the problems brewing. Likewise, fears about rising 
Kurdish clout in northern Iraq continue to grow for Turkey, now restrained from 
entering the region after not joining the initial American offensive. Strong public 
opinion against the U.S. declaring war on Iraq has festered into growing anti-
Americanism. This is becoming a problem in itself, and one that will make other 
problems more difficult to solve.  
As a traditional ally to the U.S. and a democratic country, Turkey is an 
intriguing and significant case in which to explore the concept of anti-Americanism. 
Anti-Americanism in Turkey is among the highest in the world.1 At the crossroads of 
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Europe and Asia, Turkey has a unique blend of factors influencing its view of 
America. At the same time, America and Turkey have a history of positive relations 
that should be an asset. Turkey is therefore a fascinating case study on how anti-
Americanism has become so high. With a majority Muslim population, Turkey 
garners special importance for the United States in its post-September 11 perspective 
of the world. According to Chris Fitzgerald, Deputy Director of Press and Public 
Diplomacy for Europe in the U.S. State Department, Turkey has a high profile in the 
public diplomacy efforts of the United States due to its special characteristics and 
geopolitical importance.2  
This chapter analyzes anti-Americanism in Turkey as a case study to build 
toward how the United States can improve its public diplomacy based on better 
understanding. This chapter utilizes the anti-Americanism framework set forth in 
chapter three to categorize anti-Americanism in Turkey and then delves deeper into 
Turkey’s own mix of reasons for resentment. A case study of the rift in the 
relationship between Turkey and the U.S. provides insight into anti-Americanism and 
illuminates one of the problems confronting the U.S. in the Middle East and the 
world. The chapter will begin with the statistics showing the current levels of anti-
Americanism and why it is a problem that must be taken seriously.  
 
IV.1.1 Statistics of Anti-Americanism 
The opinion polls in Turkey make it abundantly clear that Turks are 
disenchanted with America. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, those in 
Turkey having a favorable opinion of the U.S. dropped from 23 percent in 2005 to an 
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abysmal 12 percent in 2006, even lower than the 15 percent in 2003.3 Rather than 
decreasing, it seems that anti-Americanism is increasing. Only three Turks in one 
hundred have a favorable or somewhat favorable view of President Bush. Turks are 
not only turned off to the U.S. government; in 2006 a scant 17 percent of Turks held a 
favorable opinion of Americans. An in-country poll conducted by Consensus 
Research 4 in 2005 found that anti-Americanism in Turkey had risen to 82 percent.5 A 
poll conducted in Istanbul in 2003 reported that 90 percent of Turks do not think 
America is a good and trustworthy ally and 74 percent that it is looking out only for 
its own interests.6 
Turkish-American relations may have never been worse than they are today.7 
Poll after poll of public opinion paints an ominous picture of Turks’ view of America.  
 
IV.1.2 Why Anti-Americanism is a Problem 
Is the anti-Americanism that shows up in polls really a detriment to the United 
States? Perhaps there is going to be a natural ebb and flow of anti-Americanism with 
which America does not need to concern itself. Katzenstein and Keohane assert that 
“it is difficult to identify big problems for American foreign policy created by anti-
Americanism.”8 International columnist Bruce Stokes argues that Turkey is a 
testament to the contrary.9 The two primary reasons that anti-Americanism matters are 
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the example of the 2003 decision and the longer term impact it will have if the anti-
Americanism becomes deeply ingrained.  
In the build-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the United States desired Turkish 
support for a “Northern Front” in the invasion. The resolution which would have 
allowed tens of thousands of U.S. troops to be based on Turkish soil failed before the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003. By many accounts, the strong 
public opinion to the contrary from almost all segments of society influenced the 
government decision. An overwhelming 83 percent of Turks opposed allowing the 
U.S. and its allies to use its bases in war according to the Pew Global Attitudes survey 
in late 2002.10 “Turkish public opinion was clearly opposed to U.S. intervention, and 
a wide range of Turkish elites, including the security establishment, were ambivalent, 
at best, regarding U.S. policy.”11 Reports by such organizations as the Strategic 
Studies Institute recognized the pressure on the Turkish government not align too 
closely with the U.S., due to the strong opposition by the public.12 Stokes holds that 
the decision cannot be removed from its domestic public opinion context: “At the 
time of their decision, Turkish politicians and military leaders were undoubtedly 
aware that fewer than one in six of their fellow countrymen called themselves pro-
American.”13 Cengiz Çandar, an influential Turkish journalist specializing in the 
Middle East, wrote that the decision was “The product of the corporate Turkish entity, 
ranging from the moderately Islamic ruling party to the arch-secularist main 
opposition party in the parliament, from the president to the powerful military, from 
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the influential judiciary to the mainstream media.”14 Writing in 2001, Kemal Kirişci 
observed that in regard to force against Iraq, “public opinion plays a very important 
role and there is a great reluctance among Turkish decision makers to be seen as a tool 
of US policy in the region.”15  
A journalist for Zaman, one of the leading conservative newspapers, argued in 
an editorial that the Turkish government does not want to be identified with America 
when its image is so negative throughout the region.16 Cameron Brown explains that 
in a decision that came down to “going against the will of the vast majority of the 
population or saying no to the United States,” the government tried to diffuse 
responsibility for the decision.17 This is not to imply that Turkey’s decision was based 
on anti-Americanism. Turkey has reason to avoid an invasion from its territory based 
on its foreign policy priorities. Nevertheless, in a decision that came down to three 
votes in the Turkish Grand National Assembly,18 the willingness or unwillingness to 
trust and follow the lead of the United States has significance. Public opinion factored 
into the government’s decision.  
Philip Robins writes how the public opinion has traditionally been a secondary 
player in the making of foreign policy in Turkey, coming from the Ottoman tradition 
that people exist to serve the state rather than the state existing to serve the people. 
Accordingly, Turkey’s political culture is characterized by foreign policymaking 
being dominated by the elites. An example is the way that Turgut Özal was able to 
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carry the day in Turkey supporting the U.S. in the first Gulf War. 19 Özal took a 
gamble to join the coalition in 1991, with only 20 percent of the population behind 
him, according to one poll at the time, expecting to be rewarded by members of the 
Western alliance for his support.20 “Despite wide public endorsement of neutrality, 
President Özal almost single-handedly led Turkey into an alliance with the 
coalition.”21 This has been typical in Turkey, where the public’s views rarely appear 
to have had much influence on either policymakers or the policy-making process.22 
The result has been the U.S. focusing on government elites in its efforts to influence 
Turkey. However, there is indication that this is changing. Robins acknowledges that 
public opinion has been growing in importance since the 1990s.23  
Ali Karaosmanoğlu, professor of international relations, also argues that the 
publics are now involved more than ever before, making it difficult for issues between 
the U.S. and Turkey to be approached calmly.24 This requires the U.S. to relate 
directly to foreign publics and build understanding. The changing dynamics mean that 
a working relationship with the government will not be enough. Making a deal with 
Turkish elites behind closed doors did not accomplish what the U.S. wanted in 2003. 
If Turks and others in the region have a predisposed negative attitude, it will make it 
increasingly difficult for America to lead in the future 
Beyond the example of the Iraq War, if anti-Americanism is not dealt with 
now it will harden into something worse. Nasuhi Güngör, a political columnist for the 
Star newspaper, pointed out that if the anti-Americanism remains high for several 
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more years, a generation will be raised with this kind of anti-American atmosphere. 25 
He says that the more anti-Americanism rises, so does the sympathy for Iran. More 
generally, “No government in today’s Turkey would risk its popularity by going along 
with pro-American policy suggestions.”26 The longer anti-Americanism persists, the 
more difficult it will be for America and Turkey to work together.    
 
IV.1.3 Anti-Americanism in Turkey Overview 
Based on the framework in chapter three, anti-Americanism in Turkey is 
grounded in political reasons. The lead-up to the Iraq War and its aftermath ignited 
pre-existing sensitivities in Turkey due to its past relations with American and its own 
identity issues and fears. Contrary to the emotional reactions evident in public opinion 
polls, anti-Americanism has not yet become a widespread dislike of Americans or 
their culture, but a resentment of American policies that are viewed as a threat to 
Turkish interests.  
 While this is true, the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey are deeper than 
the general rejection of the legitimacy of the Iraq War and the ensuing instability. The 
ongoing war and accompanying issues are seen through the lenses of Turkey’s 
lingering mistrust of America as an ally and the insecurities over the threats to the 
Turkish Republic. More specifically, these lenses become 1) an inflated view of 
American agency coupled with 2) mistrust and a reactionary phobia about threats to 
undermine the Republic. Anti-Americanism is primarily based on a perception that 
America’s actions in the Iraq War are against Turkish interests in supporting Kurdish 
self-determination that will lead to the eventual dismemberment of Turkey and, 
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secondly, supporting the AKP and political Islam as a part of its broader plan for 
Middle East politics, which threatens to erode Turkey’s secularist state.  
 The resulting anti-Americanism is mostly based on distorted perceptions 
caused by the lenses, which leads to an exaggerated view of American involvement 
and conspiracy theories not grounded in reality. These have caused the Iraq War and 
the “Hood Event” to be seen in the worst light possible, leading to a deepening belief 
that America is a Threatening Power, according to the spectrum of the last chapter. 
 
IV.1.4 The Common View 
 Living in Turkey since the Iraq War, it would be easy to think that anti-
Americanism began in Turkey after America’s decision to invade Turkey’s neighbor. 
Indeed, a full 70 percent of Turks believe America’s war in Iraq made the world a 
more dangerous place, compared to just eight percent who think removing Saddam 
Hussein made the world safer. The Turks’ negative view of the Iraq war is evidenced 
by the 60 percent of Turks that believe the U.S. in Iraq is a threat to world peace, the 
highest among any of the 15 countries polled by Pew. As a point of comparison, only 
16 percent believed Iran and 6 percent North Korea to be a danger to world peace.27 
The headline of a 2005 article in the conservative Yeni Şafak newspaper proclaims 
“Bush politics is the reason for Anti-Americanism,” both reflecting and fueling the 
public sentiment.28 
 As a way to get a feel for the reasons for anti-Americanism, I conducted a 
survey. With no pretense that it is scientific or representative of all Turkey, I thought 
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it would be useful to get the pulse of students. According to a one-page questionnaire 
completed by 127 university students in Ankara, the top three issues that influence 
anti-Americanism in Turkey are the Iraq War, U.S. support for Kurds, and President 
Bush. The responses are shown below. From the list of ten choices, respondents were 
asked to select the top three.29  
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This same general attitude is held by both Turkish and American specialists. 
Banu Eligür wrote that the perception of the U.S. as “Turkey’s most trustworthy and 
dependable ally in the West” changed in March 2003 when the United States invaded 
Iraq.30 In a 2005 hearing before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, 
Soner Çağaptay, Director of the Turkish Research Program of the Washington 
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Institute for Near East Policy, explained anti-Americanism in this way: “Regarding 
resentment in Turkey toward the United States, the bad news is that it is widespread. 
The good news is that it is not deep-rooted.”31 He believes that it is quickly reversible 
if the proper policy steps are taken. A similar sentiment was stated even more clearly 
by Ambassador Daniel Fried before the same subcommittee in March of 2007. 
“Turkish anti-Americanism is broad, but it is, in our view, shallow.”32 He asserts that 
“It would be easily reversed if circumstances such as the PKK situation were 
changed.” Perhaps both wanted to paint a positive picture to the U.S. Congress, but 
the U.S. government needs to have an accurate analysis, not a hopeful one.  
 While this common view of Turkish anti-Americanism may be in part true, it 
does not provide an accurate enough understanding of the roots of anti-Americanism 
in Turkey, which go deeper than the recent policy in Iraq. Henri Barkey of Lehigh 
University, a regularly consulted expert on Turkish affairs, offers a more sophisticated 
evaluation of the anti-Americanism in Turkey by putting forth two seemingly 
contradictory statements. “First is, I actually think that the current malaise in United 
States-Turkish relations is temporary in nature…That said, I also do believe that anti-
Americanism in Turkey is actually much deeper than we think it is.”33 Although he 
too is hopeful anti-Americanism may drop to its pre-Iraq War levels, Barkey holds 
that it will remain “problematic over the long term.” While anti-Americanism has 
reached remarkably high levels in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the phenomenon is 
more complicated than opposition to recent American policies. To understand the 
dynamics of anti-Americanism in Turkey, the U.S. needs to look below the surface.  
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IV.1.5 Anti-American Iceberg in Turkey 
It is evident to most observers that the U.S.-Turkey relationship wrecked on 
the iceberg of the Iraq War, both in the lead-up to the March 1 decision, and the way 
that the conflict continues to be handled. In looking at the unprecedented levels of 
anti-Americanism in Turkey it is easy to see the huge block of ice floating atop the 
water upon which the relationship continues to be bashed. However, in the analogy of 
an iceberg, as explained in the last chapter, what is visible above water is only a 
fraction of the predicament. The U.S. policies in Iraq are only the most observable 
part of what has caused wreckage in relations. That Turkish anti-Americanism is 
among the highest in the world is indication of the iceberg phenomenon. Even the 
predictions far before the Iraq War that such a conflict would be detrimental to 
relations is indication of preexisting issues.34 
However, a more careful analysis of statistics shows greater complexity in the 
anti-Americanism. 35  The 52 percent favorable opinion of the U.S. before September 
11 is not an overwhelming majority. In other words, nearly half of Turks before 
September 11 did not have a favorable view of the U.S., challenging the commonly 
held notion that anti-Americanism originated from the Iraq War. There was plenty of 
lingering apprehension toward the U.S. in place. A huge drop in the favorability of 
America in 2002 is evidence that America’s reaction to September 11 was viewed 
negatively even before U.S. troops were on the ground in Iraq. It appears that the lead 
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up to and the beginning of the war disenchanted even more Turks. It also stands out 
that the lowest ratings were reached in 2006.  
In a survey I performed at Bilkent University and Middle East Technical 
University (METU) campuses in Ankara, when asked specifically about whether anti-
Americanism in Turkey began after the Iraq War, about two-thirds of Bilkent 
Students and 85 percent of METU students said that it did not.36  
 
IV.1.6 Anti-Americanism in Turkey is Political 
To begin the evaluation of anti-Americanism in a country, the underlying 
reason should be identified. Based on the anti-Americanism framework explained in 
the last chapter, Turkey fits into the Political strand of anti-Americanism. Soner 
Çağaptay explains that the Iraq War was primarily responsible for “reviving dormant 
political forces and anti-Americanism.”37 Underneath the inflammatory event of the 
Iraq War is an anti-Americanism rooted in the Political. In the iceberg analogy, the 
whole iceberg is composed of Political reasons,38 although some are the recent and 
visible ones, while others are below the surface. Anti-Americanism in Turkey is not 
significantly influenced on cultural or economic reasons. Duygu Sezer, professor of 
international relations, stressed that Turks have a natural tendency to like Americans. 
She says that no one in Turkey is saying “I don’t like you.” Instead, Turks are saying, 
“We don’t like your policy.”39 
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Another finding from the survey I conducted among 168 social science 
students at Bilkent University was a widespread belief that anti-Americanism in 
Turkey is based on political, rather than cultural or economic reasons. Seventy-five 
percent of students cited “Political” as the only or number one basic reason for anti-
Americanism in Turkey.40  
The politically rooted anti-Americanism is influenced by its past relations with 
America. Philip Robins wrote in the introduction to his study of Turkey. “There is 
also a need to consider the experiences, ideas, and values which help to condition 
perceptions.”41 Turkey is not simply a predictable and generic geo-strategic ally. The 
way Turkey perceives its foreign policy, America, and the world are shaped by a 
unique mix of factors.  
 
IV.2 The Left Lens: The Past Relationship of U.S. and Turkey  
U.S. actions in Iraq are widely resented, in all corners of the world and even in 
America. However, each country views these events through a different pair of 
glasses, as described in the last chapter. What America is doing is real, but how this is 
perceived varies from country to country. The left lens of the glasses, the topic of the 
remainder of this chapter, is about what America is, which is based primarily on the 
past relationship or interaction between the two countries. The right lens of the 
glasses, addressed in the following chapter, is about what Turkey itself is.  
 The strategic relationship between Turkey and America began out of the 
common fear of the Soviet Union after World War II, marked by the arrival of the 
American warship USS Missouri to Istanbul in 1946. The Turkish reaction was 
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“ecstatic. To the man in the street at last was tangible proof that Turkey did not stand 
alone…The Turkish press hailed the United States as the defender of peace, right, 
justice, progress, and prosperity.”42 Turkey became a beneficiary of America’s 
Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Marshall Plan a year later to contain the spread of 
communism. “Conceived in the cold war, born in the context of the U.S. policy of 
containment, the postwar collaboration of Turkey and the United States once seemed 
a model of international cooperation.”43 The fledgling relationship was strengthened 
by Turkey sending a significant contingent to fight in the Korean War alongside the 
U.S.-led UN forces. Turkey’s formal acceptance into NATO in 1952 was the 
crowning moment in the countries enjoying a close alliance throughout the 1950s. 
Turks greeted the joining of NATO with rejoicing.44 Turkey provided critical military 
base locations of great geo-strategic importance to the U.S. In return, Turkey 
benefited from extensive military and economic aid. “The period from 1947 to the 
early 1960s was one of almost full convergence of American and Turkish policies.”45 
 
IV.2.1 Roots of Mistrust 
However, damaging episodes over the next couple decades still cloud the 
relationship between the countries. The U.S. decision in 1962 to remove the Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey without any notification to Ankara following the Cuban missile 
crisis was perceived as U.S. willingness to turn its back on Turkey when it served its 
interests.46 One author wrote that there was “more than a hint of a Turkey-for-Cuba 
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trade.”47 The realization of the apparent asymmetrical nature of the relationship 
disturbed Turkish elites. In 1964 President Johnson sent the infamous letter now 
associated with his name, warning Turkey not to use U.S. arms against Cyprus. If 
military action incited the involvement of the Soviets, Turkey should not expect the 
U.S. to come to its aid. “Johnson’s letter amounted to threatening America’s Turkish 
ally with the common Soviet enemy. The feeling of betrayal in Turkey was 
widespread.”48 A third notorious event for Turkey occurred a decade later, when 
Turkey’s military intervened with force in the July 1974 coup in Cyprus. The action 
was widely condemned by the international community and the U.S. imposed an arms 
embargo against Turkey. “If the Johnson letter shook the Turkish establishment, the 
events of 1974 confirmed that there were limits to which Turkey could rely on her 
superpower ally.”49 These events are felt decades later. “The punitive aspect of the 
sanction fed Turkish anti-Americanism, and instilled feelings of suspicion towards the 
United States on the part of Turkish decision-makers that still reverberate today.”50  
During the 1960s and 1970s there was a leftist anti-Americanism popular 
among young people. According to Nihat Ali Özcan of TOBB University, one of the 
roots of anti-Americanism today is the anti-Americanism from the leftist, pro-Soviet 
socialists in the 1960s and 1970s.51 During this time there were new American 
military bases opened in Turkey and there was resentment over the presence of U.S. 
soldiers within Turkey’s borders. Journalist Meriç Köyatası also acknowledged the 
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historical roots of one of the anti-American camps. He describes them as coming from 
the leftist culture and against American imperialism.52  
Although these harmful events were weathered, the Turkish-American 
relationship emerged from the Cold War scarred. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for 
example, “left a deep imprint on Turkish-American relations… it gave concrete form 
to creeping suspicions that the fate of the NATO allies might not be inextricably 
linked after all.”53 Turkey has viewed the U.S. as an unreliable or “ambivalent”54 ally 
because of the critical times the “U.S. has either failed to deliver or has shown itself 
willing to trade its Turkish assets in favour of some greater reward.”55 There is fear 
that the U.S. could withdraw support when Turkey needs it most. Robins writes 
directly, “this perception of the United States as an ally that waxes and wanes 
overlays what for many in Turkey is an instinctive anti-Americanism.”56 Journalists 
still frequently refer to the Johnson Letter as having great influence on Turkish 
American relations.57 The “imprint” and “perception” left from the history of the 
relationship are what make the left lens of the glasses through which Turkey views the 
U.S. today.  
Despite predictions by some that Turkey would lose its strategic importance 
after the end of the Cold War, it remained an important ally of the U.S. with the many 
conflicts that sprang up in the regions around Turkey. Although Turkey joined the 
U.S. and the international community in taking action against Iraq in 1991, many feel 
they were not compensated for the losses incurred. One foreign correspondent 
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reported in April 1991 that since Özal’s decision to “shut off Iraq’s dual oil pipeline 
over Turkish soil right after Saddam Hussein sent his forces into Kuwait on August 2, 
Turkey has lost at least six billion dollars in trade.”58 Most Turks look back on the 
first Gulf War with resentment, seeing the economic losses the crisis caused and the 
refugee crisis of nearly half a million Iraqi Kurds flooding into southeast Turkey.59 
“Turks remain convinced that they were forced to bear an excessive share of the 
financial burden that resulted from the war.”60 Duygu Sezer is one scholar who 
maintains that Özal made the right decision to join the U.S. alliance against Iraqi 
aggression, despite the lack of compensation.61 Turkey’s cooperation with the U.S. 
and the West helped solidify its geo-strategic importance at the end of the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, the memories of the first Gulf War would have influence on the way 
Turks perceived a future war against Iraq. 
The relations between the countries remained workable throughout the rest of 
the 1990s as Ankara and Washington’s strategic interests remained similar more often 
than not. For example, Ankara was a strong advocate of NATO continuing when there 
was talk of it dissolving at the end of the Cold War. A high point of relations was in 
President Clinton’s visit to Turkey in November 1999, attracting Turks with his 
skilled style.62 It is remarkable how much Clinton’s visit to Turkey is mentioned by 
Turks of all ages, often-times cited as an example that anti-Americanism did not exist 
before the Iraq War. Nur Bilge Criss, professor of international relations, refers to 
Clinton’s visit and the standing ovation he received in the Turkish parliament as a 
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positive high in relations between the countries since the end of the Cold War.63 The 
relationship between the two capitals has continued on, but with a suspecting eye to 
the reliability of the U.S. as an ally.  
Turkey has long considered the U.S. an untrustworthy ally with a propensity to 
act only in its own best interest. The Jupiter missile issue, Johnson Letter, and arms 
embargo remain as examples where the U.S. has been viewed as willing to 
compromise its relations with Turkey when it serves its own interest. In addition to 
the unreliability, there is a related view of asymmetry in the relationship, where the 
U.S. does not adequately consider and compensate the financial losses that Turkey 
incurs, as in the first Gulf War. Mistrust has built up historically in the relationship 
between the countries. This has become part of the lens through which Turkey views 
its current interaction with the United States.  
 
IV.2.2. America the “All-Knowing” and “All-Powerful” 
 The other factor tainting the lens is a feeling America is an omnipotent and all-
powerful force that can accomplish everything it wants. America is believed to be a 
huge influence on everything Turkey does. When it does not act in Turkey’s favor, it 
is seen as part of a bigger plan. 
Turkey has a tendency to attribute great power and influence to the United 
States. Aykan Erdemir, a sociology professor at Middle East Technical University, 
says that despite the heterogeneity of Turkey, everyone gives enormous agency to the 
United States.64 He explains a widespread tendency to credit America with a type of 
omnipotence, where it can see all, hear all, and has enormous power. America is 
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accordingly held responsible for much of what happens negatively in Turkey and the 
world. Harris wrote about the “American factor,” where the U.S. is perceived to be an 
important influencer in Turkey’s internal affairs.65 
A tendency to attach enormous weight to the actions of the U.S. is also evident 
through the events discussed above. President Johnson’s letter, for example is made 
into a larger-than-life symbol of American intentions. Nur Bilge Criss explains that 
the importance of the letter has been blown out of proportion. She maintains that 
Turkey would have had trouble taking military action at that time anyway, but it is 
built into a huge act of power by the Americans.66 The same tendency to point the 
finger at U.S. involvement is evident in beliefs that the U.S. put its support behind the 
military coups of the past or that the U.S. is backing an opposing political party. 
It is noticeable upon examining this case that Turks expect a lot of America 
and sees issues from the perspective of their own self interests. Of course, the same 
could probably be said about any other country. Harris explained the belief that while 
the U.S. can negatively influence Turkey, it also has the power to help, “resting as it 
does on the notion that a superpower can and will find the means to accomplish its 
desires. 67  
Turks feel they have enough problems and do not want the U.S. to create any 
more.  However, Turks also believe that America has the power to help relieve 
Turkey’s problems, and expect it to do so. If not, Turks feels that America is not a 
reliable ally. In this sense, the power of America can become an inhibitor in its 
relations. Hasan Cemal wrote that the faults of the U.S. are evident, especially the 
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Bush administration’s two years of inaction in dealing with the PKK issue.68 Turkey 
does not expect Italy, for example, to be able to solve its Kurdish problem and 
eliminate the PKK. America touches every place on the globe either directly or 
indirectly through the influence of its foreign policies. While Turks would not 
necessarily expect Italy to do other than what is in its interest, Turks, along with the 
rest of the world, want America to attend to its needs. 
The Cyprus crisis of the 1960s, with noticeable parallels to the current Turkish 
desire for U.S. to deal with the PKK issue, exemplifies expectation of U.S. 
involvement. “Many Turks had an exaggerated notion of what could be done toward 
solving the Cyprus problem if Washington would only throw its weight into the 
balance.”69 Another remarkable parallel to the current issue of the PKK is mentioned 
later by Harris that in 1964 the main complaint against the U.S. was that it was 
permitting the build-up of Greek Cypriot forces by counseling peaceful means and 
discouraging the use of Turkish military force.70 
Donald Kirk provided a clear example of how America can be held 
responsible for domestic events. He relates an exchange with Turgut Özal about why 
Turkey had not started a modernization effort sooner. Özal reportedly said that it is 
because of a lack of support from the U.S., which he believed was limited by the 
Greek lobby.71 The United States’ taking action (or lack thereof) was used to explain 
away Turkey’s failure to begin a modernization effort. 
The United States created this picture partly itself as it built up a strong image 
to counter Soviet influence in countries like Turkey. The Bush administration 
contributes to this all-powerful image that it can go it alone. The mission statement of 
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the State Department (not the Department of Defense!) has a bold unilateral 
statement.  
 
We will strive to strengthen traditional alliances and build new relationships to 
achieve a peace that brings security, but when necessary, we will act alone to 
face the challenges, provide assistance, and seize the opportunities of this era. 
U.S. leadership is essential for promoting this vision, but others must share the 
responsibility.72 (emphasis added) 
 
For international relations it would be better for the brash unilateral phrase to be 
eliminated from the mission statement. 
This overview of Turkish-American relations through the last six decades 
shows the long-standing issues in the relationship, and the factors clouding and 
constituting the left lens of Turkey’s metaphorical glasses. These influence the way 
Turkey has viewed American behavior in recent events. Therefore, as the War in Iraq 
is continuing, and touches on other sensitive issues for Turkey, it is not surprising that 
distrust of America would sky-rocket in 2003. It is to the basis of the sensitive issues 
that we now turn.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
ANTI-AMERICANISM IN TURKEY: WHAT TURKEY IS 
 
 
 
While the left lens is the past relationship between the countries, the right lens 
of the metaphorical glasses has to do with what Turkey specifically is. This includes 
Turkey’s history, identity, fears, and current politics. In contrast to the left lens, 
America has very little or no influence on the right lens, even though the lens 
significantly influences the way Turkey sees the United States. In the case of Turkey, 
this will be addressed in terms of Turkey’s history and fears related to its identity 
struggle, which in turn shapes the current politics.  
 
V.1 Historical Reasons Based on Turkey’s Past 
One essential element in assessing a country’s anti-Americanism is its past. 
Every country did not begin at the same time with a clean slate. To the contrary, each 
nation has an individual story and past that influence how it views the world. The case 
study of Turkey presents an obvious example of how the weight of its history is still 
felt today. “Makers of Turkey’s foreign policy continue to shoulder the burden of 
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their Ottoman past.”1 Although history’s heavy influence on Turkey could be 
addressed at length, just two examples will be given of how Turkey’s past impacts the 
way it interacts with the world and, more specifically, with the U.S. 
One of the aspects of Turkey’s past that affects it today is the greatness of the 
Ottoman Empire, which stretched from the Middle East to Central Eastern Europe. 
According to Veysel Şimşek, Ph.D. candidate of Ottoman History at Bilkent 
University, Ottoman history is an important part of the Turkish national identity.2 
From primary school to high school Turkish history is taught almost exclusively, 
including mainly Ottoman, War of National Liberation, and earlier Republican 
history.3 Şimşek explains a belief deep in Turkish minds: “We are taught that we are 
heirs to war winners, law givers and order givers.”4 According to policy analyst 
Cengiz Çandar, Turkey carries the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The swift 
transformation of the Ottoman Empire to a nation-state deeply influences the outlook 
of Turks today.5 I have personally felt how much Turks are aware of their ancestor’s 
greatness, a sentiment I have experienced even outside of my many friends doing 
graduate work in Ottoman history. The first time I grasped the widespread 
identification was in a TÖMER6 classroom in Ankara, the state capital established to 
solidify a break with the Ottoman Empire. I was invited to the TÖMER class as a 
guest English speaker by a young Turkish teacher. The advanced English class was 
composed of government employees in their thirties and forties. In the midst of a 
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lively discussion about their views of America, the teacher commented that if they are 
honest they all are proud of the greatness of the Ottoman Empire. It was memorable to 
hear this from a young woman who graduated from a university in Ankara and to see 
every head nodding in agreement in a class full of state employees. 
 In an interview with Nihat Ali Özcan, a former army officer and current 
academic with a focus on anti-Americanism in the Turkish military,7 he talked at 
length about the influence of the Ottoman past on Turkey today and how Turks desire 
to be loyal to a powerful state that watches over them. He explained that because of 
its imperial tradition, Turks respect the powerful position of America and do not 
naturally resent it for being an empire. In the TÖMER classroom, I was surprised by 
the number of students who, although without hesitation calling America an empire 
that rules the world, said that they would do the same if they had the opportunity. 
There is a sense of jealousy of America that brings respect, but also sensitivity that 
can lead to anti-Americanism. 
An example of this sensitivity is that Turks still have a pride about their past 
greatness, and are angered by references to Turkey still being the “sick man of 
Europe,” the tag placed on the ailing Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. There was a 
volatile reaction in Turkey to Robert Pollock’s 2005 article in the Wall Street Journal 
titled “The Sick Man of Europe—Again.”8 Pollock scathingly writes, “Much of 
Atatürk’s legacy risks being lost, and there won’t be any of the old Ottoman grandeur 
left, either. Turkey could easily become just another second-rate country: small-
minded, paranoid, marginal and—how could it be otherwise?—friendless in America 
and unwelcome in Europe.” With such strong and demeaning language, it is no 
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wonder that the article prompted such strong reactions.9 To taunt Turkey with being 
“just another second rate country” understandably fans the embers of its past 
greatness.  
 
V.2 Sevres Phobia 
Another historical influence on the way that present-day Turkey sees the 
world is the “Sevres Phobia.” The infamous Sevres Treaty, signed in 1920 by the 
victors of World War I and representatives of the Ottoman sultan, carved up the 
remaining Ottoman provinces, including an independent Armenia in the east and a 
referendum for an independent Kurdistan in the southeast. Although the treaty never 
came into force because of the successful National War of Liberation, “the map of 
‘Anatolia according to Sevres’ remained in the pages of schoolbooks as a symbol of 
hostile intentions on the last piece of land left to Turks.”10 The Turkish Republic 
continues on with the fear that it is surrounded by others who want to take its 
territory, as was tried in the past. “An integral part of the Turkish political culture is 
the conviction that the outside world is conspiring to weaken and carve up the 
country.”11 This fear contributes to the rising nationalism within Turkey. A common 
phrase that resonates with nationalists is “Türk’ün Türk’ten başka dostu yoktur” (“A 
Turk has no friend but a Turk”). Turkey’s dealings with foreign powers, the U.S. 
included, are seen through this lens. For example, in the mainstream newspaper 
Radikal, Đsmet Berkan wrote that “The most important thing here is [that we have a 
blind and] unshakable belief that the foreigners have been acting and will act secretly, 
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insidiously and by not telling the whole truth.”12 The Sevres Phobia is an example of a 
pervasive phenomenon where “expectations or perceptual sets represent standing 
estimates of what the world is like and, therefore, of what the person is likely to be 
confronted with.”13 
The prevalence of this attitude toward the U.S. and other foreign powers is 
supported by polling data such as the “Transatlantic Trends 2005” poll14 launched by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States.15 Suat Kınıklıoğlu analyzed the 
implications about Turkey in the Turkish Daily News. 
Transatlantic Trends 2005 also asked Turks what they think about other 
countries on a scale from zero to 100, with 100 meaning a very warm, 
favorable feeling and zero indicating a very cold and unfavorable feeling. As 
was the case last year, Turks are cold towards the United States (28), cooler, 
in fact, among nine European countries also included in the survey. Turks 
have become unfavorable towards France (29). While support for Russia (24), 
China (46) and Iran (36) have increased a little, overall these figures are rather 
low and are not even above the “neutral” 50. The EU still maintains the 
highest warmth degree (50), but analyzing the Turkish figures and comparing 
them with the other 10 countries polled it becomes apparent that Turks are not 
particularly warm to any other nation. Turks feel alone and isolated….Indeed, 
Turks are only particularly warm towards themselves. Turks gave 82 degrees 
to Turkey. These figures seem to confirm our famous isolationist dictum, 
“There is no friend to a Turk but a Turk.”16  
 
Another poll conducted by Sonar Research revealed that 22 percent of the Turkish 
public cannot find a single country close to Turkey.17 The highest countries were 
Germany, at just under 10 percent, and America at 6 percent.  
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V.3 Turkish Identity 
 In addition to the historical influences on the right lens, there is also the all-
encompassing issue of identity and the accompanying fears within a country. How 
Turkey views itself and the threats to this identity influence the way it sees the world. 
Katzenstein and Keohane maintain that anti-Americanism translating into very active 
anti-Americanism is dependent on the extent to which America is feared.18 If there is 
a fear of U.S. actions, anti-Americanism will increase. Based on this premise, the 
especially high anti-Americanism in Turkey could stem from deep fears within its 
populace about the negative effects that U.S. policy may have on the Turkish 
Republic.  
 As discussed earlier, there are deep-seated fears about threats to break up the 
Turkish Republic. Partly grounded in the Sevres phobia, the same legacy of fear was 
left by Atatürk.19 An example is in his monumental “Address to Turkish Youth” on 
October 20, 1927. The majority of the speech is devoted to imploring the young 
people to always be on their guard to defend Turkish Independence and the Turkish 
Republic. He warns about outside forces and “schemers,” but also that “More 
distressing and more grievous than all these, those who hold and exercise the power 
within the country may have fallen into gross error, blunder, and even treason.”20 
Atatürk’s fear seems to be that there will always be those who have a design to break 
apart the Turkish Republic, both from the outside, but also possibly from traitors 
within. With perceived threats such as this embedded in Turkish identity, it is vital to 
try to understand how fear acts as a source of anti-Americanism in Turkey in order to 
help mitigate anti-American sentiments. 
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 Another key component of understanding anti-Americanism is Kemalism. 
Kemalism is not an easily defined concept, and although any depth of the topic is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, a basic understanding would go a long way in helping 
American policy makers appreciate the way its policies are perceived by a Turkish 
Republic that is still saturated with its founder’s legacy.21 Kemalism was named after 
Mustafa Kemal (later honored with the name Atatürk), the hero that led Turkey in its 
National War of Liberation and galvanized a Republic from the remains of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
People had to be given a new collective identity, and they had to be persuaded 
to accept it. The Kemalist revolution had to establish simultaneously the 
Republic of Turkey, the Turkish people as a nation, and the Turk as a citizen 
with an identity different from being a Muslim subject of the sultan.22 
 
The official twin identities rigidly laid down by the Kemalist state were secularism 
and Turkish nationalism.23  
 Kemalism gradually became more of a conservative ideology out of a desire to 
protect what it has achieved.24 “Especially for Turkey’s politically powerful military, 
Kemalism represents a defensive political reaction against the perceived enemies of 
the secular Turkish republic: Kurdish nationalism and political Islam.”25 The 
principles that guided Kemal’s efforts to establish the modern Turkish Republic 
gradually became an obstacle to Turkey becoming more democratic because the 
country’s elites preferred an authoritarian interpretation rather than a liberal 
democratic one.26 
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V.4 Political Islam and the Kurdish Issue 
 In his article, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey,” Ömer Taşpınar, 
co-Director of the Brookings Project on Turkey, argues that the root of anti-
Americanism has to do with the tensions over Turkey’s own identity. “At its roots, 
Turkey’s current wave of distrust of the United States is a Kemalist identity 
problem.”27 Taşpınar describes “twin threats” of Kurdish and Islamic dissent against 
Kemalism. 28 Heinz Kramer, in his book A Changing Turkey goes into more detail 
about these two challenges to the Kemalist state.  
What is less-often realized in the West is that Turkey is also undergoing 
extraordinary internal changes. As a side effect of the international changes, 
important developments such as the uneasy relations with Kurds or the 
advance of politicized Islam that have long been in the offing but have been 
restrained by the repercussion of bipolar international relations on Turkish 
domestic politics could break through.29  
 
These internal issues in a changing environment provoke the way Turkey views the 
world and the U.S. 
 
V.4.1 Political Islam 
 The first prominent fear of the Turkish Republic since the time of Atatürk is of 
political Islam. Metin Heper, professor of political science at Bilkent University, 
refers to the issue of political Islam in Turkey as the “presumed efforts on the part of 
the government to bring back a state based on Islam.”30Atatürk sought to separate 
Islam from the state and break with the “backwardness” of the religious Ottoman 
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state. Secularism, or the divorce of public affairs, including law and education, from 
religion, was one of the indisputable parts of Kemalism,31 and it is still staunchly 
defended by the State in Turkey. “The republican principle, the national and social 
homogeneity of the Turkish nation, and the secular character of the republic were 
givens that could not be openly debated or even questioned by any political group.”32 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there was a territory populated “by a whole 
collection of ethnic minorities, bound together only by a shared Muslim faith.”33 
Although Islam was an important unifier of the Turkish identity, it also needed to be 
kept in check. Turkey adopted the French, or Jacobin, model of secularism where the 
state controls the majority religion.34  
Islam remains a very important part of the social fabric of Turkey, and is still 
viewed as a potential threat to the secular state. A Pew Global Attitudes survey 
release in July 2005 revealed that among those who consider themselves Muslim in 
Turkey, a plurality of 43 percent consider themselves a Muslim before a national 
citizen.35 Sixty-two percent of respondents in the same survey said that Islam plays a 
large role in the politics of Turkey, a significant increase from 41 percent in 2002, 
although 50 percent compared to 39 percent say that it is a bad thing. Political Islam is 
still feared, exemplified by the strong opposition to the appointment of Abdullah Gül 
as president in the spring of 2007.  
The intentions of the AK party,36 elected in 2002, continue to be hotly 
contested. Scholars such as Metin Heper believed that the AK party had passed the 
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“litmus test of acting rationally and responsibly in politics as well as keeping their 
distance from Islam.”37 Đhsan Dağı, professor of international relations at Middle East 
Technical University, wrote that the AKP is best described as a “post-Islamic 
movement” and can hardly be called Islamist “with a liberal, democratic and pro-
western orientation and political agenda.”38 
However, there are vehement responses regarding the Islamic intentions of the 
AKP. Michael Rubin, editor of Middle East Quarterly, makes an impassioned 
argument about the Islamist AKP’s erosion of secular institutions, asserting it intends 
to appoint “Islamists” to control all Turkish offices and attract “Green Money” from 
Saudi Arabia. 39   
In the post-September 11 environment, with fears and accusations of a war 
against Islam, the U.S. was eager to hold up Turkey as a model of a democratic and 
Muslim country. Taşpınar explains why this was not welcome in Turkey, especially 
by the government elite: “Turkey is a secular republic. We do not sympathize with 
religion-based illustrations that contradict this concept.”40 Çağaptay similarly states 
that highlighting the rise of the AKP as proof that Turkey is a democracy has 
alienated Turkey’s secular elites because they see it as a strategy by Washington to 
undermine Turkey’s secular order.41 More generally, Taşpınar argues, that U.S. 
support for “moderate Islam” in the Middle East and affirmation of Turkey as a model 
within it has been perceived as support for Islam within Turkey. Many Turks are 
concerned that Washington’s true aim is to “Islamify” Turkey and that Washington is 
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guilty for political Islam’s rise to power.42 For example, Ali Aslan of Zaman explains 
that the United States makes Ankara’s political and bureaucratic elite uncomfortable 
by holding up Turkey as a model Muslim country.43  
America has made mistakes that do not help the matter. In April of 2004, then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell “Ignited a small firestorm when he referred to Turkey 
in a speech as a model ‘Islamic Republic.’”44 Such instances fan suspicions over 
whether Washington has a close connection with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and 
the AK Party. Under Secretary Hughes may have fueled similar perceptions in her 
comments that, though made in good faith, drew attention in the Turkish media. 
Radikal reported Hughes saying “President Bush especially wanted me to meet with 
the religious leaders” during her visit to Turkey in 2005, and attracted attention to it 
with the subheading “Bush’un özel isteği” or “Bush’s special wish.” 45 
In Turkish mainstream media it is normal to hear assertions that the U.S. is 
supportive of the AK Party. A recent example is a Güngör Uras editorial in the 
mainstream newspaper Milliyet. He says that the bottom line is, “The AKP lies in the 
hearts of Americans.”46 He argues that because American decision makers are taking 
their information from a limited number of people who all support the AK Party, 
Americans believe that without the AK Party, there will be no democracy. He closes 
his article with an anecdote about a cleaning lady who went to the demonstration in 
Istanbul to advocate the preservation of a secular state. “I am, thanks to God, a 
Muslim, but I don’t want to live in a Muslim state.” In his article, Uras strongly 
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presents the case that the AK party, or political Islam, is a danger to the Republic, and 
is supported by the United States.  
There is also a tendency for Turks to interpret neutral statements made by the 
U.S. as intended to be in support of the AK Party. An example is a headline in 
Radikal, “Strong American Support for AKP.”47 The article is based on Secretary 
Rice’s statement that the U.S. supports democracy in Turkey, however the headline 
makes it appear to be a given that the U.S. supports the AK Party.  
 
V.4.2 The Kurdish Issue 
The second of the twin fears is about the Kurdish issue, a fear that is grounded 
in the problem of ethnic minorities and the Turkish identity from before the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic. The assertion of ethnic-nationalist minorities 
was used to justify the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire marked by the Sevres 
Treaty, which was detailed above. “At Sevres, the minorities issue emerged as being 
at the very heart of the existential challenge to the aspirations of the new Turkish 
nationalist movement.”48 The Sevres Treaty was officially replaced by the 1923 
Lausanne Treaty that recognized only the existence of religious minorities. “Under 
Lausanne, then, ethnic minorities among the Muslim population of Turkey, notably 
the Kurds and Arabs, were left without any special status or recognition.”49 The 
Republic identity became based on Turkishness and the existence of different ethnic 
groups was simply denied.50  
The Kurdish issue has been so closely monitored by the state because the 
Turkish national identity was based on the assertion of a common Turkish ancestry. 
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“Predominant is how to resolve the official state doctrine of the ‘one and indivisible 
nation and state’ with the undeniable existence of 10 to 12 million persons of different 
ethnic origin and cultural background…”51 The issue remains extremely sensitive, 
even as the laws have been slightly loosened. “Until the 1990s, mentioning the words 
“Kurd” or “Kurdish” in public was generally regarded as breaking a taboo.”52  
It is through this lens that Turkey views anything that happens in support of 
Kurds. “In a way, both the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey have been 
hostages to the Kurdish problem for the past 25 years.”53 The assertion of a separate 
Kurdish ethnicity is a challenge to the Turkish identity. It evokes fears of population 
and territory being seized from Turkey, as happened with Sevres. According to 
Taşpınar, almost everyone in Turkey thinks that Washington supports a Kurdish state 
in Iraq, either intentionally, or that its policies will eventually have this result.54 The 
problem is exaggerated by reporting of Kurdish statements that confirm all fears. For 
example, Kadir Konuksever, media coordinator at the Diyarbakır mayor’s office, 
stated that “the Kurdish people have tremendous sympathy for America, as they think 
it is helping the Kurds in Northern Iraq to build an independent Kurdistan.”55 The 
Kurdish identity problem exemplifies how the Iraq War caused such a spike in anti-
Americanism by touching on deeper issues. “The empowerment of Iraqi Kurds—and 
their quest for autonomy—in the wake of the 2003 war reopened old wounds in 
Turkey.”56  
Related to the identity challenge, there is also a territorial threat acutely felt by 
Turks. “The Kurds of Turkey have demands that range from full secession to 
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federalism, and the recognition of individual rights as Turkish citizens.”57 Nasuhi 
Güngör of Star newspaper says that an equation has formed in people’s minds that if 
an independent Kurdish state is formed in northern Iraq it will lead to the 
dismemberment of Turkey, and it will happen with American support.58 
The most visible facet of this issue is over the PKK, the separatist Kurdish 
terrorist organization. Semih Đdiz wrote the same in the Turkish Daily News, “Most 
Turks, whether civilian or military, seriously believe today that the PKK is actually 
being harbored by the American military in northern Iraq.”59 Academics have made 
the same observation. “Many Turks believe that the United States is supporting the 
formation of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq with future irredentist 
aspirations in Turkish territory, and are thus using the PKK against Ankara.”60 Tulin 
Daloğlu wrote that “Anti-Americanism in Turkey is related more to America’s 
inaction against the PKK than the legality or reasoning behind the Iraq War.”61 
These Turkish perceptions of America courting moderate Islam and Kurds, the 
sources of the twin fears of the Turkish Republic, give insight into why anti-
Americanism has spiked since September 11 and the Iraq War. The twin fears are 
viewed as challenges to nationalism and sovereignty, helping to explain why Turkey 
fits primarily within the Political sphere of the anti-Americanism framework 
presented in the last chapter. It is logical that as Turkish fears of America threatening 
these two areas increases, anti-Americanism will increase. “The principle of 
nationalism is more precisely defined as the indivisibility of the Turkish state’s 
territory and nation.”62 It is through this lens that America’s support to both Kurds 
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and political Islam is suspected and viewed as a threat to the national identity in the 
Kemalist state. 
 
V.5. Current view of the U.S. through these lenses 
 It is through these glasses that Turkey views the changes that have taken place 
since September 11. Prior to September 11, the relationship between Turkey and the 
U.S. was not a clean slate upon which anti-Americanism was formed. Instead, 
decades of Turkey’s suspicions of an asymmetrical alliance and fears and sensitivities 
related to its own identity influenced how the behavior of the U.S. would be perceived 
by Turks. 
 
V.5.1 Iraq War through the Glasses 
The Iraq War, which has been viewed negatively throughout the world, has 
been especially problematic for Turkish-U.S. relations because of the lenses through 
which Turkey views the events. This is not to invalidate the Turkish perspective, or 
the problems of the Iraq War, just to acknowledge that the extent of the trauma in the 
relationship has to do with what Turkey is and the past, and not merely an objective 
examination of the event. Upon close analysis, it is evident that the Iraq War was a 
trigger to suppressed sensitivities. Aykan Erdemir, a sociology professor at Middle 
East Technical University, explained that the Iraq War provided a platform and strong 
rationale for the heterogeneous latent and suppressed anti-Americanism to be 
expressed.63  
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The main opposition and fear came over the threat to destabilize the precarious 
Kurdish issue. There was fear that support for the U.S. war effort could trigger either 
religious fundamentalism or Kurdish separatism,64 the concerns detailed earlier in the 
discussion of the right lens of the glasses. The U.S. has worked more closely with 
Kurds in the restructuring efforts,65 and has discouraged Turkish involvement due to 
the instability that could be caused in northern Iraq, a region of relative peace.66 With 
the passing of time the fears and suspicions have only grown in Turkey, shown by the 
highest anti-Americanism since September 11 in 2006.67  
Leftist anti-American feelings of the 1970s have also been triggered by the 
Iraq War. “The 2003 war awakened leftist anti-Americanism among intellectuals and 
the academic and media elite, many of whom had flirted with extremist left, anti-
American movements in the 1970s.”68 Nihat Ali Özcan, with his expertise on anti-
Americanism in the Turkish military, explained that youth influenced by the Marxism 
of the 1960s and 1970s are the two and three-star generals today. Although their 
ideology was transformed as they reached the high ranks of the military, the anti-
Americanism feelings in the military today draw on the anti-American sentiments of 
decades past.69 According to Baskın Oran, an influential retired political science 
professor at Ankara University, the same anti-American concepts are being used from 
40 years ago. The “No to the USA” signs displayed at the recent Republican 
demonstrations create a bridge between today and the protestor’s youth when such 
sentiments were the fashion of the day.70 
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From the eyes of many Turks every death in Iraq is the fault of Americans. 
Although most of the deaths are Iraqis killing other Iraqis, the United States is seen to 
have brought the instability that causes deaths each day. Veysel Şimşek suggested that 
there has been a discourse that has become prevalent especially during the Iraq war 
that “It was all quiet in Ottoman times. Everyone was happy.”71 This is a way that the 
Iraq War is seen through the lens of the Ottoman past.  
 
V.5.2 “Hood Event,” July 4, 2003 
A lamentable event that was particularly upsetting to Turks took place on July 
4, 2003, when Americans mistakenly detained a group of Turkish Special Forces that 
was operating in northern Iraq.72 The Turkish military personnel were led away with 
hoods over their heads, and thus it became known as the “Çuval Olayı” or “Hood 
Event.” The soldiers were interrogated by the U.S. military and released a few days 
later after the protest of Turkey. Some of the details are obscure and the accounts of 
what happened can vary. Some sources maintain that the Turkish Special Forces were 
planning to assassinate a Kurdish leader in northern Iraq.73 U.S. Representative 
Wexler referred to the event as “American detention and humiliation of Turkish 
troops in Sulaymania.”74 
Many say that this event became a low point in Turkish-American relations 
and sharpened anti-Americanism in Turkey. “That sealed the perception that America, 
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Turkey’s close NATO ally, chose the Kurds over the Turkish Republic.”75 As with the 
discussion of the Iraq War, the Hood Event became a specific trigger of Turkish 
sensitivities (such as support for Kurds). The event was the basis for the popular 
Turkish film Kurtlar Vadısi (“Valley of the Wolves”) Irak released in 2006, and an 
ongoing successful television series, in which the opening scene depicts the incident. 
Retired military officer Nihat Ali Özcan told me that this was the breaking point in 
the Turkish military’s view of America. Since this event, anyone who says the U.S. is 
a good ally is viewed as an outcast.76  
Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, faculty member of the political science department 
of Bilkent University, explains that the Hood Event was a blow to Turkey’s national 
pride and did a lot to crumble the self-image of Turkey.77 She says it can foster a type 
of anxiety that makes Turks feel disrespected. Mehmet Yılmaz of the conservative 
weekly news journal Aksiyon expressed a belief that the Johnson Letter of 1964 
opened a deep wound in the relations between Turkey and America.78 He argues that 
the Hood Event deepens this already existing wound. Yılmaz argues that words and 
concepts can take on either negative or positive new meanings that remain in the 
consciousness of people. In his evaluation, “çuval” (hood) has become the most 
contemporary negative term. In the same vein, M. Ali Kışlalı disagreed with 
Ambassador Wilson’s assertion that the “Hood Event” is history. Instead, he argues, 
that like the Johnson Letter, it has become a cornerstone in the relations between the 
two countries.79 It is remarkable to see how frequently the Johnson Letter is 
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referenced, serving as a strong example of how past issues in the relations between 
countries can influence how current events are seen.  
 
V.5.3 America viewed as a Threatening Power 
This leads to an evaluation of the degree of anti-Americanism in Turkey as 
based on the second part of the framework from chapter three. What is the nature of 
America as viewed by Turks? The three representative grades of anti-Americanism 
are Benign Hegemon, Disruptive Force, and Threatening Power. Unfortunately, the 
trend in Turkey is towards viewing the U.S. as a Threatening Power, where America 
is an immediate threat and danger to the world.  
According to the poll I conducted among social science students at Bilkent 
University, by far the most common response was that the U.S. was a Threatening 
Power. For clarity, I put the categories on a spectrum, with an additional category on 
either side: “Good Influence” and “Source of All Evil.” Eleven percent of the Bilkent 
students indicated that America is the “Source of All Evil.” Added to the 45 percent 
who identified America as a “Threatening Power,” more than half of the respondents 
view America as an immediate threat or worse. The results are shown graphically 
below. 
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What is your attitude about America in the World?
3%
16%
25%
45%
11%
Good Influence
Benign Hegemon
Disruptive Force
Threatening Power
Source of all Evil
  
Among 51 students interviewed at Middle East Technical University, the 
response was even stronger, with 54 percent considering the U.S. a Threatening 
Power and almost one third a Source of All Evil. A mere 15 percent considered the 
United States a disruptive force or better.80 
Influential journalists such as Hasan Cemal argue that despite the need for 
criticism of the U.S., “America is not Turkey’s enemy, but a country that is a close 
friend and ally.”81 However, a student studying American culture at Hacettepe 
University in Ankara told me that almost everyone he talks to in Turkey hates 
America and thinks that any evil comes from America.82 Nihat Ali Özcan described 
the mood as, “You know you need America, but on the other hand you hate it.”83 
Despite such a range of comments from all over the spectrum of opinion, I believe 
that Turks primarily see America as a Disruptive Force, although there is a tendency 
to make strong statements about the threatening nature of America. If the relationship 
between the Turkey and U.S. is not improved, the situation will change from strong 
                                                 
80
 The same survey questions were answered by 51 students at Middle East Technical University on 
May 21, 2005.  
81
 Hasan Cemal, “Çünkü Amerika, Türkiye'nin düşmanı değil, dost ve müttefik bir ülke,” Milliyet, Feb 
20, 2005.  
82
 Serkan Taş (Hacettepe University), interview with the author, April 17, 2007, Ankara. 
83
 Nihat Ali Özcan, interview with the author, April 17, 2007. 
 113 
rhetoric and a desire to communicate opposition in polls about anti-Americanism and 
cement into an actual belief that America needs to be stopped immediately as a threat 
to Turkey.  
 
V.6 Real Grievances or Distorted Perceptions? 
Is the problem of anti-Americanism in Turkey based more on genuine 
grievances or distorted perceptions? This question is of central importance in the 
assessment of what can be done to mitigate anti-Americanism through public 
diplomacy. If the grievances are real, the U.S. needs to tailor its public diplomacy to a 
defense of the policies along with damage control on the negative reactions to them. 
However, to the extent that there are distorted perceptions and misunderstandings, 
there is greater hope that increased public diplomacy could play a vital role in 
mitigating the anti-Americanism and paving the way for a strengthened partnership.  
Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International Politics is a seminal 
work on the idea of perceptions, but it is also the source of much criticism.  Many 
scholars object to the idea of “misperception” because how one sees the world is a 
perception, and a perception cannot be wrong.84  I use the term “distorted perception” 
to clarify that I am not attempting to make a judgment on whether or not a perception 
is wrong.  I agree with Jervis that instead of assessing right and wrong, “often it will 
be more fruitful to ask why people differed and how they came to see the world as 
they did.”85 The purpose of the glasses analogy is not whether U.S. actions are right or 
wrong, but that there are distorted perceptions of America. One example detailed later 
is the film “Valley of the Wolves,” which influences the perception of Americans as 
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long-haired, muscle-bound soldiers who kill people at a whim.  I believe this is a 
distorted perception.  
I have found that anti-Americanism is based more on distorted perceptions 
than real grievances. Turks are not without legitimate basis for being concerned, but 
the level of anti-Americanism is out of proportion with the actual character and 
behavior of America. “It is as much the myth as the reality that frays the bond 
between the United States and Turkey,”86 wrote Harris in 1972. Gürkaynak explained 
that while there are structural factors, a lot of the anti-Americanism in Turkey has to 
do with misunderstanding and subjectivity.87 Although many of the issues have been 
addressed in preceding sections, this section will highlight the ways in which distorted 
perceptions and unsubstantiated fears are driving such rampant anti-Americanism.  
 
V.6.1 Real Grievances 
It is important to note first, however, that anti-Americanism is not based solely 
on distorted perceptions. In this regard, the Yeni Şafak article saying that Americans 
should ask themselves, “What are the mistakes that we have made for anti-
Americanism to have grown so high?”88 holds true. The Iraq War, the Hood Event, 
the concern about Kurds gaining power in northern Iraq under the protection of the 
U.S., and the feeling of asymmetry in the alliance over the preceding decades are 
among the valid grounds for disenchantment with America. The U.S. must take these 
issues seriously and understand how they damage Turkey’s view of America. These 
are the real grievances that cannot be dismissed. Without going into detail about each, 
a strong example is about the issue of the Kurds and the PKK actions from across the 
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border in northern Iraq. These are the words of General Joseph Ralston, special envoy 
countering the PKK, before the U.S. Congressional subcommittee in March 2007. 
Mr. Chairman, if I could put this in the U.S. context, how would the American 
public feel if there was a terrorist group that set up operations 10 miles inside 
Mexico, came across the border and blew up hotels in Phoenix, Arizona and 
then went back into Mexico? And if we complained to the Mexican 
government and nothing was done about it, what would the American people 
demand? That’s the situation we have in Turkey today.89 
 
 
General Ralston’s analogy thoughtfully explains why there is anger towards 
America for fostering this type of situation. Americans would never tolerate another 
country’s protection of terrorists that are attacking its people and accordingly need to 
realize the ways that it exacerbates resentment from Turks. However, as stated above, 
the deeper issues that are fanning the flames of stronger anti-Americanism stem 
mainly from irrational fears and misunderstandings. 
 
V.6.2 Distorted Perceptions of the U.S.  
 The level of conspiracy theories and lack of understanding about America 
cause distorted perceptions of the United States.  
 
V.6.2.1 Conspiracy Theories 
Conspiracy theories are a part of anti-Americanism that is surprisingly 
widespread. “The Iraq war re-ignited a tendency among Turkish leftists to find U.S.-
led conspiracies everywhere.”90 A U.S. diplomat commented on the phenomenon, 
“Just like sex sells, anti-Americanism sells right now. Unfortunately, it’s nothing to 
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laugh at, because it’s damaging to both American national interest and to Turkish 
national interests.” 91 Ekrem Dumanlı, Editor in Chief of Zaman, is in agreement about 
how conspiracy theories sell and earn a proft in Turkey. He explains specifically how 
much unsubtantiated issues can destroy Turkish-American relations: 
 
If the intention is to destroy the bridges between two countries, it is not too 
difficult to find a speculative issue. We are swept into provocative 
information. False information, exaggerated opinions, provocative statements, 
harsh articles, angering images, inflammatory photographs… In difficult days 
like these, a historical responsibility falls on the shoulders of the [politicians] 
and the press.92 
 
 
This is a way in which the Turkish government is at fault in not taking more 
leadership to mitigate anti-Americanism. While this thesis is focused on what 
America must do, Turks also have an important role to play. In the short-term it may 
be easier to ride the popularity of anti-Americanism, but elites need to have the vision 
to recognize that America has and will continue to be an important ally to Turkey.  
Especially in an area like conspiracy theories, Turks in influential positions can 
quietly express that these do not help anyone and that Turkey needs to take 
responsibility for its own future. Dumanlı’s sentiments in the article quoted above are 
not the norm. It will serve both countries well in the future for a few influential 
politicians, academics, or newspaper columnists to go against the tide and speak 
against the absurdity of some claims.  
A well known example of the anti-Americanism in Turkey based on 
conspiracy theory is the best-selling novel Metal Fırtına (“Metal Storm”). The basic 
plot is that in 2007, after a clash with Turkish forces in northern Iraq, U.S. troops 
stage a surprise attack against Turkey. “The Foreign Ministry and General Staff are 
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reading it keenly,” Murat Yetkin, a columnist for the Turkish daily newspaper 
Radikal, recently wrote. “All cabinet members also have it.”93 Yasemin Çongar also 
criticizes how counselors employed by the state advocate conspiracy theories to the 
statesmen and media.94 In the same article she outlines many of the absurd conspiracy 
theories that underlie rational Turks’ thoughts about America. Karaosmanoğlu is 
critical of the intellectual laziness and suspicions of Turkish journalists.95 
Another example of conspiracy based anti-Americanism is the television 
series “Valley of the Wolves,” in which fiction blurs with reality. Ali Unal began his 
Zaman editorial in June 2003 with two paragraphs of detail from the series.96 He even 
makes reference to the Sevres Treaty and how America and Europe have ambitions to 
divide Turkey. Although he is not directly saying he believes the same, by citing 
extensively from a series based on fictional conspiracy theories, the line between 
reality and fiction is blurred. If series like “Valley of the Wolves” were not taken 
seriously, it is unlikely a journalist would devote so much attention to it in order to 
draw in his readers. M. Ali Kışlalı of Radikal poses the question of whether events are 
marketed to assuage the Turkish nation’s broken pride.97 
 
V.6.2.2 Misunderstanding the Diversity in America 
 Another area of misunderstanding is about the diversity and democratic nature 
of America. Turks do not understand the role of Congress and civil society in U.S. 
foreign policy making. “Often, Turkish officials do not understand that the U.S. 
executive branch cannot always influence Congress’s legislation on foreign policy 
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and that non-governmental organizations can exert effective pressure on the executive 
branch concerning arms transfers and human rights.”98 Turkey is not as familiar with 
the disputes between the executive and the legislature,99 contributing to the lack of 
understanding of the checks and balances in the American government.  
 There is a tendency for Turks to think that they know more about America 
than they actually do. Nur Bilge Criss, reflected this sentiment: “America is the least 
understood country…Turks, including journalists, think that they know America 
well.” 100  She explained how hard pressed she is to find any good Turkish academic 
articles written about America. A remarkable personal anecdote related to this came 
from a survey filled out by an undergraduate international relations student who 
marked that he considers himself anti-American. In the section with six “yes/no” 
questions, the students left the other five questions blank, but checked that, yes, “I 
know a lot about America.” He did not know or care enough to answer questions like 
whether America has historically been an unreliable ally of Turkey, but he does know 
that he is anti-American and knows a lot about America. Overall, two out of three 
Bilkent students polled said that they knew a lot about America.101 
The influence of ethnic lobbies is an area of specific misunderstanding. An 
example of the role of ethnic group influence on American foreign policy toward 
Turkey was the arms embargo in 1974. This was an instance where Congress had 
influence over the executive branch, which would have preferred to act in favor of 
Turkey. Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly opposed the initiative to cut 
military assistance to Turkey and faulted the Greek American lobby for harming 
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American interests.102 In his analysis of this case, Paul Watanabe, currently Director 
of the Institute for Asian American Studies at University of Massachusetts, Boston, 
illuminated the tension that exists between wise action in the international arena and 
preserving a democratic domestic order that allows participation from many 
sources.103 He argues that the “potent and narrow-minded Greek American lobby was 
able to cow his congressional opponents into supporting the arms embargo at the 
expense of the national interest.”104 However, Watanabe concludes his analysis of the 
politics of the Turkish arms embargo case with the following words, “In the final 
analysis, no matter how impressive the organizational strengths of the Greek 
American community might have been, they would not have been sufficient to 
compensate for weak arguments and unreliable information.” Ethnic groups are a very 
real factor in the making of American foreign policy. While it is popular to berate the 
executive, and specifically the Bush administration at the present time, the power of 
ethnic groups and Congress should be understood. As Watanabe points out, ethnic 
lobbies are not just evil interest groups, but rather part of a democracy at work. As a 
nation of immigrants, ethnic interest groups are a natural part of politics and the 
forming of foreign policy.  
 The freedom of press within America also can fuel resentment toward 
America. In a conversation with Ben Ball, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer at the 
U.S. Embassy in Ankara,105 about the issue of America’s disproportionate influence 
on the rest of the world, he gave me the example of the outrage caused by an article in 
the Armed Forces Journal, a little known and unofficial journal. In July 2006 Ralph 
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Peters wrote an article “Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look,”106 
complete with a suggested map of more just borders, including a gigantic “Free 
Kurdistan.” Peters writes, “The boundaries projected in the maps accompanying this 
article redress the wrongs suffered by the most significant ‘cheated’ population 
groups, such as the Kurds, Baluch and Arab Shia.” He explicitly writes about  
the long-suffering Kurds of Turkey, who have endured decades of violent 
military oppression and a decades-long demotion to ‘mountain Turks’; in an 
effort to eradicate their identity. While the Kurdish plight at Ankara’s hands 
has eased somewhat over the past decade, the repression recently intensified 
again and the eastern fifth of Turkey should be viewed as occupied territory. 
 
The Armed Forces Journal is not an official publication of the U.S. Government, 
although no Turk would know that or even necessarily care. A journal seeming to 
represent the U.S. military suggests a “Free Kurdistan” that would rival the size of 
Turkey. When Peters wrote his article complete with a map that confirms the core fear 
of Turks, he did not consider that his article and map will be front page news on 
leading newspapers in Turkey. This is a telling example of the difficulty for America 
to control the way that it is seen abroad. Even if the government is legitimately 
understanding of Turkey’s concerns and careful in the message it communicates, the 
freedom of the press is not going to change. This creates a challenge for the United 
States, which has a high value of the freedom of the press, when coupled with a 
foreign public that does not appreciate the diversity of opinions.  
 Đsmet Berkan criticized the Turkish media in the response to the Robert 
Pollock’s “Sick Man of Europe” article mentioned earlier. He says that instead of 
action, the media is expending effort to respond and is taking the article more 
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seriously than it deserves.107 The disproportionate response of the Turkish media 
elicited by Pollock’s article hints at a lack of understanding about the diversity of 
American opinion (or lack thereof) about Turkey.  
 
V.6.2.3 Misunderstanding over U.S. threat to secularism  
In addition to the distorted perceptions about the United States itself, there is a 
great deal of unjustified worry over America’s involvement with the Kurds and 
political Islam. The perceived U.S. danger to Turkey on these issues seems 
surmountable by better understanding and communication. 
It is a misunderstanding for Turks to think that the U.S. wants to see Islam 
take a larger role in Turkey. In an interview published in Milliyet, U.S. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza was asked about the claims that the U.S. 
supports moderate Islam in Turkey. “It’s an absolute fact that America cannot have a 
policy about Islam.”108 The U.S. continues to verbalize such sentiments that fall on 
deaf ears in Turkey. The United States wishes to see Turkey continue to mature into a 
democratic country that upholds its constitution. This was stated most recently by the 
U.S. in response to the opposition to Abdullah Gül’s appointment as president. “We 
hope and expect that the Turks will work out these political issues in their own way, 
in a way that’s consistent with their secular democracy and constitutional provisions,” 
said U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried.109 The same sentiments are 
evident in the American media, such as in a recent Washington Post article trying to 
explain the drama over the Turkish president in the spring of 2007. “A casual 
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observer might also expect that because the Turkish protestors are enemies of Islamic 
extremism, they are friends of the United States. Not so. The secularists here are if 
anything more hostile to the West than the AKP.”110 Berlinski’s article is based on 
communicating to Americans that the AK Party is not Islamist. For all of the 
negatives of Robert Pollock’s article, it is nevertheless contradictory to the notion that 
America is supporting political Islam through the current government. “And at the 
2002 election, the increasingly corrupt mainstream parties that had championed 
Turkish-American ties self-destructed, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the subtle 
yet insidious Islamism of the Justice and Development (AK) Party.”111 Even though 
Berlinski and Pollock have different views of the AK Party (just like many Turks), 
they are the same in arguing that the U.S. should not support political Islam. The U.S. 
probably has the same fear as secular interests within Turkey about an overtly Islamic 
government coming to power in Turkey. The U.S. has enough problems caused by 
Islamic regimes and does not want to risk Turkey becoming another. An editorial in 
the conservative newspaper Zaman made the same case:  
As anyone who knows Washington even a little bit would see, the U.S. 
administration does not consider Turkey a republic ruled by Islam, has never 
wanted it to become one, and will never do so. Why should they let Islam rule 
the country anyway, when they have been struggling for decades to secularize 
Turkey hand-in-hand with other Western countries?112  
 
There is a distorted perception that the United States strongly supports the AK 
Party. It has been normal to see headlines about U.S. support of the AK Party based 
on statements that the U.S. supports democracy. In making such statements about 
democracy, the United States is not venturing beyond what respected Turks have 
written. One example is Atatürk. Ambassador Wilson recently replied to a question on 
the “Ask the Ambassador” page of the U.S. Embassy website about anti-Americanism 
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in light of a clip of Atatürk speaking on Turkish-American relations.113 The 
Ambassador wrote, “The words expressed by Atatürk in the clip are still true today: 
the high value we place on democracy is the tie that binds the Turkish people and the 
American people together, and this gives us a strong basis for going forward.” 
Another more contemporary example is Metin Heper, who wrote in 2005 about the 
cooperative relationship between the AKP and the military. He gives the example of 
chief of general staff Özkök’s response to a journalist about AKP’s victory in the 
November 2002 elections. “We have made elections in accordance with democratic 
rules…The results reflect our people’s preferences, for which I have respect.” He later 
cites him as saying that they follow the constitutional procedures.114 While the events 
surrounding the parliament vote for Abdullah Gül and the military’s statement in 
April 2007 have challenged Heper’s optimism, it nevertheless seems an overreaction 
to criticize the United States for making similar statements to the military about 
supporting democracy and the constitutional processes.  
 
V.6.2.4 Misunderstanding of U.S. intentions regarding Kurds 
The U.S. can also do more to communicate shared interests with Turks over 
the Kurdish issue. There is hope that the U.S. could help increase the understanding 
about what is in its national interests in regard to an independent Kurdish state. 
Distrust that the U.S. is threatening Turkey’s territorial integrity is “not based on 
rational foundations.”115 The chaos in the region that would result from a Kurdish 
state is not in the interests of the U.S.  
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The U.S. views the Kurds’ effort to establish their own state as a destabilizing 
factor that will worsen the current situation in Iraq. Washington fears a 
possible turmoil in a quiet region like Northern Iraq due to the unrestrained 
nationalism expressed by the Kurds and Kirkuk; therefore, it does not 
welcome the idea of an independent Kurdish state.116 
 
Turks need to understand that although the war may be wrong, it is reasonable that the 
U.S. is working with Kurds and is not going to prioritize military action against the 
PKK while in over its head in other parts of Iraq. 
 
V.7 Conclusion 
 All of these issues are also viewed with a tendency toward distrust that will 
take time to overcome. The nature of anti-Americanism is that it biases the way 
people see America. In this sense, the problem is not going to be rectified 
immediately. But with sustained commitment to foster understanding and with 
consistency in its policies, America can gain ground against the expansion of anti-
Americanism. The next chapters set out to explore practical solutions in how America 
can correct the problem of anti-Americanism. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
VI.1 Introduction 
 Despite a great amount of well-intending effort, anti-Americanism is at 
sustained high levels that are detrimental to Turkish-American relations and to the 
U.S. leadership in the region. The U.S. State Department acknowledges the current 
state of affairs in Turkey: “But much work remains, with anti-Americanism remaining 
at a historic high among the Turkish public.”1 In an interview with Ben Ball, Assistant 
Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, I tried to suggest there might 
be room for improvement in public diplomacy. He cut me off, saying, “Public 
diplomacy is being done wrong. You don’t have to be so generous.”2 Beneath the 
positive press releases and many great programs, the bottom line is that U.S. public 
diplomacy is failing to amend Turkish-American relations.  
Ball was very honest about the shortcomings in public diplomacy in Turkey. 
In his evaluation, there are three parties at fault that combine to make anti-
Americanism worse: Washington, the U.S. Mission in Turkey, and the Turkish 
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government.3 Ball explained that the three of these combine in a damaging way for 
anti-Americanism to be ineffectively dealt with in Turkey. The previous chapter 
addressed the reasons for Turkish anti-Americanism and the faults of Turkey in the 
issue. However, the focus of this thesis is about what America what must do. Rather 
than rationalize or blame, America needs to focus on its part in lowering the rampant 
anti-Americanism. The two American culprits for inadequately mitigating anti-
Americanism need to be analyzed. 
Public diplomacy plays a vital role in ameliorating anti-Americanism. Soner 
Çağaptay, an influential Turkish scholar, remarkably comments that even if the U.S. 
policies are in favor of Turkey, “there will be little improvement unless the U.S. 
government improves its public diplomacy.”4 Despite the bleak picture, there is hope 
that people are not well informed and could be impacted by more communication. 
Journalist Nasuhi Güngör said that if the man on the street is asked why he does not 
like America he will say because it is imperialist.5  After the first answer there will 
not be specific arguments. He was straightforward that the average person is dogmatic 
without being informed or knowing details. Güngör believes that communication can 
make a difference in reaching the average Turk.  
The remainder of the thesis builds on the analysis and understanding of anti-
Americanism in Turkey. Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to first and foremost be 
based on understanding the way Turks view America and the world. “Both to interpret 
others’ behavior and to design one’s own behavior so that others will draw the 
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desrired conclusions from it, the actor must try to see the world the way the other sees 
it.”6 
This chapter is focused on what America needs to do better through public 
diplomacy to turn the tide of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Part one evaluates the 
public diplomacy efforts of the U.S. Department of State since September 11, 2001. 
The second part is about the transfer of Washington’s efforts to the “post” in Turkey. 
Part three narrows to the positive efforts but nevertheless shortcomings of public 
diplomacy on the ground in Turkey. I aim to present a critical evaluation of U.S. 
public diplomacy as it looks from the ground in Turkey. In the final chapter, 
recommendations will be made based on a more accurate understanding of anti-
Americanism in Turkey and the analysis presented in this chapter. The current state of 
public diplomacy in Turkey is best approached from an overview of American public 
diplomacy since September 11.  
 
VI.2 Washington & Public Diplomacy 
 There are multiple ways in which Washington is to blame for the anti-
Americanism around the world and particularly in Turkey. Although the last chapter 
argued that anti-Americanism is about more than recent policy, the policies certainly 
are a large factor. But beyond policy formation, the lack of successful public 
diplomacy is also at fault for anti-Americanism flourishing.7  
 
                                                 
6
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7
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system.  Instead of recommendations about policy, the goal of this thesis is to focus on how public 
diplomacy can be done better.   
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VI.2.1 New Mission, Post-September 11 
September 11 was the decisive event shaping the foreign policy of the Bush 
administration. President Bush declared three days after the attacks, “Our 
responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of 
evil.”8 This quotation appears in the seminal 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
document. The introduction to the 2006 NSS of the United States reveals the ongoing 
importance of September 11 in the outlook of what threatens national security. 
“America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave 
challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred 
and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001.”9 In the 
view of the Bush administration, the grave challenge is terrorism fueled by this 
ideology of hatred and threat emanating from a militant Islamism. This is revealed in 
the “Overview of America’s National Security Strategy,” which attributes the threat to 
“the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of 
the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, 
and repression.”10 An example of the clear continuity in policy since September 11 is 
the obvious way in which the 2006 NSS only serves to complement the defining 2002 
NSS. The corresponding sections from 2002 are included at the top of each chapter of 
the 2006 document.  
In the aftermath of September 11, The United States has committed an 
incredible amount of its vast resources outside of its borders for proactive security. 
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The thinking still goes, “Our best defense is a good offense.”11 This is revealing of the 
Bush administration’s conviction that it is not adequate to sit back, but the fight must 
be taken to the enemy. 
The Bush administration’s eyes are fixed on this threat, which in turn 
influences the priorities of its agenda. Due to the focus on radical Islamic terrorism, 
the State Department’s view of anti-Americanism is primarily one of an Arab brand 
promoted by the Islamist terrorists. Washington sees especially strong anti-
Americanism in the Arab World.  
So where does the Secretary of State spend the majority of her time in 2007? 
It’s got to be the Middle East… we’ve got this sea of anti-Americanism in the 
Arab world…I would say if you had to choose one part of the world where our 
vital interests were most engaged, it’s the Middle East.12  
 
VI.2.2 Public Diplomacy as a part of the War on Terror 
The United States has slowly recognized that peace cannot be won by military 
prowess. A battle must be waged for the hearts and minds of people. Washington has 
returned to the need to bolster its public diplomacy efforts, as it had in the Cold War. 
The acknowledgement of the importance of public diplomacy has increased 
significantly in the 2006 NSS compared to the 2002 NSS, which had almost no 
mention of diplomacy. The 2006 NSS refers to, “Continuing to reorient the 
Department of State towards transformational diplomacy, which promotes effective 
democracy and responsible sovereignty.”13 The 2006 document also stresses the 
importance of: 
Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and 
values of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a 
watching and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign 
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audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about 
foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study 
in the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as 
well as those foreigners who share our commitment to a safer, more 
compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing 
our channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting 
propaganda quickly, before myths and distortions have time to take root in the 
hearts and minds of people across the world.14 
 
The language of public diplomacy found its way into the national security priorities of 
the Bush administration. According to the State Department website, diplomacy, 
development, and defense are the three underlying and interdependent components 
that anchor the President’s NSS.15 This is a huge jump in the recognition of the 
importance of public diplomacy in four years’ time.  
The primary responsibility for this engagement of the world falls to the U.S. 
Department of State. Its mission statement is to “create a more secure, democratic, 
and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international 
community.”16 According to the longer document developing the State Department’s 
mission, “American diplomacy in the 21st century is based on fundamental beliefs: 
our freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; our prosperity depends 
on the prosperity of others; and our security relies on a global effort to secure the 
rights of all.”17 With the belief that its security is linked to the world, America has 
recommitted itself to the vast undertaking of engaging the world.  
 Public diplomacy is integrally linked to and heavily influenced by the Bush 
administration’s war on terror. 
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VI.2.3 Karen Hughes, Leading the War of Ideas 
Karen Hughes’s appointment by President Bush as the Under Secretary of 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, announced in March of 2005, was big news in 
Washington. “Though the impact of Hughes’s reemergence in Washington would be 
largely lost on her new foreign audience, here in the capital it has set tongues 
buzzing.”18 By all accounts, Hughes is one of Bush’s closest advisors, dating back to 
his years as governor in Texas. Her high profile appointment was seen as an 
expression of Bush’s seriousness in public diplomacy. “For the first time since the 
9/11 terrorist attacks put public diplomacy back on the State Department radar, 
America’s front lines of public relations have a well placed, and serious, political 
leader.”19 The position had been open for a year after short stints by advertising 
executive Charlotte Beers and Margaret Tutwiller, with very little evidence of 
progress. 20 
It was clear from the outset how much Hughes’ appointment was focused on 
another facet of defeating the enemy that came into full view on September 11. At the 
swearing-in ceremony of Hughes in September 2005, President Bush proclaimed: 
We’re in a war on terror. We are still at war. And to succeed in this war, we 
must effectively explain our policies and fundamental values to people around 
the world. This is an incredibly important mission. And so I've asked one of 
America’s most talented communicators to take it on.21 
 
It is remarkable how much significance fighting the terrorists is given at the 
appointment of Hughes, revealing the main mission assigned to her:  
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We’re on a hunt for the terrorists. We are striking them in foreign lands before 
they can hurt our citizens again. Yet we know that this war will not be won by 
force of arms alone. We must defeat the terrorists on the battlefield, and we 
must also defeat them in the battle of ideas.22 
 
Hughes’ background is television news reporting in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas. 
She became Bush’s communications guru, overseeing his two election wins as 
governor of Texas, then as president.23 She continued to be one of Bush’s most trusted 
advisors after he won the presidency. “If Karl Rove, the other pillar of Bush’s 
political brain trust, aims more at promoting a conservative agenda, Hughes is the one 
known for nudging the president back toward the center.”24 She served for 18 months 
as Counselor to the President in the White House and managed the White House 
Offices of Communications, Media Affairs, Speechwriting and Press Secretary.25 
Hughes has been tasked by President Bush with leading efforts to promote 
America’s values and confront ideological support for terrorism around the world. 26 
She actually oversees three bureaus at the Department of State: Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, International Information Programs, and Public Affairs, in addition 
to participating in foreign policy development at the State Department. No one has 
any illusions about this being an easy task. Hughes said that on the morning of her 
appointment the Vice President told her, “Karen, my condolences. You just took the 
hardest job in government.”27 
 Along with this high-profile appointment to head public diplomacy efforts, 
Washington has increased the amount of resources at Hughes’ disposal. On April 19, 
2007, Hughes testified before a House committee:  
                                                 
22
 Karen Hughes, “President Honors Ambassador Karen Hughes at Swearing-In Ceremony.” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050909.html 
23
 Jones, 24. 
24
 Feldman, March 16, 2005. 
25
 U.S. Department of State Website. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/53692.htm 
26
 U.S. Department of State Website. 
27
 Elaine Shannon and Jay Carney, “10 Question for Karen Hughes,” Time, February 20, 2006.  
 133 
Because our efforts against terrorism are more than a military or intelligence 
matter, but also an ideological struggle, we are asking you to fund urgent 
public diplomacy programs in this year’s war on terror supplemental request, 
and to support increases for vital programs in our 2008 budget request.28 
 
The President’s 2008 budget request provides for three primary line-items related to 
public diplomacy, which are included in the war on terror. The first is $669 million 
proposed for the Broadcasting Board of Governors to support radio, television, and 
Internet broadcasting worldwide. The second is $486 million for education and 
cultural exchanges. Finally, there is “$359 million for the public diplomacy to foster 
mutual understanding between the United States and other countries and combat 
violent extremism, particularly in the Muslim world.”29 The Bush administration’s 
2008 Budget Fact Sheets also specifically mentions, “Winning the war of ideas: 
Promoting democracy and countering violent extremism through improving the 
world’s understanding of the United States and improving our understanding of the 
world is a critical component of the Global War on Terror.”30 The specific mention of 
the Muslim world and the funding coming under the budget for the war on terror 
leave no doubt about what drives Washington’s view of public diplomacy initiatives. 
In her first months after beginning her term on July 29, 2005, Under Secretary 
Hughes outlined three “strategic imperatives” in a statement before the House 
International Relations Committee on November 10, 2005. The same priorities of 
contributing to the war on terror are evident throughout.  
All my efforts are guided by three strategic imperatives. First, that America 
must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity to people throughout the 
world, a vision rooted in our enduring commitment to freedom… 
Our second strategic imperative is to isolate and marginalize violent 
extremists, and undermine their efforts to exploit religion to rationalize their 
acts of terror. We must work to amplify a clear message from people of every 
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nationality and faith: That no injustice, no wrong—no matter how 
legitimate—can ever justify the murder of innocents… 
Our third strategic imperative is to foster a sense of common interests and 
common values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures 
and faiths across our world. We share so much. People the world over want 
education and better lives for our children, people everywhere want to live in 
security, we all want jobs and economic opportunity.31 
 
In addition to the three “strategic imperatives,” Hughes said she would be 
guided by four “strategic pillars” that she calls four “E’s”: engagement, exchanges, 
education and empowerment.  
We need to engage more vigorously. We cannot expect people to give a fair 
hearing to our ideas if we don’t advocate them. And research shows, when 
people know that America is partnering with their governments to improve 
their lives, it makes a difference in how they think about us. 
The second “E” is exchanges. People who have the opportunity to come here 
learn for themselves that Americans are generous, hard-working people who 
value faith and family…Our exchange programs are responding to the new 
realities of the post-911 world, reaching out to critical new participants such 
as clerics and community leaders. We need to make our exchange programs 
even more strategic, attracting teachers, journalists, youth leaders and others 
who have the ability to influence a wide circle. We want more American 
young people to study and travel abroad. 
The third pillar is education – for we know education is the path to upward 
mobility and greater opportunity – for boys and girls. Americans must educate 
ourselves to be better citizens of our world – learning different languages and 
learning more about other countries and cultures… 
The final “E” is empowerment – people cannot give a fair hearing to our ideas 
if they are unable to consider them. We will take the side of those who 
advocate greater participation for all, including women. 
Again, the importance of the defining September 11 event is evident, especially in the 
focus of the “exchanges” being based on “adapting to the new realities of the post-911 
world, reaching out to critical new participants such as clerics and community 
leaders.” 
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In order to accomplish the goals of public diplomacy, Hughes set forth many 
ambitious goals. One was to make changes in Washington, including a commitment to 
reinvigorating the interagency process. Public diplomacy needs to be more 
coordinated between the many government agencies that touch on foreign relations. 
She aimed to provide leadership to make efforts more harmonized and strategic. To 
increase the awareness for a unified strategy, she has placed a deputy assistant 
secretary for public diplomacy in each of the State Department’s six regional 
bureaus.32 Addressing the need for a unified message, Hughes has said, “As I travel 
the world, people almost everywhere tell me, ‘you all don’t speak as one government. 
You speak as a bunch of different governments.’”33 With the strong support and 
attention of President Bush, she is taking steps to change this.  
As a second goal, Hughes intended to more fully integrate policy and public 
diplomacy. Because Hughes has the ear of President Bush, many have high 
expectations that she will be able to influence policy with the perspective of public 
diplomacy. This causes concern for others who do not want foreign opinion to greatly 
influence American policies. In traditional diplomacy, as described in chapter two, 
diplomats take the foreign policy objectives of their state and attempt to communicate 
and persuade foreign governments to act in these interests. Public diplomacy is 
largely the same, but using different tools to reach foreign publics. However, public 
diplomacy is accordingly more sensitive to public opinion. While the consequence of 
foreign policy to the opinion of foreign publics needs to be communicated to 
Washington, if this becomes too influential in foreign policy formulation, it could run 
counter to American interests. In the way that public diplomacy is considered in 
                                                 
32
 Zeller, 24. 
33
 Zeller, 25. 
 136 
policy formulation, Hughes intends to find a better balance than she believes currently 
exists.  
For the third goal, she set out “to reinvigorate public diplomacy as a vibrant, 
vital career path.”34 She spoke of the importance of the Foreign Service staff.35  
I will do all I can to support and empower them with strategic and policy 
guidance and the training and tools they need to carry out their mission on the 
front lines of diplomacy. I intend to serve as the advocate for a reinvigorated 
public diplomacy community in the State Department.36  
 
Since the folding of the public diplomacy focused USIA into the State 
Department in 1999, as described in chapter two, the Foreign Service staff has yet to 
feel fully integrated or valued. Former U.S. Senator and President of the United 
Nations Foundation Timothy Wirth remarked in 2005, 
The Department is still dominated by an old diplomatic culture in which real 
men do not do public diplomacy—or human rights, or environment or 
refugees. Real men do politics and maybe economics… [which] makes it 
harder for public diplomacy to be rewarded in the career service.37 
 
 There was positive feedback for Hughes in Washington in the first days. “I 
think she’s doing far better than her predecessors,”38 said Shibley Telhami, professor 
at the University of Maryland and an expert on the Middle East. In a short time she 
was able to quickly implement some positive programs. One was a “rapid response 
center” that produces a daily one-page summary of what news outlets are saying 
about American policies from monitoring newspaper clippings, television programs, 
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and the Internet. This report is intended to assist senior government officials to know 
how policies are interpreted overseas and how to talk about them. 
Another noteworthy change has been Hughes’ desire to have ambassadors and 
public affairs people out talking more to the public, including more interviews in the 
critical languages. Hughes herself has even appeared on Al Jazeera, something not 
done by her predecessors based on the rationale that Al Jazeera is hostile to the U.S. 
Hughes has said, “We have to be out there. We may not like everything they report. 
They may be putting out misinformation. They may incite violence. But we have to be 
out there.” She has freed ambassadors to talk directly to the media without permission 
from the State Department, as was previously required. “We are trying to change the 
entire culture of the State Department,”39 Hughes told the Associate Press. After 20 
months at the helm of U.S. public diplomacy, she was able to report many concrete 
improvements, such as a record number of 591,000 student and exchange visas being 
issued, the participation in education and exchange programs growing in the last three 
years from 27,000 to 39,000, and the American presence on Arab media increasing by 
30 percent. 40 
 
VI.3 Transfer of State to the Field in Turkey 
Washington’s recognition of the value of public diplomacy has clearly 
increased. However, the transfer of Washington’s reinvigorated efforts to the ground 
level has not been entirely smooth. Turkey is an example of a country where a 
disconnect is felt between what is done in Washington and what works on the field. 
Under Secretary Hughes began her position with great expectation and the support of 
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the Bush administration behind her. Although armed with her three “strategic 
imperatives” and four “strategic pillars” to go wage the war of ideas, the difficulty of 
seeing results on the field became quickly evident.  
 
VI.3.1. Hughes’ Listening Tour Harshly Criticized 
Under Secretary Hughes’ first mission was a “listening tour” in September 
2005 that took her to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The next month she visited 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Many felt that it exposed her lack of experience in foreign 
affairs. “She has little foreign policy experience and her pedestrian, at times vapid, 
responses to questions raised by people in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey showed 
she knew precious little about the region’s social concerns and political 
preoccupations.”41 One American commentator described the visit with the following 
analogy:  
Let’s say some Muslim leader wanted to improve America’s image of Islam. 
It’s doubtful that he would send as his emissary a woman in a black chador 
who has spent no time in the United States, possessed no knowledge of our 
history or movies or pop music and spoke no English.42  
 
She drew harsh criticism from many in the Middle East as well. One columnist 
in Arab News wrote, “Thanks, Karen, message master, communications guru and 
undersecretary of state for public diplomacy. You came to our part of the world to aim 
at the public’s hearts, and you ended up hitting it in the stomach.”43  
One long-time American officer with ten tours overseas said, “She started out 
not just badly, but horrifyingly, shockingly, embarrassingly badly.”44 Many felt that 
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her listening tour confirmed that she was in over her head. Others were more 
optimistic, knowing her previous success in completing tasks.  
On the leg of the trip to Turkey, Hughes intended to meet with a group of 
women in Ankara, as well as the Foreign Minister, many religious leaders at the 
Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, and other government leaders. Even before her arrival, 
there were strong words that foreshadowed the difficulty of her task. Hughes wanted 
to meet with important women around the capital and “talk about the position of 
women and women’s rights.” The twenty Turkish women who were invited, based on 
their studies on women’s rights, replied, “Let’s discuss George W. Bush’s policies on 
Iraq and women as well.”45 The KA-DER Ankara branch announced that they would 
organize a meeting in which Hughes could participate, but that they were opposed to 
any restrictions on the topics for discussion. KA-DER made a statement that “Karen 
Hughes defines her contacts as a ‘listening’ opportunity. Let her listen to us but let her 
answer our criticisms as well. We also want to discuss the US policy on Iraq and US 
President Bush’s policies on women. We do not want the meeting to be perceived as a 
USA-NGO embrace.” Surely this is not what Karen Hughes had in mind.  
The high profile visit was intended to be a positive start to Washington 
improving relations with the Muslim world. “Hughes arrived in Turkey with more 
than 20 US journalists in tow, explaining to her hosts that part of the goal of her tour 
was to bring back images of the region to the American people, who were on the 
whole ignorant of the geography and the people living in the region.”46 It not helpful 
for nearly every article to refer to Hughes as President Bush’s “image guru” and how 
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she is sent by Bush to save his destroyed image.47 There was minimal decent Turkish 
press from Hughes’s visit to Turkey, with lukewarm headlines such as, “America is 
taking the pulse.” This article had a picture of Hughes appearing to drink tea and a 
caption that said she was shopping in the covered bazaar of Istanbul.48 However, most 
of the reporting about Hughes’s time in Turkey was about the anger communicated by 
the women with whom she met in Ankara. 
 
VI.3.2 View of Turkey from Washington 
Even Hughes’ agenda on her listening tour exemplifies the focus on reaching 
out to the Muslims who could be pulled into the orbit of the radical Islamic terrorists. 
Turkey is included in the same trip as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There is evidence that 
Turkey is grouped in with Washington priorities to reach out to the Muslim world, 
with frequent references to the “Islamic majority country” and even an occasional 
high profile slip-up of an “Islamic country.” The echoes are still heard from former 
Secretary of State Colin Powell explaining,  
There will be an Islamic Republic in Iraq just like other Islamic Republics 
such as Turkey and Pakistan...There is no reason why Islam cannot be together 
with democracy. Turkey is an Islamic country, why would there not be a 
democracy just like there is in Turkey at the same time.49  
 
The comments are revealing of the State Department’s preexisting mindset that 
Turkey is the region’s example for how democracy and Islam can coexist.  
As a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey is viewed by the Bush 
administration as a prime candidate for a strategic ally in its war on terror. In her 
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comments at a press conference with Foreign Minister Gül, Secretary Rice spoke 
about the strategic foundation of the relationship with Turkey.  
I would just add that sometimes it’s very important to step back from the day-
to-day issues and to look at the broad relationship and to remind ourselves and 
to remind our populations that this is a relationship that is broad and deep, and 
based on values and based on strategic interests, and that’s really what this 
document allows us to do.50  
 
The document is a “statement of strategic vision” for Turkish-American relations to 
which Gül and Rice agreed in 2006.51 
One of the challenges is potential differences between what is said 
diplomatically to the public, and the true mindset with the State Department. 
Nevertheless, public statements can be revealing of the Washington perspective.  
Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, is one of 
the most common voices speaking about Turkey in Washington. In public statements, 
Fried communicates a solid understanding of the issues confronting Turkey. 
The volatility of debate has given rise to and coincided with an undercurrent 
of popular nationalism, frustration with Europe, and even anti-Americanism. 
One cause of these trends is Turkish citizens' frustration with PKK terrorism 
from Iraq, and a popular belief that the United States could do more to combat 
the PKK terrorists, whom Turks view as the greatest threat to their national 
security. Another cause is the identity crisis dominating Turkish society as 
Turkey strives for admission in the European Union. Many Turks feel 
humiliated by what they perceive as the shifting of accession requirements by 
the EU even as Turkey advanced serious constitutional and market economic 
reforms, and made significant compromises on the Cyprus question. While it 
is up to the Turks to meet the EU's requirements for accession, many Turks 
believe that some in Europe use the complex EU accession process to mask a 
bias against Turkey.52 
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 Fried astutely recognizes many of the issues in Turkey, including the 
undercurrent of popular nationalism and the identity crisis dominating Turkish 
society. He also provides good analysis of different strains in Turkish political life. 
This political turmoil and the widening boundaries of democratic expression 
have propelled a new nationalism as one factor common across Turkey's 
political spectrum. At the same time, a growing and sophisticated middle class 
also supports the emergence of progressive and liberal ideas in Turkey. The 
ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, with its foundation in Turkey’s 
traditional Islamic culture but also including progressive and liberal elements, 
is one expression of the different strains in Turkish political life today. 
Turkey's secular elite, rooted in the civilian and military bureaucracies that 
play a key role in Turkey's democracy, also reflects these trends. And these 
two diverse political camps are in competition with each other.53 
 However, it is unclear whether the knowledge of the situation really filters into 
the perspective of the State Department. Ball, for example, explained the tensions 
between “Washington” and the “post,” the U.S. Embassy or Consulate on the ground 
in a country. “Sometimes we work with Washington and sometimes against it.”54 He 
went on to explain,  
Washington wants us to implement all the plans for a ‘Muslim’ country, but 
the cookie-cutter approach does not work for Turkey. The model cannot be 
used here. In many Arab countries programs directed towards bringing imams, 
or religious leaders, who have never left their country to the U.S. are effective. 
They are shocked with what they see in America; Muslims aren’t being killed 
in the streets. However, the people who shape public opinion in Ankara are 
not the imams or religious leaders.55 
 
The State Department is so heavily tasked with fighting the war on terror that 
it does not apply a nuanced understanding of Turkey.  
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VI.3.3 Top-Down Approach Applied to Turkey 
One of the issues of public diplomacy in Turkey is the top-down approach by 
Washington. Washington’s influence on the posts increases as the importance of 
public diplomacy grows within the strategy of the Bush administration and the State 
Department. The American voters and Washington expect to see instantaneous 
results. The results-oriented mindset about the immediate and ongoing threat to the 
security of the United States cloud the ability for more skilled direction about Turkey 
from Washington. 
A degree of separation between Washington and the post is intentional. As 
explained in chapter two, the basic idea is that Washington determines the policy and 
message, and the staff in the field decide how to package and communicate it in 
Turkey. The embassies report back to Washington, serving as the eyes and ears on the 
ground. The feedback is ideally incorporated into the policy and the message 
formulated by Washington. Ambassador Wilson, with a leg on both sides of the 
ocean, explained there is a gulf between Washington and the post, but feels it is a 
natural reality. “When you are in Washington, there is a sense that the whole universe 
revolves around you. Washington is focused on working the fundamental policy. Of 
course they are not well-informed about the nuances here.”56  
One of the frequently mentioned complaints at the posts is too much influence 
from Washington. While the Department of State is tasked with implementing the 
priorities of the Administration, the Foreign Service is generally more sensitive to the 
reactions of the world. Dan Sreebny, who oversees all of the Public Affairs of the 
U.S. Mission in Turkey, explained, “the less important a country is, the more 
influence you can have. For example, when I was in London, we knew that we had no 
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influence. The President would talk directly to Blair. Turkey is somewhere in-
between.” He also gave the example of how the backlash to Secretary Rice’s use of 
the word Kurdistan filtered from the Embassy to the Turkey desk in Washington. He 
speculated that Rice probably saw it because she has not used the term again since 
then. 
One of the criticisms of Karen Hughes has been that she runs things with top-
down thinking that works better in a political campaign than foreign affairs.57 She 
tends to begin with a dictate from Washington, with less receptivity of ideas coming 
from the field. A related criticism is that, despite verbalizing intentions to the 
contrary, Hughes has relied mainly on political appointees, showing a lack of trust for 
the Foreign Service veterans. One of her goals at the beginning of her term was “to 
reinvigorate public diplomacy as a vibrant, vital career path.”58 Development of the 
Foreign Service staff has taken a back seat to accomplishing tasks as soon as possible 
with her hand-picked team. 59  
Overall, there is an attitude at the post that Washington tries too much to 
influence public diplomacy in Turkey, without an adequate understanding of the 
complexity of the country.  
 
VI.4 On the Ground in Turkey 
Posts, such as Ankara and Istanbul, are where the rubber meets the road. This 
is where the message and resources supplied by Washington are put into practice to 
try to win the hearts and minds of people.  
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VI.4.1 Perspective at the Post in Turkey  
Just as Washington is partly to blame for not effectively lowering the anti-
Americanism in Turkey, so is the U.S. Mission in Turkey. Washington is too ready to 
see Turkey as a strategic partner against the threat of Islamic terrorism in light of the 
war on terror. While Washington pushes for undue importance given to the Muslim 
identity of Turkey, the Embassy is not acting with enough energy and clarity that 
would come from a better understanding and application of Turkey’s deeper reasons 
for anti-Americanism.  
The post in Turkey has a better understanding of the complexity of the country 
and the identity issues related to anti-Americanism, but is failing to act on the basis of 
this knowledge. The post is critical of the top-down approach of Washington trying to 
push the Mission into the mold the State Department uses for Arab countries, and yet 
the post is guilty of the same one-sided approach in focusing almost exclusively on 
elite secularists. The target audience in Turkey is people who influence public opinion 
such as journalists, policy makers, employees of key think tanks, and university 
professors.  However this has not been balanced to reach non-elites and more 
religious parts of society. 
There is a lack of optimism, energy, and new ideas being devoted by the U.S. 
Mission in Turkey to do anything to alter the current anti-Americanism. Although 
Washington does not have the understanding of Turkey, it does have the energy and 
commitment to make changes. At the Embassy there is a sense that only so much can 
be done by the Mission in the face of the Iraq War. The most notable person to voice 
this sentiment was Ambassador Wilson. “There’s not a lot we can do, except at the 
margins to decrease aggravation. The things we can do to ameliorate anti-
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Americanism are only working around the edges.”60 Sreebny was similarly clear 
about the limitations of public diplomacy. He said that although public diplomacy can 
help improve Turkish-American relations, “I’m realistic that it can’t do everything. 
The most important things are what happen between the two countries and foreign 
policy. We can’t change that.”61 I did not come away from my interview with the top 
public diplomacy officer in Turkey encouraged about the impact that public 
diplomacy could have. I got more of a sense that they are “doing what they can.” 
Ball told me they have reached almost all of the important policy makers in 
Ankara. “It’s just not that big,” he told me about a city of 3 million people with 
continuing record-high anti-Americanism.62 Elizabeth McKay, Cultural Affairs 
Officer, said that they are well funded because of Turkey’s importance. She gave the 
example of the State Department asking them last year specifically if they have under-
funded priorities, and granting money for a few new programs.63 I was overall 
surprised to hear that the post feels it has ample resources. To turn the tide of anti-
Americanism, it seems there needs to be greater creativity and new initiatives that 
stretch the funding available  
 
VI.4.2 Foreign Service Staff  
One of the most significant aspects of public diplomacy on the ground in 
Turkey is the Foreign Service employees, including Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), 
Foreign Service Specialists, and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs). In Turkey, there 
are over 900 people in the Mission, the vast majority located in either Ankara or 
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Istanbul. Included in the numbers are approximately 600 employees at the Embassy in 
Ankara, 250 of whom are Americans. At the U.S. Consulate General there are some 
60 Americans and 200 Turks.64 
 The FSOs typically come on two to three year tours before moving to the next 
assignment. Before coming to Turkey, most receive 10 months of full-time Turkish 
language learning to reach a “working” level.65 The language training allows the staff 
to be able to conduct a basic meeting in Turkish. Maria Snarski, English Language 
Officer at the Embassy and of course experienced in teaching language, admitted her 
displeasure with the quality of the language school in Arlington, Virginia.66 The 
language level is still inadequate for the Foreign Service to completely engage in 
meaningful relationships.  
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 The chart above provides a visual picture of the chain of command and 
departments in public diplomacy throughout Turkey.67 
 The Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) are the vital Turkish employees of the 
U.S. Mission in Turkey. Gollner-Sweet raved about the quality of the FSNs. “We 
have a fabulous Turkish staff. They need very little direction. We haven’t hired 
anyone new because people tend to stay. They have the connections and personalities 
to meet people. They lead out in public diplomacy… I couldn’t imagine life without 
them.”68 Because FSOs turn over regularly and do not typically contact their 
predecessors from five or ten year ago, the FSNs help fill this gap by maintaining 
relationships and tracking changes over time. FSNs also help with the language at 
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meetings and relationships are sometimes built in conjunction with an FSN because of 
the language limitations.  
However, the FSNs are an example of the Embassy’s inadequate connection 
with the more religious parts of society. Schalow shared that all of the FSNs at the 
embassy are secularists. “There are no turbans on the campus. Honestly, if there were, 
I think the FSNs would be uncomfortable. They are used to their own little secular 
world and are still deeply suspicious.”69 Part of the reason for the heavy leaning 
toward secularists is historic. She explained that there was a time when little attention 
was given to Muslims, since for the last 80 years the secularists had all of the power. 
But now the AK Party, with its Islamic ties, controls parliament and its influence is 
unlikely to wane in the near future. Schalow also astutely pointed out that the bias 
towards the secularists filters the information that is received about Turkey.70 If all of 
the FSNs are secularists the perspective received will tend to be one-sided. This is not 
nearly the balance that is needed to have an accurate gauge of opinions in Turkey and 
reach out to all parts of society.  
 
VI.4.3 Security and Facilities 
  One of the challenges to diplomacy is the threat to the well-being of 
Americans serving abroad, presenting a tension between security and accessibility. 
Terrorist threats present a danger to the embassies and consulates of the Unites States 
overseas. A new program will increase funding for the construction of 150 new 
embassies and consulate compounds over a 14-year period from 2005–2018. Since 
2001, the State Department has relocated more than 11,000 government employees to 
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safer facilities. The 2008 Budget supports the construction of 11 new secure 
facilities.71 
One of the notorious public diplomacy issues in Turkey is the U.S. Consulate 
General in Istanbul, the fruit of this commitment to increase security. Many people 
have referred to it as a fortress or “crusader castle.” One scholar wrote, “The new 
consulate looks like a maximum-security prison. All that’s missing is a moat with 
alligators and a sign that says: ‘Attention! You are now approaching a U.S. Consulate. 
Any sudden movement and you will be shot. All visitors welcome.’”72 
In 2003, because it could not meet the heightened security requirements, the 
Consulate was moved from the central location of Beyoğlu in downtown Istanbul to 
Đstinye, about an hour outside of the city. Just months after the move, the British 
Consulate was bombed and the British Consular General was killed. The bombers 
revealed that the U.S. Consulate General would have been included in the attacks had 
it been similiary accessible. “The suspected terrorist captured in Turkey reportedly 
told police his cell's preferred target was the U.S. consulate.”73 With the fatal attacks 
just months after the move, it is difficult to argue with the wisdom in moving to a 
safer location. 
The consulate is indeed an impressive structure, and the security is obvious.74 
It is set atop a high hill with a view of the Bosphorus. From the entry level an elevator 
rises to the main part of the building atop the hill, further bolstering the security. The 
pleasant interior, with lots of windows, modern architecture, and an open courtyard is 
hidden behind the foreboding exterior. 
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Beyond the criticism of the menacing architecure is the loss in accessiblity 
from the move to Đstinye. Gollner-Sweet explained that a meeting in Istanbul requires 
three hours with the transportation and traffic, eliminating any possibility of 
spontaneity. Furthermore, it makes walk-ins very rare; no one wants to make the trip 
to Đstinye.75 They try their best to compensate by renting hotel space in the city center 
to hold functions, but the reality is that a lot more of their work is done by phone and 
email than it was before. Unfortunately, some of the “last three feet” of personal 
contact, to quote Edward R. Murrow’s phrase, has been lost by the move to Đstinye. 
The Mission in Turkey needs to be more innovative in overcoming security concerns 
to cover the “last three feet,” which are the most critical.  
 
VI.4.4 Current Public Diplomacy Programs and Efforts in Turkey 
 The next section will outline the major programs and efforts in U.S. public 
diplomacy in Turkey. Although the range of activities is very broad and there is 
naturally extensive overlap, the main thrust of what is actually being done on the 
ground in public diplomacy can be broken into five categories. The first is press and 
media outreach; second, the many types of exchange programs; third, the English 
language initiatives throughout the country; fourth, the library related efforts; and 
finally, the various cultural events and speakers that are brought to Turkey.  An 
overview of each will be presented as a picture of the work that already exists in 
public diplomacy.  The final chapter makes recommendations for each effort.   
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VI.4.4.1 Press/Media Outreach 
The press and media effort is carried out by the Information Office in both 
Ankara and Istanbul. The basis of this effort is to provide information to the press and 
other parties that are interested in the U.S. policies. Schalow outlined the three main 
tasks.76 First, their mornings are spent reading and listening to the media for the day 
to see if there is anything that requires a response. Schalow explained that working 
with the Turkish media can be a frustration because they do not have the same 
journalistic rules. Because articles are written on one anonymous source or sometimes 
no source at all, conspiracy theories can quickly develop and spread. In the words of 
one Turkish observer, “Over the past few years, Turkish newspapers have been awash 
with theories attributing all problems in the Middle East to the United States.”77  
Second, their afternoons are spent communicating back to the places where 
correction, clarity, or statements are needed from the Embassy. Great effort is 
required to release timely statements to the electronic and print media and proactively 
communicate the U.S. position on events that arise.78 The Information Officers stay 
available to the media and encourage reporters to call to confirm the truth of a story 
before it is printed. The post tries to respond to set the record straight before false 
stories get out of control. “The most important thing is to be a part of the 
conversation,” said Schalow. 
The third part of their role, and the most proactive, is to try to get the word out 
to the public about the good things the Embassy is doing. This is an effort to broaden 
the conversation beyond the handful of issues that dominates coverage about the 
United States.  
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Related to the media-specific efforts are the investments made to foster 
stronger relationships with the press. They try to have lunch with journalists and 
provide education opportunities for the press about topics like journalistic standards. 
Gollner-Sweet explained how especially recently they are trying to go beyond the 
secular media, and relate to the more Islamic media, such as Zaman and Yeni Şafak 
newspapers.79  
A shortcoming in media outreach is the lack of Turkish language ability. 
According to Schalow, there are one or two Americans in the Embassy whose Turkish 
is good enough to be interviewed on television.80 She was emphatic that more Turkish 
would be advantageous in reaching out to the media. Sreebny related the same 
information about Turkish ability, but I was surprised to hear that they rarely put the 
few outstanding Turkish speakers they have on the air, preferring to have the 
Ambassador speak, of course in English.81 While the Turkish diplomatic 
correspondents, many of the bureau chiefs, and a good number of the leading 
columnists speak English, there is still a lot of the media that is difficult to access 
without Turkish. Stephanie Morimura was honest that this causes them to lean more 
toward English speakers within the media.82 
 
VI.4.4.2 Exchange Programs 
There are many different exchange programs, including the Fulbright 
Commission, International Visitor program, and the YES program. According to Seçil 
Yazıcıoğlu, the American Programs Officer at the Fulbright Commission in Ankara, 
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there are about 30 grants awarded per year to American lecturers, senior researchers, 
and students of all levels.83 A budget increase for Turkey by about three times two 
years ago has increased the number of Turkish Fulbrighters from 23 to about 70.84 
Sreebny, who also serves as the Chairman of the Board of the Turkish Fulbright 
Commission, explained that one of the greatest things about Fulbright is that it is not 
just a one-year experience.85 After someone returns home the hope is that he or she 
keeps in touch with American friends and the experience continues. 
According to Gollner-Sweet, the International Visitor (IV) program is “the 
best public diplomacy program we have.”86 The IV program is designed to increase 
the grantee’s understanding of the United States in a certain field or area. The 
program seeks rising stars in their respective fields, such as journalists, heads of 
NGOs, mayors, and academics, who have spent little or no time in the U.S. The IV 
program is organized primarily through the State Department, which works closely 
with each country’s embassy. The program exposes approximately 40 Turks per year 
to the diversity of the United States, both in geography and viewpoints. An example 
of the program is a three-week trip, with time spent on the East and West Coasts of 
the U.S. and a few places in-between. Ball admitted that almost exclusively 
secularists have been sent. Before the AK Party came to power, virtually no one from 
the party had participated in the program, with the important exception of Abdullah 
Gül.87 “But we are doing much better now. Maybe we’re even overcompensating. But 
it is harder to reach out to the Muslims. This is the reality of getting past prejudice of 
both past and present. It will take time.” 
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The YES (Youth Exchange and Study) program is another exchange program 
run out of Washington that brings young people, aged 16-18 and from a variety of 
primarily Muslim countries, including Turkey, to live as a “son” or “daughter” in an 
American family and attend high school for an academic year or semester.88 
According to Serkan Taş, now a volunteer for the program, the program has doubled 
in size since he went in the 2004/2005 school year.89 “The main point of the program 
is to get the students to want to change their community, change things for the better; 
becoming bi-cultural.” He had an amazing experience in a diverse Chicago 
neighborhood, and went back to stay with his host family for another four months 
after the program ended. He now tells his friends that “Americans are not monsters 
and they do not want to go to Iraq to kill people.” 
But the YES program again illuminates Washington and the post’s disjointed 
effort to effectively relate to Turks and lack of outreach to the Islamic community. 
Washington lumps the Turks in with Arab Muslims, not appreciating that Turks are 
different and are not all practicing Muslims. Meanwhile, the Embassy is sending 
almost exclusively secularists.90 Both sides are therefore to blame for Turkish students 
being rubbed the wrong way. Thankfully, the program is good enough that the whole 
experience is not ruined. But it could be much better and more of the Turkish 
population could be reached if both the State Department and post expanded their 
vision.  
Taş relates different instances that irritated him during his particapation with 
YES. He felt pigeon-holed as a Muslim because he is Turkish. He shared the specific 
experience of leaving the “religion” section blank on his application form, because he 
did not want to say he was a Muslim. When he saw his application later in the U.S. he 
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saw that someone had written in big letters in that section “ISLAM.” In addition to 
being upset that someone had written on his application, he was angered by the 
assumption about him beneath the action.  
Another experience was during the YES orientation, when the Turks were 
grouped in with students from Arab countries. During one of the sessions an imam 
came and talked to the students about practical religious concerns that would concern 
many of the Muslims, such as what to do during Ramadan and how to wake up for 
morning namaz prayers without waking one’s host family. Taş was bothered that he 
had to sit through this, and does not think all the Turks should be included. He said 
that probably only one of the 16 Turks cared! This is a clear example of how Turkey 
is grouped in with YES because of its Muslim population, but does not fit in the same 
mold. 
 
VI.4.4.3 English Language Office  
“The English Language Office (ELO) of the Public Affairs section works with 
Turkish universities and with the Turkish Ministry of Education to help improve the 
teaching of English and to disseminate information on American culture and 
institutions.”91 These programs provide a real service and benefit in Turkey where 
English teaching is in high demand. The English is not pushed on people, but offered 
to those who want it. Snarski says that the demand is greater than they can currently 
meet.  
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Even the Ambassador commented on the opportunities English programs give 
Americans to reach new places and create a different image of the U.S.92 Maria 
Snarski, the English Language Officer, explained to me the three big programs that 
they run.93  
 The most exciting and extensive is the English Language Fellow Program that 
places qualified American English teachers, teacher educators, linguists, and other 
language professionals to work in Turkey for a full academic year. The main focus is 
on working at universities to train other teachers how to teach English more 
effectively. For the past two years, Turkey has had ten English Language Fellows, 
making it the largest among the more than 70 participating countries. The ten Fellows 
are scattered throughout Turkey, reaching the eastern parts of the country that few 
other programs do. 
 The second program is the English Language Specialists Program, where 
English Language Teaching experts are brought to Turkey for between two and four 
weeks. Specialists in a variety of fields related to English teaching such as computers 
and curriculum development conduct programs with Turkish educational institutions 
as well as the Ministry of Education. The up to six specialists brought in per year 
allow new institutions to be reached where the Fellows are not. 
 Lastly, the English Access Microscholarship Program is a State Department 
initiative for secondary school students begun in the last three years. The ELO is 
working closely with the Turkish-American Association. Whereas the other programs 
are more focused on training other teachers, English Access Microscholarship 
provides an American-style classroom experience for young students using U.S. 
books and materials.  
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These programs need to be expanded. How much difference are ten English 
Language Fellows going to be able to make in a country of 70 million people? The 
great opportunity that this program provides to send Americans to the eastern parts of 
Turkey needs to be bolstered.  
 
VI.4.4.4 Information Resource Centers, American Corners 
 There have been efforts made by the State Department to replace the 
expensive American libraries of the past, which were potential targets for terrorist 
attacks. Two of the efforts to maintain some of the assets of a library, without the 
same costs and security dangers, are the Information Resource Centers (IRC) and 
American Corners.  
 The IRCs, on-site at both the Embassy and Consulate General, specialize in 
providing information on American political, economic, social and cultural life.94 
Betil Gürün, IRC coordinator, was helpful in using the ample reference collection and 
an extensive online database.95 The IRC is small but efficient. There are several staff, 
mostly former reference librarians from the past American Library in Ankara, who are 
ready to help Turks or Americans with information about the U.S. Unfortunately, few 
people know about the resource. An appointment must be made ahead of time, 
decreasing accessibility.  
 There are four American Corners in Turkey whose goal is to be a partner in 
promoting mutual understanding between the United States and Turkey. Located in 
Gaziantep, Kayseri, Izmir, and Bursa, they are positioned as being cheaper than a full 
library, but still accessible to people. According to Ball, the Americans Corners have 
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not been effective and the funding is being cut.96 Although a good idea, little takes 
place after an opening ceremony where the Ambassador cuts the tape. American 
Corners are also unpopular in a city because of security concerns. Ball gave the 
example of Gaziantep, where the sign was taken down outside of the American 
Corner, so that someone actually has to walk in the building to be able to see the sign.  
 
VI.4.4.5 Cultural Events and Speakers 
The final major thrust of public diplomacy is the cultural events and speakers. 
Relationship-building is included in this category, although it involves most of the 
areas. “Promoting cultural and educational ties with the United States is a major 
responsibility of the Public Affairs sections in Turkey. They work closely with 
Turkish institutions in organizing exchanges, lectures, seminars, workshops, and 
presentations by U.S. academics, specialists, writers and artists.”97 
An example of this effort in action was the 60th Anniversary of the Truman 
Doctrine at the Embassy Residence in March 2007. There was a pleasant reception 
where the Ambassador and his wife and other Embassy staff mingled with the few 
dozen guests from various universities and organizations. An unexciting speech over 
video conference by a professor in Ohio was the main event of a generally enjoyable 
evening. I had the sense that the personal relationships I build with Turks as a student 
are more valuable than a similar group of guests attending an occasional formal event.  
Another event I experienced was a round-table discussion at Bilkent 
University with Nancy McEldowney, Deputy Chief of Mission.98 McEldowney began 
her presentation, “I’m not here to convince or propagandize. I will share ideas and 
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want to have an honest exchange. I welcome alternative views; want to have dialogue 
and learn.” Duygu Sezer, to whom McEldowney referred by name and has met at 
many functions, said afterward that she found McEldowney very knowledgeable and 
effective at talking in a scholarly way. One of the international relations students who 
attended the event gave the following evaluation: 
It was clear that she is an expert on Middle Eastern issues. And she was trying 
to be as sincere as possible. Yet, unfortunately I can’t say that she influenced 
my thought about US-Turkey relations. Don’t get me wrong. I really 
appreciate what she is doing and it would really be very good for US-Turkey 
relations if such ‘moderate’ diplomats work here. But you know—they’re 
diplomats in the end. And they are supposed to not tell every fact, every aspect 
of our relations.99 
 
Although McEldowney was knowledgeable and sincere, the influence from such 
events is not certain.  
According to Ball, political sensitivity restricts the programming they can do. 
He gave the specific example of a program to fly 18 Turkish opinion-influencers onto 
the USS Eisenhower aircraft carrier when it was off the coast of Turkey. While it 
seemed to the embassy like a neat opportunity, the coverage ended up backfiring. In 
TEMPO magazine there was a lengthy article that put a negative spin on why the U.S. 
would invite them to do this, complete with all sorts of conspiracy theories.100 
Programs often do not have the intended influence.  
I saw the evidence of what he told me later that night when I was in the dorm 
room of one of my Turkish friends. By chance, he happened to have the copy of 
TEMPO lying on his desk with the article about the Turks visiting the USS 
Eisenhower. His impression is that America did this to show these important people 
how powerful the U.S. military is. “Everyone already knows this, and a war ship is a 
terrible place to try to be building your relations with Turkey. It comes across like the 
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type of thing the Soviets would have done to try to show their power.” His conclusion 
was that Turks need to be asked whether programs are a good idea because it would 
be obvious to a Turk.101 This is interesting considering that I had just learned that 
more than half of the people working at the embassy are Turkish. Perhaps they are not 
in positions to give enough advice about such programs. New programs need to be 
attempted, but with discernment and as much involvement as possible from Turks 
with different perspectives.  
For the most part, such events are useful in building contacts with Turks and 
also exposing them to American culture. Concerning the question of building 
friendships with Turks, Ball told me,  
There is a fine line, and not just in Turkey. There is reputation of people from 
embassies being snobby, closed off in a bubble. This is true to an extent and it 
needs to be. You have to keep a certain distance. You need to understand the 
local perspective, but not adopt it. You have to keep people at arms length.102  
 
As long as Turks are kept at arms length, so will America be kept at arms length by 
Turks.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
VII.1 Thesis Summary/Theoretical Contributions 
 Public diplomacy was defined in chapter two as the “government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its 
nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
current policies.”1 This definition was placed in the context of traditional diplomacy, 
emphasizing how public diplomacy reaches out to foreign publics, whereas traditional 
diplomacy is primarily government-to-government interaction. It was argued that 
public diplomacy has taken on increasing importance due to the erosion of the state-
centric system and the democratization of technologies. A history of the public 
diplomacy in America was developed, from its origins during the World Wars to the 
hope it provides in the ideological battle after September 11, tracing the theme of 
public diplomacy’s importance being recognized only in the face of a competing 
ideology.  
 In chapter three, I made the theoretical contribution of an anti-Americanism 
framework, by which the anti-Americanism of different countries can be categorized 
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based on the root causes and intensity. The final part of the framework presented a 
way of thinking to analyze the deeper roots of anti-Americanism in a country. The 
reasons for and intensity of anti-Americanism are influenced by the lenses of 1) what 
America is viewed to be and 2) what the beholder itself is. Anti-Americanism varies 
so widely because the actions of the United States are seen through different glasses.  
The lenses of the glasses are the topics of chapters four and five, which are a 
case study analysis of anti-Americanism in Turkey. This framework is used to classify 
the Political strand of anti-Americanism and America increasingly being viewed as a 
Threatening Power in Turkey. The problem of anti-Americanism goes deeper than the 
Iraq War and cursory assessments of reasons for resentment of America. The 
politically based reasons for Turkey’s resentment of America begin with the lens 
based on what America is viewed to be. Chapter four focuses on the exaggerated view 
of American power and untrustworthiness based on a history of Turkish-American 
relations since the end of the Second World War.  
Chapter five begins with the second lens of the glasses based on what Turkey 
itself is. Its Ottoman past, “Sevres phobia,” and sensitivity to its secular and 
homogeneous identity give Turkey a reactionary phobia that influences the way it 
views American behavior. The two lenses are combined to explain the two biggest 
drivers of anti-Americanism in Turkey: feared U.S. support for a Kurdish state and 
U.S. presenting a danger to secularism by backing political Islam as a part of its 
bigger plan for the region. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of how Turkey’s 
view of America as a disruptive force is based mostly on distorted perceptions.  
Chapter six assesses the shortcomings of U.S. public diplomacy, both at the 
State Department level and on the ground at the post in Turkey. These shortcomings 
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come, in part, from not understanding the depth and reasons for anti-Americanism in 
Turkey and from a failure to adjust public diplomacy to the country.  
This final chapter offers recommendations for public diplomacy in Turkey 
based on the type of anti-Americanism, an understanding of the forces driving it, and 
critical analysis of current shortcomings in public diplomacy. The chapter ends with 
conclusions about the findings of this thesis and recommendations for future areas of 
study.  
 
VII.2 Recommendations for Public Diplomacy in Turkey 
Public diplomacy must be done better in order to turn the tide of anti-
Americanism in Turkey. This chapter builds on the critical analysis of the one 
preceding it to make recommendations based on a better understanding of anti-
Americanism in Turkey. Throughout my research, I have learned of the substantial 
efforts in public diplomacy that America is making to strengthen its ties with Turkey. 
In many interviews with Foreign Service Officers in Turkey, I have been impressed 
by the competence and perseverance in representing America with the odds against 
them. All of them know more about public diplomacy than I do, and it is therefore 
with a degree of humility that I make recommendations. But I also believe that I can 
offer an outside perspective, untainted by the way things have always been done. 
While I do not know as much about the Foreign Service, I have spent time in Turkey 
comparable to the people working for the State Department, and more than almost 
everyone in Washington who heavily influence the U.S. Mission in Turkey. 
Additionally, I believe that I have lived more among Turks than most people who are 
determining what should be done in public diplomacy in this country. In the face of 
rampant and ongoing anti-Americanism, it is worth considering making adjustments. 
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Recently, Under Secretary Hughes talked about the need for close evaluation of every 
public diplomacy activity. “What works we will expand and continue. What doesn’t, 
we will change, cancel or improve.”2 My goal is to apply this mentality to an 
evaluation of the efforts in Turkey and to make recommendations of how the public 
diplomacy effort can be bolstered to restore Turkish opinions of the United States.  
 
VII.2.1 Understanding Anti-Americanism in Turkey 
The change in public diplomacy in Turkey needs to begin out of a more 
sincere understanding of how Turkey views the United States. A one-way delivery of 
a pre-made sales-pitch with little or no consideration of the culture, concerns, and 
criticisms of the receiving audience will accomplish little.  
In the job description of a Public Diplomacy Officer there is a strong emphasis 
on understanding, but it is all about getting the foreign public to understand America. 
“Public Diplomacy Officers strive to broaden the understanding of American values 
and concerns…promote U.S. interests overseas…educating foreign cultures about our 
nation.” Public Diplomacy Officers “explain to foreign audiences how American 
history, values, and traditions shape American foreign policy” and “deepen foreign 
understanding of American society.”3 
The U.S. needs to needs to improve in understanding Turkey and helping 
Turks understand America. “What is needed is a deliberate policy to improve mutual 
understanding, in the literal sense of those two words.”4 The United States’ 
understanding of Turkey must go beyond its self-interested view of Turkey as a 
“bridge” to the Middle East or the Muslim world. “Historically and strategically, 
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culturally and commercially, Turkey is the West’s bridge to a more peaceful Middle 
East.”5 Another example of the self-serving American perspective of Turkey 
emphasizes the military value of Turkey based on its geostrategic location. “The 
concept of Turkey as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ was coming into its own.”6 Such 
notions leave a significant gap in understanding of what Turkey is and desires to be. 
“An alliance is far more valuable and effective when it is based not only on perceived 
common interests, important as these may be, but on genuine affinities—a community 
of beliefs and values, particularly concerning social, political, cultural, and economic 
matters.”7 A start for the alliance being placed back on the right track is an 
understanding of the reasons for anti-Americanism and initiating change with a 
reinvigorated public diplomacy. The next five sections outline basic principles that 
should be applied to public diplomacy based on this understanding.  
 
VII.2.1.1 Turkey’s anti-Americanism is Political 
 An understanding of anti-Americanism in Turkey must begin with clarity on 
what it is and what it is not. As explained in chapter four, Turkey fits squarely within 
the Political grouping of the framework presented in the chapter preceding it. 
Although it may at first seem rudimentary, it is vital that this be the starting point 
from which the public diplomacy strategy is built. Conversely, anti-Americanism in 
Turkey has minimal economic or cultural basis. In the famous “SWOT analysis” 
business strategy model, one’s strengths and weaknesses need to be clarified. It will 
serve U.S. public diplomacy to clarify the area of weakness as Political, and build on 
the strengths of Economic and Cultural. The political issues that cause anti-
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Americanism need to be addressed over time, but strengths need to be capitalized 
upon with the appropriate opportunities.   
 The Iraq War and specifically the “Hood Event” have been the two most 
inflammatory events for the sky-rocketing anti-Americanism in Turkey. The damage 
has been done with both. The Hood Event cannot be undone, nor can the 
exaggerations in the media and entertainment industry be negated. Whether the U.S. 
continues to battle in Iraq or withdraws, there is very little hope anti-Americanism 
will decrease in the near future. Although these are vital parts of the rampant anti-
Americanism, they are not the places where America can or should devote effort. 
There are more distorted perceptions and misunderstandings underlying the reasons 
for anti-Americanism than there are deep divisions between the countries. It is 
because of this that public diplomacy is a vital tool for combating anti-Americanism. 
Turks are not going to believe any time soon that the United States was benevolent in 
its 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, Turks are very willing to go on an exchange 
program to live with an American family and discover Americans have benevolent 
qualities. Nor will the shame of the Hood Event be completely forgotten, but it will 
not stop Turks from wanting to do business with Americans.   
Waiting for administration or policy change is looking to false hope and 
passing responsibility. Of course policy matters, but public diplomacy has a vital role 
that can make a difference now. The United States must act out of an understanding of 
the four deeper reasons driving anti-Americanism and thoughtfully engage them with 
the “plain, simple, unvarnished truth.”8 The next four sections outline the driving 
forces of anti-Americanism and the lessons Americans should accordingly take into 
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account in its public diplomacy. These categories focus primarily on the principles 
and mentality, which will then be applied to appropriate actions. 
 
VII.2.1.2 View of the U.S. as “All-Powerful” and Untrustworthy  
 Chapter four developed the second lens of the United States viewed as an 
omnipotent and powerful country that can accomplish whatever it wants. Throughout 
the countries’ relations, the U.S. is viewed as unreliable, in part because it has not 
adequately helped Turkey solve its own problems. Turks largely create this over-
powerful illusion of America, and then fear the illusion they have conjured up.  
 With this understanding of a root cause of anti-Americanism, the United States 
needs to help Turkish people understand that the U.S. is not all-powerful. Nancy 
McEldowney attempted to communicate this idea to Bilkent students, reasoning from 
an academic perspective about a “paradox of power” where “those who need friends 
and allies the most are those who have the most power.”9 She was right to try to break 
down the idea that America is all-powerful, which actually ends up fueling anti-
Americanism when it does not live up to being able to solve all the problems that face 
a country. The U.S. would do well to promote humility and not give the impression it 
is all-capable. Meekness will ultimately be more helpful than an inflated view of 
American influence. 
 America needs to communicate its diversity and heterogeneity and break down 
the image of a unified juggernaut led by a dictator. The reality is an incredibly 
complex mix of opinions, interest groups, checks and balances, and debate within 
America about foreign policy. The U.S. needs to speak with one voice, but also give 
Turks insight that the U.S. is not a country with a grand, perhaps evil, strategy.  
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 America should communicate the ways it has been reliable in the past. 
Although it has not taken action recently against the PKK, the United States has, on 
the whole, been a reliable ally. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid, assisting in the 
arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, and helping Turkey out of its financial 
crisis in 2001 are solid example of U.S. contribution to Turkey’s interests. These areas 
need to be promoted.  
 Lastly, the United States should work to do more to show its human side. 
Aykan Erdemir, professor of sociology, advocated the importance of symbolic politics 
in America’s relating with Turkey. He pointed out that this does not take a lot of 
financial resources, but it does take intellectual resources to determine the important 
symbols.10 The famous example is President Clinton’s visit to Turkey after the 
earthquake in 1999. The photograph of a baby grabbing the president’s nose touched 
Turks as an example of the humanity and compassion of the U.S. This helps break 
down the detrimental larger-than-life view of America. 
 
VII.2.1.3 Turkey’s Reactionary Phobia 
 Chapter five detailed the historical roots of Turkey’s phobia that it is encircled 
and everyone wants to claim its territory. America did nothing to cause this phobia, 
but will fail in relating to Turkey without understanding it. The fear stems from the 
“Sevres phobia” and the threat to the Turkish identity handed down by Atatürk.  
 America needs to appreciate that everything it does will be seen through the 
lens of this phobia. Every statement and every action are viewed under a microscope 
by the Turkish media and public, as if expecting confirmation at every move that the 
United States does, in fact, have the same intentions to divide Turkey. Accordingly, 
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the United States needs to approach everything it does that affects Turkey, especially 
in its public diplomacy, with the question, “How are Turks going to view this through 
their glasses of a reactionary phobia and an all-powerful and untrustworthy United 
States?” In addition to thinking in such a way, the easiest thing to do is to ask Turks 
that represent different perspectives how a specific action would be interpreted by 
Turks. Turks react in emotional, not always rational, ways to insults and perceived 
threats. This should not paralyze Americans from taking action, but with discernment 
that comes from understanding the Turkish perspective, focus on what alleviates fears 
and mistrust rather than what confirms them.  
 Secondly, the United States can more regularly verbalize that it does and will 
defend the territorial integrity of Turkey. Erdemir explains that words mean a great 
deal to Turks and public statements could have a bigger impact than huge programs 
that require vast resources.11 Accordingly, the United States would lose nothing to 
state very clearly, and frequently, that the United States is a strong defender of the 
territorial integrity of Turkey. Words are not enough, but they are important. Instead 
of high-profile mistaken mentions of “Kurdistan” and Turkey as an “Islamic country,” 
the State Department should intentionally strongly assert the defense of the territory 
of its NATO ally. The United States can make simple and true arguments about how 
America benefits from a stable Turkey and does not want to take any of Turkey’s 
land. As much as possible, whenever Turks hear or read statements by the U.S., this 
should be the overwhelming sense.  
 Thirdly, the United States should focus on bolstering the idea that America is 
Turkey’s most dependable ally. Despite the anti-Americanism and the strain in the 
relationship, America is still in consideration as Turkey’s best ally. In the words of 
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Duygu Sezer: “I believe that America is—potentially—Turkey’s best foreign friend.” 
Forty-five percent of the Bilkent students I polled said that “America is Turkey’s most 
important ally.” The United States can encourage this through rhetoric and actions.  
 
VII.2.1.4 Fear of U.S. Support for Kurds 
 The third issue driving anti-Americanism is fear that the United States is 
intentionally or unintentionally going to bring about an independent Kurdish state. As 
developed in chapter five, this issue is seen to threaten the foundation of the 
homogeneous Turkish state established by Atatürk. This issue is seen through the two 
lenses in chapters four and five and discussed above. This is the most outstanding 
focus of the phobia and is coupled with the untrustworthy United States having a 
grand plan for the region that will harm Turkey.  
 First and foremost, the U.S. needs to understand why this issue is so sensitive 
to Turkey and approach it delicately. This begins in the language that is used. 
Secondly, of all the Turks’ demands, the issue of the PKK is where the U.S. should 
take action. Whereas the other issues are ones where the U.S. is trying to 
communicate “we’re not what you think we are; we’re not really doing that,” this is 
an area where the U.S. can strongly come to the support of Turkey. This should be 
balanced with not angering the Kurds, but the U.S. can stand by its acknowledgement 
of the PKK as a terrorist group, as well as defend Turkey’s territorial integrity. As 
explained in chapter five, this is the area where there is the most legitimate grievance 
causing anti-Americanism.  
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VII.2.1.5 Resentment of U.S. Support for Political Islam 
 The second identity issue seen through the glasses is the perceived U.S. 
support to political Islam. As drawn out in chapter five, this is part of a wider 
resistance to the United States’ plan for the Middle East, and therefore ignites anger 
from nearly everyone in Turkey, not just the secularists. The U.S. is believed to be 
supporting political Islam to prove that democracy and a Muslim majority country are 
compatible. The U.S. needs to account for this fear, and position its public diplomacy 
accordingly.  
 First of all, the U.S. needs to understand the nuances of the debate that is 
taking place and the extent to which a significant part of the population really fears 
that the Republic founded by Atatürk is threatened by the AK Party’s rise to power. 
The United States needs to understand that every word it says in support of the 
“democracy” or the “constitutional process” is interpreted by the media and the public 
to back the AKP. Secondly, the United States needs to stay out of the debate. The 
U.S. would do well just to keep quiet and not dabble in the issue or push it one way or 
the other. It is not the role of the U.S. to decide who is right or wrong. Michael Rubin 
vigorously makes a case that “U.S. officials should be patient and do nothing to imply 
endorsement for the AKP, its prime minister, or its ambitions… Washington should 
do nothing to undercut Turkish secularism or downplay the dangers which it faces.”12 
Although Rubin himself is choosing sides, he is right that the U.S. should stay out of 
the debate. The issue is not clear-cut, and the U.S. should not entangle itself.  
 Overall, the U.S. must chart a balanced course in Turkey’s domestic politics. 
Relationships with both strong secularists and supporters of the AKP need to be 
cultivated. Terms such as “secularists” and “supporters of the AKP” or “Islamists” are 
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by their nature generalizations and oversimplifications, but their presence is very real 
in Turkey. Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to steer a steady course of building ties 
and relationships with both.  
 
VII.2.2.1 Public Diplomacy Recommendations based on Understanding 
 To begin, I want to take a step back and ask the question, “If I were put in 
charge of the U.S. Mission to Turkey, what would be my focus? What am I going to 
do with the resources and staff of about 900 people, including more than 300 
Americans and some 600 Turks?” Of course these people are spread thin in a variety 
of positions, including non-political areas such as security and facilities maintenance, 
and relatively few are devoted to public diplomacy, per se. But all of them are part of 
representing America in Turkey and should be committed to fostering a better 
Turkish-American relationship.  
 I would start with trying to shape the overall attitude of everyone on my staff 
to be one of integration into the culture and developing genuine friendships with 
Turks. I would encourage them not to just view Turks as contacts, but to try to learn 
from them, share life with them, and become part of the community. Of course, the 
concern about this from the Foreign Service perspective is that people will “go 
native” and start sympathizing too much with a Turkish perspective.13 While this 
needs to be addressed, I believe that ultimately we need to have enough confidence 
that our Foreign Service staff has conviction about the values of America. As long as 
this remains fundamentally true, is it a problem if Americans do begin to really see 
things from a Turkish point of view? Will these people not be able to more effectively 
communicate back to Washington the way that Turks view the world? Will they not 
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be better able to unite with Turks in thinking about how the rifts in the relationship 
between countries and the animosity throughout the region could be better mitigated? 
This will require an educated staff with a certain level of devotion to America and 
ability to think critically, but I think this exists, and if not, needs to be better 
developed. There can be accountability at work where people can critically discuss 
the input received from friends, which will enable the message to stay consistent and 
not be swayed based on the views of one or a few Turkish friends. 
 After all, people are going to draw their opinion of America just as much, if 
not more, from an American student or tourist in Turkey, as they will from an official 
statement from the Embassy. The Foreign Service should, on the whole, be even 
better and more sophisticated personal representatives of America than the common 
American with whom Turks come in contact.  
 My overall perception from observing and interviewing Foreign Service 
Officers in Turkey is that there is not a culture of whole-hearted friendship-building 
with Turks. Although it is not forbidden to develop relationships with Turks, there 
seems to be an unwritten hesitancy that keeps most people from fully entering into the 
community and keeps most relationships with Turks at the level of contact more than 
friendship. This attitude needs to change.  
 As emphasized above, the strength of the United States right now is the 
cultural propensity for Americans. I have heard more times than I can count while 
living in Turkey, “We hate American policies, but we like Americans.” Gollner-Sweet 
put it well when she said she sees anti-Americanism in the polls but never feels it.14 
Students fill out a survey saying that they are anti-American and even view America 
as the “Source of all Evil” but treat me with warmth, light up when I converse with 
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them in Turkish, and want to visit America.  With this strength, the best and most 
fundamental effort that needs to be made is the development of close personal 
friendships. 
 This recommendation is made with no illusions that it will be a quick-fix for 
Turkish-American relations.  Instead, it is where the process of public diplomacy 
must begin. Just because friendships are formed does not mean that political 
resentment of the U.S. will subside.  However, close personal ties, beginning with the 
Foreign Service staff in Turkey, provide the best chance for American foreign policy 
to receive an honest hearing.  Without a personal connection with an American it is 
easier for most Turks to ignore statements by the U.S. or draw hasty conclusions 
about American intentions based on the lenses through which they see the world.  As 
friends communicate, both are more likely to have an examined and thoughtful 
understanding of each other. As explained in chapter two, the chance for 
misunderstanding is especially high in intercultural communication.  Friendship is a 
great way to begin the process of better communication and understanding that can 
help mitigate anti-Americanism.15  
 
VII.2.2.2 Bottom-up instead of Top-down 
Who knows best the way Turks think, the reasons for anti-Americanism, and 
how to strengthen the ties of friendship? The answer is not Under Secretary Hughes or 
the U.S. State Department. Nor is it even the Foreign Service Officers whose job it is 
to be experts in diplomacy. It is the Turks themselves. This highlights the value of 
Americans having close Turkish friends and Foreign Service Nationals. 
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 As close relationships are built between Americans and Turks, a mutual desire 
for the bridge to strengthen between the two cultures will develop, and even efforts to 
make sense of the issues at the political level that divide the countries. The Foreign 
Service Officer can ask his or her friend: “How do you think we should go about 
reaching your network of relationships to help break down the distorted perceptions 
about America?” That friend will know better than anyone else. Some Turkish friends 
might not feel comfortable involving their own friends, but would still be willing to 
give ideas. Others can become the gate-keeper to his or her whole network of 
relationships. It is not a mystery that relationships are vital in the Turkish culture. If I 
walk past a Turkish stranger on the sidewalk he will not look at me, let alone give a 
greeting. But if I am personally introduced to that same person by a mutual friend, it 
would not be a surprise to be invited to dinner that night. In order to really get deep 
into the culture and reach a wide audience, it has to be done through relational 
networks. A reception at the Embassy Residence to which isolated academics or 
journalists, for example, will come, is not going to diffuse the anti-American 
sentiment that is discussed over çay in every corner café throughout the country.  
Secondly, the Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) are an incredible asset that 
needs to be better utilized. The biggest shortcoming right now, as discussed in chapter 
six, is that all of the FSNs are secularists based on the Embassy’s long connection 
with the secularist elite of Turkey. The same FSNs have been in their positions for 
years, and there is no balance being provided with the addition of new ones who have 
more contact with the AK Party leadership and more conservative part of the society. 
New FSNs who will lead the way in building friendships with people from every 
segment of society need to be brought on board.  
 177 
Another recommendation to counter the top-drown approach from Washington 
is to encourage a culture of teachability, where ideas are absorbed from all of the 
people on the ground in Turkey. I sensed a lack of a learning spirit on how to improve 
public diplomacy in Turkey. In each of the interviews I had at the Embassy, it would 
have meant a lot for someone to ask for my suggestions about what to do to reach out 
better to Turks. While everyone was kind and helpful, I perceived a stagnancy of 
ideas. There needs to be a culture of looking for innovative approaches. This is 
probably influenced as much by the top-down approach from Washington as it is the 
shortcoming of the Embassy in Turkey. At one appearance, the Ambassador skillfully 
led out with questions to “solicit advice” from his mostly Turkish and distinguished 
audience.16 One of the professors there even complimented him on his “preemptive 
strike.” However, it feels like this is more rhetoric than it is sincerity to learn.  
 
VII.2.2.3 A New Approach to Security 
  One of the primary challenges to public diplomacy in Turkey and the world is 
the issue of security. As described in chapter six, the move of the U.S. Consulate 
General from an accessible location in Istanbul to a distant suburb has decreased the 
accessibility and rendered more of the job to telephone and email. This is squandering 
the strength that the United States has in the affection for its people. Americans in 
Turkey are far better able to communicate from “the last three feet” than from over an 
official government broadcast. Relationships need to be in the forefront of the U.S. 
public diplomacy effort in Turkey.  
 My recommendation in regard to security is that the mentality change to 
getting Americans out of the Embassy and Consulate and into the community and 
                                                 
16
 Ambassador Wilson, Bilkent Hotel, February 28, 2007.  
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lives of people as much as possible. Not only is this the most vital part of public 
diplomacy, but in Turkey it also makes sense from a security perspective. I feel safest 
in Turkey when I am among Turkish friends. They have a better sense for potential 
dangers in their own country, and are not going to take me somewhere that might be 
dangerous. I have visited places like Maraş and Antakya in southeastern Turkey with 
friends and never felt the least bit worried. There are probably neighborhoods where a 
blond-haired and blue-eyed American should not go at certain times of day. But when 
I am with a friend, among his own friends and family, there is no safer place.17  
 Embassies and other American outposts are targets. It fits that the political 
symbols would be attacked, whereas it is much less likely in Turkey that the personal 
residence of a U.S. diplomat would be attacked, especially if living among and well 
connected with the Turkish neighbors. 
 Although there are of course many functions that need to be served on 
facilities of an Embassy or Consulate, could more be done to get people out from 
behind desks and into the community? Could the email checking and phone calls be 
kept to the mornings for some of the staff, and the afternoons spent among Turks? 
Instead of employees at the Embassy skimming through online newspapers, what if 
that time was spent out hearing the same news from Turks in the community or at the 
events that are making the news? This is not to say that this is altogether non-existent 
now, but I believe that the level could be increased. In time, I think that the 
maintenance of huge consulates and embassies could be stream-lined and more people 
could be scattered throughout the country.  
                                                 
17
 The possible exception to this is the U.S. Ambassador, who is so high profile that he will remain a 
political target. However, even the Ambassador would be relatively safe if he is in the care of close 
friends whose trust he has won. Nevertheless, this would take a degree of prudence. More generally, 
there can of course be security guidelines for other Foreign Service staff and a degree of common sense 
is needed. If someone were tragically murdered by following this approach, I contest that it would still 
be lower than the likelihood of several people dying in an attack on the Embassy. 
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VII.2.2.4 Foreign Service Officers 
 As Under Secretary Hughes proclaimed as a goal upon taking the helm of U.S. 
public diplomacy, the Foreign Service staff needs to be reinvigorated and trained to be 
more equipped for the challenges they face. 18  
 The first necessary area for development is language. From the highest post all 
the way through the culture of the entire Mission in Turkey, not to mention the world, 
language skills need to be improved. Each word of Turkish I know gives me 
opportunity to relate more meaningfully with every Turk and especially expand the 
number of people with whom I can relate. At Bilkent University, my graduate level 
friends all speak outstanding English. But as soon as I venture beyond this tight group 
of friends or my professors, Turkish becomes vital. For instance, if I go with a friend 
to visit his hometown almost no one in his family speaks English. Neither do most of 
his friends. I am immediately reminded of how much I need to keep learning the 
language to be a part of the culture. I have been in Turkey longer than many of the 
people I talk with at the Embassy. If the majority of the FSOs have Turkish abilities 
somewhat similar to mine, it means that only a very small educated and elite 
population is being directly reached. I find that the language endears one to Turks 
more than probably anything else. Nothing communicates a value for another culture 
more than learning the language. Every effort to speak is appreciated, probably partly 
due to the surprise of an American who is making a sustained effort to learn their 
difficult language. This needs to become less exceptional.  
Practically, the language ability and cultural knowledge of Turkish-Americans 
should be drawn upon. According to a 2005 article in The Geographic Review, about 
                                                 
18
 Hughes, “The Mission of Public Diplomacy,” July 22, 2005. 
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500,000 Turkish-Americans live in America, and Turkish immigration is close to 
4,000 people per year.19 This is a substantial talent pool from which to draw. Just as 
Turkish-Americans are hired by commercial airlines as flight-attendants, they should 
be recruited to represent the U.S. in Turkey. Americans’ language skills should also 
be strengthened by implementing ideas such as language high schools.20 
 Secondly, there needs to be more investment in cultural training, and not just 
language. For the FSOs who do the ten month language program before coming to 
Turkey, there is currently a half-day a week devoted to “area studies.” There are guest 
lecturers and activities that educate the FSOs more about the region than the specific 
country. Kathy Schalow shared, “I’ve done this several times and have always felt 
well to very well briefed on the basic history, politics and culture of the country I'm 
going to.”21 However, others have indicated it is mostly up to the individual to learn 
about the nuances of a country before arrival. Some parts of a culture are best learned 
on the ground and take time, which leads to the next point.  
 Thirdly, and related to the need for both language and cultural understanding, I 
believe that the length of tours to Turkey should be extended to somewhere closer to 
four years, in addition to more repeat tours. This may very well be valid for all 
American public diplomacy, but I have seen it to be the case in Turkey. After almost 
two years in Turkey, I am still making discoveries about the complexity of the 
Turkish identity and mindset. Turkey is not a simple place. If the U.S. is going to 
adjust its public diplomacy to meet the needs in Turkey, it will require people with 
greater understanding and appreciation of the complex Turkish identity. The 
language, addressed above, is also a reason to extend the lengths of tours. Schalow 
                                                 
19
 Ilhan Kaya, “Identity and space: the case of Turkish Americans,” The Geographical Review, July 1, 
2005. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-15890795_ITM 
20
 See Appendix 2 about language high school.  
21
 Kathy Schalow, in email correspondence, May 25, 2007. 
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shared, “I have found in my experience that 3/3 [the required language level] is barely 
enough to survive and it’s only after a few months to a year or so in-country actually 
using the language that one really starts to become comfortable using it.”22 Morimura 
added that although the cultural training she received before coming to Turkey was 
helpful, “it’s hard to internalize the information until you get here and are in the 
middle of it all.”23 Longer tours for the FSOs are even better than more pre-field 
language and cultural training.   
I believe that the short tours also feed a “generic” approach for the Mission 
that does not facilitate a consistently nuanced approach to understanding Turkey. 
Generally speaking, three years ago the staff at the Embassy was completely different 
than it is today. A half or a third of the FSOs have come in the last year. This might be 
fine if the operation is supposed to be uniform at posts throughout the world—but that 
is just the problem! Public diplomacy in Turkey needs to be different than what it 
means even next door in Syria or next door in Bulgaria or next door in Iran, let alone 
what it means to do public diplomacy in a distant country. In essence, this means that 
people can be switched in and out because each Mission is approaching public 
diplomacy in the same way. If public diplomacy in Turkey is being done more or less 
the same as in Mexico and China, Washington surely is failing to distinguish it from 
its Middle Eastern neighbors. 
 
VII.2.3 Specific Recommendations for Public Diplomacy in Turkey 
 After providing principles for public diplomacy in Turkey from an 
understanding of the four issues driving anti-Americanism in Turkey and general 
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 Schalow, in email correspondence, May 25, 2007. 
23
 Stephanie Morimura, in email correspondence, May 27, 2007. 
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thoughts related to a bottom-up approach, a change in the view of security, and FSO 
development, I now close with specific recommendations for the main areas of public 
diplomacy efforts.  
 
VII.2.3.1 Press/Media Outreach 
 The first recommendation is to send a very clear message based on an 
understanding of the way that Turks view the world. The concepts discussed above 
about threats to Turkish identity needs to be incorporated here. Based on this 
understanding, I think the message should be something to this effect:  
Turkey and America are both better off with a close friendship and alliance, 
just as we have had over the past 60 years. We have worked through the 
bumps along the road, which every alliance will have, and come through them 
together. We understand the remarkable forming of the Turkish Republic and 
its founding principles. We are committed to standing by Turkey to preserve 
its territorial integrity, support its fight against terrorism, and see it remain a 
secular republic with respect for faith. We want the same things that Turkey 
wants. We both benefit from a strong Turkey. 
 
 As argued above, America needs to stay out of the debates in Turkey between 
the secularists and more religiously inclined. In public statements the U.S. should stay 
quiet; it only sets itself up for problems. Washington especially needs to get the 
message from the post in Turkey and should not be speaking about Turkey over the 
heads of the Ambassador and the FSOs at the post. One misspoken word by a high-
ranking U.S. State Department official undoes all the efforts to speak and 
communicate the right message carefully from the post for a year. Not living in 
Turkey, it is very difficult for a Secretary of State to grasp the magnitude of a 
misspoken word or term in the minds of Turks. The emphasis should be on consistent 
statements in support of Turkey, rather than picking sides, and reaching out personally 
to the media. As discussed in chapter six, the media outreach must also be balanced to 
reach a wider breadth of Turkish society.  
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VII.2.3.2 Exchange Programs 
As chapter six described, most of the students on exchanges are secularists 
coming from western parts of Turkey. The Turks who go on exchanges, whether it be 
through the Fulbright Commission, International Visitor program, or the YES 
program, need to not feel they are pigeon-holed as Muslims or assumed to have a 
certain level of practice in their faith. For example, at the YES orientation, something 
as simple as making a session with an imam speaking optional will go a long way in 
students returning having felt that the U.S. understands all Turks are not the same.24 
Rather than the program being good despite Turks being grouped in with Arab 
Muslims, Turks can come away feeling like America understands Turkey is unique.  
The programs need to focus on drawing lower-income students from eastern 
Turkey who would not otherwise have the chance to go. There are already an 
estimated 12,000 Turkish students studying in the U.S., most of them from western 
parts of Turkey. If so many Turks are going already, what is the value of the U.S. 
paying huge scholarships to send maybe 150 more? This investment would be better 
justified if there was evidence the program was attracting and enabling a different 
segment of society. 
Thirdly, the students who return need to be tied into a network of alumni to 
help maintain their connection to the U.S.25 This can and should be done especially 
with participants who return from the official exchange programs financed by the 
State Department, but could also be extended beyond to the thousands of Turkish 
students returning from America each year. Some could be connected as volunteers to 
                                                 
24
 This refers specifically back to Serkan Taş’s experience in the YES program described in chapter six.  
25
 This idea came in part from the excitement of Elizabeth McKay to see this happen. Interview with 
the author, May 11, 2007.  
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help welcome American students coming to Turkey. English clubs could be 
established to help the students maintain their English skills. Special events could be 
organized or free tickets given to see American bands that come to Turkey, both to 
help attract the alumni. The alumni network could be attractive to Turkish employers 
and the students who are searching for jobs.  
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, too much of the “exchange” taking 
place is one-way. Other than Fulbright, there are very few large scale programs to 
bring Americans to Turkey. I have experienced how students become the ambassadors 
of America. Living in the dorm with Turkish friends, attending classes, eating meals 
together every day, I am a representative of America. Upon returning to America, I 
can be a voice to help understanding of Turkey. Even just an office in America that 
could help students connect with universities like Bilkent, which are eager to attract 
top American students and will even grant scholarships, would be a positive step.  
  
VII.2.3.3 English Language Office  
The English teaching programs should be expanded.  With English in such 
demand throughout Turkey and an obvious natural asset of America, English 
programs are a perfect way to get more Americans to eastern parts of the country.  
I had an outstanding experience volunteering teaching English through a 
Bilkent-sponsored program at schools in Mamak, a lower-income area of Ankara. 
Many of the students have never been to even Istanbul, just a five-hour bus ride away. 
It is hard to describe the kids’ excitement to have me in their classroom. I am not sure 
how much English they learned from just one morning a week, but I doubt they will 
forget having an American come to their school. The kids crowd around me asking 
for autographs and want to have their pictures taken with me. This is just the type of 
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grass-roots activity that can have an impact on the youth of the country, and can 
stretch the State Department from its traditional weakness in reaching out to youth.  
 
VII.2.3.4 Information Resource Centers, American Corners 
  Public diplomacy efforts need to be focused on going out to Turks, not 
expecting them to come to an “American” location. I feel a cultural difference 
between my Turkish friends and me in their desire to pursue new opportunities or 
information. From my experience, Turks are more likely to sit and drink çay among 
close friends when I am eager to make appointments and meet people outside. In this 
way, it makes more sense to go and meet Turks where they are rather than expecting 
them to come to the Embassy or an American Corner, even if it is downtown. In 
Turkey there is not nearly as much of a cultural pattern of library visits as in America. 
Turks will go to the Embassy if they must for a visa, but are rarely going to stop by 
for information. Additionally, the more the Foreign Service staff is already among 
Turks, instead of going out from the Embassy or Consulate to meet them, the better.  
People are much less likely to stop by an Information Resource Centers or 
American Corner than they are to look at a website for information. A specific idea is 
for the U.S. to encourage a website to which Turks can go for clear and quick access 
to the U.S. position on issues.26 It fits that with the tendency toward conspiracy 
theories, the U.S. should have a place for Turks to have access to facts. The website 
can monitor what the U.S. is actually doing on issues that matter to Turks. This could 
be based in Turkey as a joint venture between NGOs.  
 
                                                 
26
 This idea came out of an interview with Aykan Erdemir.  Interview with the author, May 21, 2007.  
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VII.2.3.5 Cultural Events and Speakers 
In summary, the main part of this effort that needs to be strengthened is the 
relationship building, especially with more parts of society. The typical programs that 
have been established to attract the elite of society need to be balanced with 
innovative ideas to spread a broader net. Sports programs are an example of a new 
initiative to reach out to young people. These are the types of programs that can 
include people from every part of society. Although cultural events cannot accomplish 
everything, the personal connections can help build a foundation on which the 
relationship between Turkey and the U.S. can be improved over time.  
 
VII.3 Findings 
 I found in my research that anti-Americanism is immensely complicated. 
There are deep reasons for anti-Americanism that defy simple explanations or a two 
or three pronged analysis. I found that the Iraq War ignited dormant reasons for anti-
Americanism.  
 I discovered that Turks have an exaggerated view of American power and 
ability to do what it wants in the world. I came to appreciate the incredible weight of 
the actions and even pithy statements made by U.S. officials. I also found that Turkey 
has deep fears and insecurities that influence the way it views the world. As I did my 
case study on Turkey, I realized that a general categorization of anti-Americanism is 
of minimal use in understanding the complexities of anti-Americanism in a specific 
country.  
 As for U.S. public diplomacy, I learned that the State Department sees public 
diplomacy very much through the lens of the war on terror. I discovered an 
underlying tension between the posts and Washington in the way that public 
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diplomacy should be approached. Washington especially, but also the Foreign 
Service, tends to have a generic approach to public diplomacy, with little desire or 
appreciation for why understanding is vital to foster a deeper relationship between 
countries.  
 On the ground at the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, I discovered a slowness to 
respond to the changing dynamics of Turkey, specifically in its traditional relationship 
with the secularist elite. Several years since the AK Party won the elections, the U.S. 
Mission is still only taking small steps to reach out to what has been a vast part of 
Turkey’s population far before the AKP’s ascendancy to power. However, I did 
discover many sincere people and a breadth of strong programs that are in place to 
strengthen relationships between Turkey and the U.S. Finally, I learned that public 
diplomacy is not a quick fix, and nor are the solutions within it simple.   
 
VII.4 Recommendations for Future Study 
 I discovered during the work on my thesis that I set out on a vast subject. I 
realized that I tried to take on three topics that are all extensive: public diplomacy, 
anti-Americanism, and the complexity of Turkey. Some two hundred pages later, It 
would be nice to have the time and space to expound more on each topic, especially 
about anti-Americanism in Turkey.  
 Specifically, I believe that a more detailed study of the segmentation within 
Turkish society and then the varying anti-Americanism within each would be a 
helpful contribution. Related, I think that some very interesting polling could be done 
to assess Turkish demographics and political ideas and the corresponding view of 
America. I was intrigued by the picture that began to take shape based on the results. 
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 I began my research hoping to generalize my findings about the case study in 
Turkey for the U.S. in the Middle East. Throughout the process I realized that Turkey 
alone has plenty of complexity. However, the anti-Americanism framework could be 
applied to case studies of other countries.   
 The non-governmental efforts to strengthen Turkish-American relations would 
be another great place to begin future study. I was only able to touch on this vast 
dimension that has received notice from Ambassador Wilson and the State 
Department. A specific facet of this, which could merit its own study, is the economic 
bonds between the countries and how anti-Americanism has influenced business or 
how business has been a stabilizer in relations.  The U.S. Commercial Service at the 
Embassy in Ankara would be a great place to start.   
 
VII.5 Concluding Remarks 
Turkey and the U.S. would both greatly benefit from a stronger relationship. 
Despite events like the Iraq War, the Hood Event, and high levels of anti-
Americanism, the United States has the ability to be Turkey’s greatest ally as it 
continues to reach for and live up to Atatürk’s vision of a western and modern 
country. For the relationship to improve, people on both sides will have to build on 
the abundant common points and work together to overcome the political 
impediments. U.S. public diplomacy can lead the way in connecting citizens and 
communicating to illuminate the distorted perceptions. The personal ties between the 
countries need to be strengthened, especially when what is happening at a 
governmental level threatens the relationship. 
The U.S. faces an uphill climb in its relations with Turkey, but understanding 
the reasons for anti-Americanism in Turkey and the tools of public diplomacy offer 
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hope.  The future of the relationship ultimately needs to be based on shared interests 
and wise foreign policy by both countries. Despite the high levels of anti-
Americanism, there is little reason to think that the countries are diverging from their 
shared interests. Public diplomacy can help mitigate anti-Americanism during a rocky 
stretch in the countries’ relations and lay the foundation for a strong future.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
Survey about Anti-Americanism in Turkey 
 
1. Do you consider yourself anti-American?   ____ Yes ____ No 
 
2. Approximately what percentage of the Turks you know are anti-American? 
 
____ Less than 10% _____25% ____50% ____75% ____90%+ 
 
3. What is the basic reason for Anti-Americanism in Turkey? (Circle the most 
important. If the others are important, rank all three from 1-3, with 1 being the most 
important) 
 
_______Economic  _______Cultural ______Political  
 
4. Please answer Yes or No to whether you agree with the following statements. 
 
Anti-Americanism in Turkey began after the Iraq War ____ Yes ____ No 
America has historically been an undependable ally  ____ Yes ____ No 
Turkish-American relations are now improving   ____ Yes ____ No 
America is Turkey’s most important ally   ____ Yes ____ No 
I know a lot about America     ____ Yes ____ No 
I would like to visit America     ____ Yes ____ No 
 
5. Which best describes your attitude about America in the world? Please put a mark 
on the spectrum that best fits your opinion. 
 
 
Good    Benign     Disruptive   Threatening  Source of 
Influence   Hegemon     Force   Power  All Evil 
 
 
6.Please check which of the views/issues are influence anti-Americanism in Turkey. 
Circle the top three.  
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____Johnson Letter (1964)  ____ Iraq War (2003)  
____First Gulf War (1991)  ____U.S. not helping with PKK 
____Globalization Backlash  ____Çuval Olayı (July 2003) 
____President Bush   ____ Popularity of Conspiracy Theories 
____U.S. support for Kurds  ____Israel-Palestine issues 
____Anti-West in general  ____Rising Turkish Nationalism 
____Arrogance of U.S.   ____U.S. support for political Islam  
Other(s)____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Optional: What should America do to improve its relations with Turkey? 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
Language High Schools 
 
 
 
An idea to bolster the language resources of the U.S. is to have high schools 
that could focus on one or more languages. There could be entire tracks where 
students could do all of their schooling with two languages. The concept of a bilingual 
school is nothing new, but instead of Spanish, the schools could be in Turkish, Arabic, 
Farsi, and Chinese. If there were even a handful of these schools throughout the 
country, every year 1,000 or more students could graduate high school with a solid 
base in Turkish. To continue Turkish in university would be relatively easy by 
entering related departments, taking Turkish classes, and studying abroad in the 
Middle East. Many of these students would probably want to go in a different 
direction during or after college, but enough would find their best job opportunity 
using Turkish. This would be a primary pool of candidates from which the State 
Department could recruit. These schools could be private or public. The top schools 
would develop the best reputations and perhaps nearly every graduate could get a job 
in the Foreign Service.  
Graduation from one of these institutions would be a huge added credential. 
Many parents would encourage their children to enter such a program because of its 
value to the country and also because it could prepare their child for opportunities in 
the State Department or many other places in the future. If there needs to be additional 
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appeal to make the school more attractive, the State Department could set up a school 
that has competitive entrance requirements, scholarships to university, and a minimal 
pay-back after graduation in the Foreign Service, like the military academies.  
One concern would likely be security. Along with language learning could 
come some uncertainty about links to foreign governments or perhaps even 
sympathies to other countries to the detriment of the U.S. But such concerns should be 
minimal and would need to be guarded against to the extent such things are monitored 
already. Security concerns may exist when someone knows another language or with 
any contact with foreign nationals, but how is someone going to really learn the 
language and culture of another people without rubbing elbows with them? 
If Americans are not beginning to learn Turkish, for example, before the age 
of 23 or once they are established in a career in the Foreign Service, I doubt that any 
amount of work will get the language skills to the level they need to be. The people I 
know in Turkey who speak amazing English, for example, have studied the language 
since at least high school and most did their undergraduate coursework in English.  
Ideas like this one must be taken seriously by the U.S. State Department to 
boost the language and overall effectiveness of its diplomats abroad. The status quo is 
not good enough. Simply paying for more on-the-job language school is not going to 
be adequate to have a vast base of good speakers of the languages of critical 
importance to America.  
 
 
